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When a buyer and a seller meet in the market, both need to decide quantity and price.
However, often they also argue when to transfer the payment. In one extreme, the seller
may demand early payment before delivering the goods. In the other, the buyer can demand
late payment after receiving the products/services. The former is sometimes called cash in
advance, while the latter is called trade credit.
Understanding the use of trade credit is essential because it is one of the main sources of
short-term finance for firms. Additionally, since each trade contract specifies prices, quanti-
ties, and payment delay, the contract is implicitly defining who is responsible for financing
the production and who bears the risk of default, which can itself be a deterrent to trade.
My dissertation aims to study some of the novel factors that shape the use of trade credit
and shed some light on its effects on a firm’s decision to trade.
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The first chapter studies the firm-characteristics that shape the use of trade credit deci-
sions in international trade. Trade credit is widely used in firm-to-firm transactions, domes-
tically and internationally. The literature has found that country-specific features, such as
interest rates, legal institutions, the rule of law, and capital controls, affect the decision to
extend trade credit. The literature has not studied additional features that might explain
the trade credit provision in the international context; it also has not proposed additional
theories.
To fill this gap, I exploit transaction-level data from Chilean customs. This data set,
available for exporters and importers, includes information that describes if a given trans-
action was paid in advance or paid post-shipment (trade credit). Additionally, I merge this
data with firm-level details provided by the Chilean Internal Tax Service.
Using this data, I document new facts. Namely, large firms measured by several metrics
are most likely to use trade credit compared to small firms. Motivated by these facts and to
guide my empirical strategy, I propose a theory for the use of trade credit. The model has
the critical assumption that firms, buyer and seller, may default on their contracts due to
liquidity shocks. Depending on the size of the shock, the firm can deplete all its assets, which
means it will default. This simple assumption will imply that larger firms will be less likely
to default since they have enough assets to absorb the liquidity shock. The predictions of the
model are confirmed using regression analysis; therefore, not only country-specific attributes
but also firm characteristics affect the contract decision: large exporters (importers) are 15%
(40%) more likely to sell (buy) under trade credit compared to small exporters (importers).
I also find that a small exporter matched with a large importer is 3-10% more likely to sell
under trade credit.
In the second chapter, we propose a theory for the use of trade credit that connects
the markup that the exporter charges to the decision of extending trade credit. The key
idea is that under pre-payment, the buyer needs to pay the full amount to the seller before
receiving the goods. This payment requires liquidity equal to the total invoice, which in turn
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corresponds to the production cost plus a markup. In contrast, extending trade credit might
be cheaper since the seller only needs to cover its production costs in advance, which is lower
than the intermediate price due to the presence of markups. If financial intermediation is
costly and the lending interest rate is greater than the deposit rate, then this difference in
liquidity needs between pre-payment and trade credit affects profits, affecting the decision
to provide trade credit.
We test the implications of the theory using Chilean data. First, we construct markup
estimates at the firm-product level, using detailed data on inputs and outputs of Chilean
plants using the methodology developed by De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik
(2016). We then use transaction-level Customs data with information on the payment choice
to test the model’s predictions. We find that trade credit use increases in the markup and
that this effect is larger, the bigger the difference between the buyer’s borrowing rate and
the seller’s deposit rate is.
The final chapter proposes and tests an alternative theory. Trade credit is used as a
quality guarantee. There are two main facts in existing theories that explain the use of trade
credit. First, all these theories focus on explaining the extension of trade credit or not, but
not the length of the contract. Secondly, and most importantly, some empirical evidence
does not speak to these models. Particularly, most of the existing theories conclude that
trade credit is used due to access to cheaper credit or as an enforcement mechanism, then
restricting the credit period, say to 30 days maximum, should not alter those incentives.
However, the finance literature has found that this type of regulation has effects on the
economy. Some authors have found that limiting the trade credit period to 30 days has
positive effects, from the seller’s perspective, through more competition due to the increase
in firm entrance and a decrease in exit rates. However, in the same literature, other papers
have shown that these laws also have adverse effects, namely, a reduction in the likelihood
and volume of trade.
The previous evidence indicates that the length of trade credit is also essential to un-
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derstand the decision and its impact on the firm’s behavior. Following Long, Malitz, and
Ravid (1993), I propose the theory that trade credit serves as a signal for the quality of
the product. In a nutshell, the model assumes that when the quality is not observable, but
verifiable ex-post, trade credit can serve as a signal of the product’s quality. The logic of the
theory is that a buyer will not pay the transaction until she is sure that what she bought is
what was agreed upon. Additionally, in this model, trade credit maturity serves a quality
guarantee. Longer maturities imply that the buyer has more time to verify the contracted
quality. This theory has the main prediction that the provision and maturity of the trade
credit are positively related to the quality of the product.
To test these predictions, I use a data set from the Chilean Customs. This transaction-
level data set has a unique feature: the number of days at which a transaction was paid, on
the addition of the usual measures such as destination, price, and quantity. As for quality
measures, I will follow two strategies. First, I will use an off-the-shelf methodology that infers
quality from prices and quantities, assuming a particular demand elasticity. Secondly, I will
focus my attention on a specific industry, wine. For wine, I web-scrapped information of
ratings, awards, and retail prices under the assumption that this data captures wine quality.
The data confirms the main predictions of the model. I find that high-quality goods are
more likely to be sold under trade credit. Moreover, regarding the other predictions, I find
that high-quality products have 20 more days of trade credit, out of an average of 100 days.
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Chapter 1
Firm Heterogeneity and Trade
Finance. Evidence from Chile
Santiago Andre´s Justel, UCLA
What shapes the use of trade credit in international trade? Most of the literature focuses
on country-specific factors like legal institutions or the rule of law. In this paper, I document
some basic facts about the firm-specific factors that contribute to the use of different payment
contracts. Then I propose a model of heterogeneous firms that speak to these facts. Under
certain assumptions, the model predicts that small firms that export choose prepayment in
greater proportion than large firms. Similarly, small importers will prepay more frequently
than large importers. My empirical results using transaction-level and firm-level data from
Chile support the model predictions.
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1.1 Introduction
Modern trade models, such as Melitz (2003), Krugman (1980), and Eaton and Kortum
(2002) treat international trade as the result of competition among firms over the world,
consumer’s taste for variety and firms’ productivity. Regardless of the microfoundation for
trade, there are three common assumptions of every international trade model. Exporters
sell directly to consumers abroad, transactions (transportation and/or payment) is imme-
diate and perfect financial markets. Reality is more complex than that since exporters sell
to firms abroad, production, transportation, and payment takes time and finally, financial
markets are not perfect. Although papers like Muuˆls (2015) and Manova (2013) from the
empirical perspective and Kohn, Leibovici, and Szkup (2016), Chaney (2016), and Leibovici
(2015) from the theoretical side, deal with trade models in an environment with financial re-
strictions, the most natural financial restriction for exporters is the fact that production and
shipment takes time, therefore exporter and importer must agree upon payment conditions.
In particular, they can agree on payment before shipment (Cash in Advance), payment after
arrival (Open Account) or they can agree through some bank document as payment guar-
antee (Letter Credit).1 Each choice leads to additional problems, related to risk sharing and
working capital requirements.
Recent papers have worked on this idea, most notably Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), Antras
and Foley (2015), and Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer (2015), although these papers mostly
rely on indirect measures of international trade credit and its effects or trade credit data
for a single firm, they conclude that country-specific institutional factors, like rule of law,
availability of credit or contract enforceability shape the payment contract that the exporter
chooses.
My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, theoretically, I propose a simple trade
credit model with firm heterogeneity. The model relies on two main assumptions. First,
1There are also two-part contracts, but in the data Cash in Advance, Open account and Letter Credit
are the main ones.
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firms can default on their obligations and the probability of default is negatively related to
their size. Secondly, in order to pay in advance, or pay for working capital in the case of
trade credit, a firm needs to borrow funds facing a similar default risk. So there will be
two main forces driving the exporter’s trade credit decision: importer’s size will affect the
default probability and the exporter’s size will impact interest rate she faces.
The second contribution of the paper is that I document and test new facts related
to the use of trade credit, focusing on firm heterogeneity and dynamics. In particular,
under reasonable assumptions, the model implies that size of the firm affects the payment
contract, namely, small exporters are more likely to demand prepayment compared to large
firms, whereas small importers are more likely to pay in advanced compared to large ones.
Moreover, I can go one step further and study exporter-importer match characteristics that
shape the use of trade credit. In particular, the model implies that small exporters matched
with large importers are less likely to sell under prepayment. Also, the model predicts
that prices and the total value of the transaction will be lower under prepayment. Using
transaction and firm-level data from Chile, I find empirical support for these predictions. In
particular, small exporters are 20-30% more likely to sell through prepayment compared to
large firms, also small importers are 50-60% more likely to buy prepaying compared to large
importers. Moreover, small exporters matched with large importers are 5-13% more likely
to sell through post-payment. Transfers and prices are 5% lower under payment in advance
than under post payment.2
Additionally, the model will have something to say about the dynamics of contract choice,
price and quantities over time. Under particular assumptions, the model predicts that pre-
payment choice decreases with the tenure of the relationship. Similarly, prices (quantities)
decrease (increases) with the age of the relationship. The empirical results also confirm these
predictions. Likelihood of a transaction being prepaid is between 2 to 9% lower for a firm
with a relationship tenure of 5 years compared to a new exporter, prices decrease between 5
2This is an implicit annual interest rate of 20%, assuming that post-payment transactions are paid in 3
months
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and 10% for a 5-year relationship.
Similar to this paper, Ahn (2011) and Demir and Javorcik (2018) use transaction-level
data for a country to study trade credit. While the former focuses on the institutional
factors that affect trade credit, in this case, capital controls. The latter studies how trade
liberalization and competition shape trade finance terms. Close to this paper is Garc´ıa-
Mar´ın, Justel, and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2019). In this paper, the authors propose and test
a theory that links the markups that the producer charges with the trade credit provision.
The idea is that in the presence of markups and costly financial intermediation, the seller
might find it optimal to extend trade credit to reduce the total financial costs. Although
their work and this paper are similar, I focus my attention on characterizing and explaining
both buyer (importer) and seller(exporter) behavior. Also, my model relies heavily on the
risk dimension inherent in the provision of trade credit, and not so much in the markup
dimension, although my model includes it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the data and
shows some motivating facts. In section 3, I provide a stylized trade credit model. Section
4 presents the predictions of the model and in section 5 I test these predictions. Section
6, introduces dynamics into the model, its corresponding predictions, and empirical results.
The final section presents conclusions and future agenda.
1.2 Definitions and Data
1.2.1 Payment contracts
In international trade, there are mainly four ways of paying a given transaction. Payment
after shipment/arrival, which implies the exporter is giving credit to the importer, this is
referred to Open Account (OA). The other extreme is the case where the importer pays in
advance, which is known in the literature as Cash in Advance (CIA). In the middle, banks
can intermediate through documentation that acts as a payment guarantee. One type of
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mechanism is called, Letter of Credit (LC), that is an arrangement where an issuing bank
(usually importer’s bank) unconditionally guarantees to pay the exporter’s bank when the
goods are delivered. Alternatively, there is the Documentary Collection (DC), which is very
similar to the letter of credit, but without any guarantee. Figure 3.7 summarizes the types
of contracts and their relationship with risk.
Figure 1.1: Payment methods and risk
To study these contracts, I use transaction-level data from the Chilean customs from 2003-
2015. This dataset includes the firm’s tax number, 8-digit HS product code, destination and,
most importantly, a variable that describes how the transaction (export/import) was paid.
In particular, if it was paid in advance (CIA), paid post-shipment (OA) or with some bank
documentation (LC/DC). Two important remarks. First, I cannot separate DC and LC,
since both are in the same category in the data. Secondly, and more importantly, although
there is the possibility of two-part contracts, e.g. 20% paid in advance and 80% paid after
arrival, in the data these arrangements are minimal,3 so I will focus my attention on the
standard methods of payment.
3Just to give a sense of the how small are these two-part contracts, on average 0.2% and 0.7% of exports
and imports respectively were sold under these contracts
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1.2.2 Aggregate facts
I present some facts at the aggregate level. In the next section, I will focus on firm
heterogeneity.. Table 1.1 shows the shares of each contract counting just transactions or
weighting them by value.
Table 1.1: Shares by type of contract. Sample: 2003-2015
Exports Imports
CIA DC/LC OA CIA DC/LC OA
Transaction 7.3 3.0 87.0 21.7 7.1 68.8
Value 2.7 12.4 84.7 12.6 9.8 77.0
No Mining
Transaction 7.3 2.8 87.1 21.8 7.1 68.7
Value 4.1 8.1 87.3 12.8 10.4 76.3
Clearly, OA is the predominant type of payment for exporters and importers, even if
exclude the mining sector in Chile (that represents 40% of the value of exports), it is the
case that, in general, exporters tend to give credit and importers tend to receive credit.
Table 2 presents some additional statistics from the data.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Exporters Importers
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Firms per year 7525 6743 8125 34544 27022 40881
Destinations per firm per year 12.45 1 77 6.91 1 86
Transactions per firm per year 76.98 1 22928 75.26 1 393046
1.2.3 Firm-specific facts
In this section, I present the main motivation of this paper, namely, firm-specific facts
regarding trade finance. To study this, I merge the Customs data with firm-level information
from the Chilean Tax Service (SII). This dataset goes from 2005 to 2015 and includes firm-
specific information like industry, number of workers, sales bracket and equity.
Fact: Small exporters/importers choose CIA contracts more than larger firms.
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Figure 1.2 and 1.3 show this fact. I measure size as total annual sales4
Figure 1.2: Exports share. Size measured as revenue. PST=OA+LC/DC
Figure 1.3: Imports share. Size measured as revenue. PST=OA+LC/DC
This fact is very robust to the use of other metrics for size such as the number of workers,
total equity, total exports/imports. In Appendix A, I show similar graphs for alternative
metrics of size and productivity. The Chilean IRS does not report total sales publicly, but
they do report if a particular firm belongs to a sales bracket, with 13 brackets in total. Figure
1.4 shows the share of CIA used in each category.
Additional evidence can be found in surveys like the Small Business Exporting Survey5
indicates that one of the main challenges when selling goods abroad is the risk of not being
paid. Moreover to tackle this issue exporters demand prepayment. In summary, evidence
points out that size plays an important role in the decision of trade credit.
4Micro corresponds to total annual sales less than $100000, Small less than $1000000 and Medium less
than $4000000
5See the link http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Export-Survey-2016-Final.pdf
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Figure 1.4: CIA share
1.3 Model
Motivated by these facts, I introduce a partial equilibrium model of international trade
with trade finance similar to Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Antras and Foley (2015).
1.3.1 Environment
I consider d = 1, 2..., D countries. Each country is populated by Ld agents with identical
preferences. Finally, each economy has two types of risk neutral firms: producers, who can
produce, sell domestically and abroad and importers, who buy from foreign exporters and
sell domestically. Exported goods take one period to arrive at the destination. Finally, there
is limited commitment. In particular, for simplicity I will assume that exporters always will
honor their contracts to importers, importers may default on theirs.6 Having said that, both
importers and exporters may default on their banks.
1.3.2 Preferences
Each consumer has preference CES preferences over a continuum of goods.
6This is to keep notation and results clean, I can assume, as in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Antras and
Foley (2015), that both exporter and importers can default on their contracts. Assuming this will modify
slightly the implications of the model.
8
Q =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
,
Given a domestic variety ω, this implies the following domestic and foreign demand
curves:
qdi (ω) =
(p(ω)
Pi
)−σ Ii
Pi
(1.1)
qfij(ω) =
(p(ω)
Pj
)−σ Ij
Pj
, (1.2)
Where Ii represents the income of country i. Consumers also supply one unit of labor
inelastically.
1.3.3 Technology and trade
Producers
Without loss of generality, I will focus the analysis on one country, that I will call Home
h, and its exporters (and importers) who sell/buy to country j. As in Krugman (1980) and
Melitz (2003), each producer is a monopolist for particular variety. To access the foreign
market they need to pay a fixed cost F each period. Each producer, indexed by f , face a firm-
specific constant marginal cost c to produce drawn from a distribution H(c) with support
[0,∞]. Marginal cost is drawn at entry and is fixed over time. Additionally, whenever a
producer asks for a credit, they will face a cost shock λ next period. These shocks are i.i.d.
and drawn from a commonly known distribution F (λ). I will assume that the expected value
of this shock is zero. This shock will play a role in the default decision of the firm.
Although I will not focus on them, foreign producers face a similar problem.
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Foreign Importers
Home producers cannot access directly the final consumer abroad, so they have to meet
a foreign importer in the foreign country in order to export. These importers are basically
retailers, they buy from abroad and sell domestically. Similarly, importers will face an i.i.d.
cost shock λ∗ drawn from a publicly known distribution G(λ∗) with an expected value of zero.
This shock will matter whenever the importer has an obligation to a bank or an exporter.
Domestic importers also face a similar problem.
1.3.4 Trade Finance
Contract
Because of the time delay and the potential default on a credit, once home exporter and
foreign importer are matched they must decide quantities, total payment, and the particular
contract. Following the presented evidence I will focus on the two extremes of the trade
credit. There will be two available contracts: CIA contract in which, the importer pays
in advance the agreed transfer (TCIA) for which he must take a loan, the exporter then
produces and ships the contracted quantity of the good (qCIA), product arrives next period,
revenues are realized, cost shock λ∗ is realized and importer repays loan back if possible
given the shock.7 If the shock is large enough, the importer will not be able to pay the loan
back. Another option will be the OA contract, in this case, the exporter will produce and
ship and quantity qOA of the good, incurring in the corresponding costs. In order to pay for
these costs, the exporter must take a loan. Next period, the importer receives the goods,
revenues are realized, shock λ∗ is observed, then conditional on this shock and revenues, the
importer will honor the contract and pay TOA. In this case, exporter receives the transfer,
but she will also face a shock λ, that will affect the probability of paying the loan back. If
the importer does not pay back, the exporter may still pay back the loan with own funds.
7This shock is akin to a negative demand shock.
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Exporter and importer have wealth N and N∗ respectively that can potentially be used
to pay back a loan or trade credit if needed.
To summarize, the timing is:
1. Unmatched Exp and Imp are matched with prob. s.
2. Cost c, income Ij, distributions F and G, wealth N and N
∗ are observed. Exp pays
cost F if (expected) profits> 0.
3. Exp offers one spot contract from {qc, Tc}c={CIA,OA}
4. Imp accepts or rejects contract c.
5.a If c = CIA, Imp pays TCIA with a loan from a bank with an interest rate of r∗, Exp
produces qCIA, product arrives next period, Imp sells goods, revenues R and shock λ∗
are realized and importer pays the loan back with probability:
θ∗CIA = P (R− (1 + r∗)TCIA +N∗ > λ∗) (1.3)
5.b Exp produces qOA, paying the corresponding costs with a loan from a bank with an
interest rate r. Product arrives next period, Imp sells goods, revenues R and shock λ∗
are realized and with prob θ∗OA = P (R− TCIA +N∗ > λ∗) Imp pays TOA.
6.b Regardless if the importer paid, Exp faces a shock λ. Then, exporter will payback with
probability:
θOA = θ
∗
OAP (T
OA− (1 + r)cqOA +N > λ) + (1− θ∗OA)P (−(1 + r)cqOA +N > λ), (1.4)
where θ∗OA is defined by:
θ∗OA = P (R− TOA +N∗ > λ∗)
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One of the key aspects of the model is the introduction of these cost shocks, which make
the default probability to exporters or to banks a decreasing function of exporter size N or
importer size N∗. Moreover, as I will show, because of perfect competition in the banking
sector, interest rate r and r∗ will also be affected by size.
1.3.5 Profit Maximization
Domestic Profits
Since in the domestic market there is no lag nor frictions, the profit maximization problem
is standard. The firm solves:
max
p
pq − cq
s.t. q = p−σP σ−1i Ii
which implies:
p(c) =
σ
σ − 1c (1.5)
pidi (c) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1c
)1−σ
P σ−1i Ii (1.6)
Since I am mainly interested in international trade and, as stated, there are no frictions
in the domestic market, I will not further analyze these profits.
Foreign Profits
For generality, I will assume that when exporter and importer decide quantities and
transfers in each contract, they do it through Nash bargaining.8 Let me denote as β the
8Bernard and Dhingra (2015) assume something similar, claiming that the ability to reject the proposed
contract enables a firm to extract some of the surplus. Moreover, this bilateral negotiation avoids double
marginalization.
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bargaining power of the exporter.
CIA Contracts
In a prepayment contract, the importer must ask for a loan to a bank to pay the transfer
TCIA. For any foreign competitive bank, the return for each dollar loaned must be equal to
the risk-free interest rate, using (1.3) we can define the interest rate r∗ as:
1 + ρ∗ = θ∗CIA(1 + r
∗), (1.7)
where ρ∗ is the risk-free interest rate abroad. With that, discounted profits of an importer
before the cost shock λ∗ are:
piCIAImp =
pq
1 + r∗
− TCIA (1.8)
The profits for the exporter are straightforward:
piCIAExp = T
CIA − cqCIA (1.9)
So, the Nash bargaining problem is:
max
T
[
piCIAExp
]β [
piCIAImp
]1−β
Then exporter chooses q s.t.
max
q
TCIA(p, q)− cq
s.t. q =
( p
Pj
)−σ Ij
Pj
, (3) and (7)
where TCIA(p, q) is the solution from the Nash bargaining.
This problem can be solved using backward induction and the fact that Nash bargaining
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implies a surplus sharing rule, thus respective discounted profits can be redefined as:
piCIAExp = βS
CIA (1.10)
piCIAImp = (1− β)SCIA, (1.11)
where SCIA ≡ pq
1+r∗ − cq is the total surplus of the transaction. Moreover, using (3) and (7)
and the definition of profits, we can define SCIA as the solution of:
SCIA = max
q
θ∗CIA
1 + ρ∗
pq − cq (1.12)
s.t. q =
( p
Pj
)−σ Ij
Pj
θ∗CIA = G
(
(1− β)SCIA1 + ρ
∗
θ∗CIA
+N∗
)
Where the last equality comes from the fact that the probability of honoring the contract
is defined by the probability that next period’s profits ((1 + r∗)piCIAImp ) plus the assets of the
importer must be greater than the shock. So, the CIA contract is defined by qCIA as the arg
max of the surplus and the transfer TCIA = βSCIA + cqCIA.
OA Contracts
In this case, the exporter needs a loan to pay for the working capital. Since domestic banks
are also competitive, using (1.4) we can define the interest rate r as:
1 + ρ = θOA(1 + r), (1.13)
where, ρ is the domestic risk-free interest rate. Now, we can express future profits for
importer before the shock as:
piOAImp = pq − T (1.14)
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Similarly, expected (discounted) profits for the exporter are given by:
E(piOAExp) =
θ∗OA
1 + r
T − cq (1.15)
Notice, that given the structure, the exporter must take into account the possibility of the
importer defaulting on the trade credit. Then, Nash bargaining problem is:
max
T
[
E(piOAExp)
]β [
piOAImp
]1−β
Then producer chooses q
max
q
θ∗OA
1 + r
TOA(p, q)− cq
s.t. q =
( p
Pj
)−σ Ij
Pj
, (4) and (13)
where TOA(p, q) is the solution from Nash bargaining. Similarly as before, sharing rule
applies, then, with a slight abuse of notation, discounted profits for each agent are:
piOAExp = βS
OA (1.16)
piOAImp = (1− β)SOA, (1.17)
where SOA ≡ θ∗OA
1+r
pq − cq is the total expected surplus of the transaction. Finally, using
analog expressions that in the CIA contract case, I can define SOA as the solution of:
SOA = max
q
θ∗OAθOA
1 + ρ
pq − cq (1.18)
s.t. q =
( p
Pj
)−σ Ij
Pj
θ∗OA = G
(
(1− β)SOA 1 + ρ
θ∗OAθOA
+N∗
)
θOA = θ
∗
OAF
(
(βSOA + cqOA)
1 + ρ
θ∗OAθOA
− 1 + ρ
θOA
cqOA +N
)
+ (1− θ∗OA)F
(
− 1 + ρ
θOA
cqOA +N
)
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As in the CIA contract, the third equation is the probability of the importer honoring the
contract and is related to the probability of future profits and assets being greater than the
shock. In a similar fashion, the last equation defines the producer’s probability of paying
back to the bank, the first part corresponds to the profits when importer pays back the
transfer and the second part when importer defaults. Then, the OA contract is defined by
qOA as the maximizer of the problem above and the transfer TOA = (βSOA + cqOA) 1+ρ
θ∗OAθOA
.
Notice that if β = 1, TOA is equal to the total revenue and if β = 0, TOA is such that the
expected transfer is equal to total cost.
1.3.6 Contract choice and entry to export
Contract choice
To analyze the contract decision exporters need to compare profits between both options.
The contract choice is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If SCIA ≥ SOA, CIA contract will be used. Equivalently, CIA contract will
be preferred if
1
1 + r∗
≥ θ
∗
OA
1 + r
,
in any other case, OA contract will be used.
Proof. Given the structure, the contract choice depends on the profits of the exporter and
because of surplus sharing rule, comparing profits is equivalent to compare SCIA and SOA.
As for the second part of the proposition, the result comes directly as an application of the
envelope theorem.
This result is similar to the one obtained by Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Antras and
Foley (2015), the main difference is that default probabilities and interest rates are endoge-
nous and depend on producer/importer size, N and N∗ respectively. So the condition to use
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trade credit in equilibrium is:
1
1 + r∗(N∗)
<
θ∗OA(N,N
∗)
1 + r(N,N∗)
Because under CIA has no default risk for the exporter, CIA will always be used, as
opposed to OA. The following proposition describes further this idea
Proposition 2. If ρ∗ < ρ, CIA will be used always regardless of the firm size. Alternatively,
if ρ∗ > ρ, for sufficiently large exporter and importer, OA will be preferred.
Proof. It is easy to see that if N and N∗ are large enough, default probabilities for both
exporter and importer are close to zero, regardless of the contract. Equivalently
θOA(N,N
∗), θ∗OA(N,N
∗), θ∗CIA(N
∗) ≈ 1
This, in turn, implies that
r∗(N∗) ≈ ρ∗ and r(N,N∗) ≈ ρ.
Then, using condition from Proposition 1, this implies that large firms will use OA contracts
if
1
1 + ρ∗
<
1
1 + ρ
⇐⇒ ρ∗ > ρ
The intuition is clear if credit is cheaper abroad than locally, the exporter will prefer to
ask for prepayment, regardless of his size, since it is cheaper for an importer to ask for credit
than for an exporter, once we take into account the default probability of the importer. So,
at its core, in this model, the decision between prepayment and trade credit depends mainly
on the interest rate differential.
For example, assuming ρ∗ > ρ, figure 1.5 shows the contract choice as a function of
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exporter and importer size and it is the first testable prediction of the model, the relationship
between size and contract choice.
Figure 1.5: Policy function
Entry to export
Defining the profits of an exporter with size N when matched with an importer with size
N∗ as
piExp(N,N
∗) ≡ max{piCIAExp (N∗), E[piOAExp(N,N∗)]},
The exporter will accept the match if:
piExp(N,N
∗) ≥ F (1.19)
Assuming that OA contracts are used, depending on the size of the fixed cost F , there will
be three cases: 1) For small F , only CIA contracts will be affected, so exporters will not sell
when matched with very small importers; 2) As F increases, small exporters matched with
large importers will choose CIA, otherwise they will either choose OA or not be matched
and 3) For F large enough, exporters and importers will only choose OA when they are big
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enough, otherwise will not trade. Figure 1.6 describes graphically this result.
Figure 1.6: Policy function for different values of fixed cost
Note: Upper left panel: small F . Upper right panel: intermediate value of F . Bottom panel: large F . Blue
line represents the decision line between OA and CIA that is independent of the value of F
An alternative interpretation of the bottom panel of figure 1.6 is that in absence of
CIA contracts, meaning exports can only be done through OA, fewer transactions will be
conducted overall. So, CIA contracts enable part of the international trade that otherwise
would be impossible. Figure 1.7 shows how the decision rules will change if transactions
were conducted only under OA. The red region is the trade loss if CIA is not allowed.
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Figure 1.7: Policy function for different values of fixed cost
Note: Red region is the trade loss. Blue region corresponds to a region where transactions previously were
paid under CIA and now are OA.
This conclusion is similar to the one obtained by Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer (2015),
where they show that producers that transact under CIA are more likely to export.
1.4 Predictions
In this section, based on the proposed model, I formulate a set of testable predictions re-
lating contract choice and size and the relationship between total transfer/price and contract
choice.
Proposition 3. If ρ∗ > ρ.
1. Likelihood of a transaction being under OA increases with exporter size.
2. Likelihood of a transaction being under OA increases with importer size.
3. Small exporters matched with large importers are more likely to sell under OA.
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Proof. For an exporter to be indifferent between OA and CIA contract it must be the case
that SCIA = SOA or equivalently:
θ∗CIA(N
∗)
1 + ρ∗
=
θ∗OA(N,N
∗)θOA(N,N∗)
1 + ρ
(1.20)
Then the decision boundary between OA and CIA is given by the pair (N,N∗) such that
solves the previous equation. It is easy to check that at the boundary, θ∗CIA = θ
∗
OA, so the
previous condition can be defined as the pair (N,N∗) that solves:
1 + ρ
1 + ρ∗
= θOA(N,N
∗) (1.21)
Notice, as before, that this solution exists as long as ρ∗ > ρ. For 1) keeping N∗ constant,
if N increases 1+ρ
1+ρ∗ < θOA(N,N
∗) then OA will be preferred, so larger exporters are more
likely to choose OA contracts. As for 2), up to a first order (ignoring surplus changes), a
small change in N∗ for a given N¯ at the decision boundary implies that the LHS of (20)
changes by:
θ∗
′
CIA(N
∗)
1 + ρ∗
=
g
(
(1− β)SCIA 1+ρ∗
θ∗CIA
+N∗
)
1 + ρ∗
,
where g ≡ G′. Similarly, the direct effect of a change in N∗ in the RHS of (20) is:
∂
∂N∗
[
θ∗
′
OA(N¯ ,N
∗)θOA
1 + ρ
]
=
g
(
(1− β)SOA 1+ρ
θ∗OAθOA
+N∗
)
1 + ρ
[θOA + θ
∗
OAK] ,
where K = F
(
(βSOA + cqOA) 1+ρ
θ∗OAθOA
− 1+ρ
θOA
cqOA + N¯
)
− F
(
− 1+ρ
θOA
cqOA + N¯
)
, clearly
K > 0. Once again, at the border, surpluses are equal, (20) and (21) still hold, then:
∂
∂N∗
[
θ∗
′
OA(N
∗)θOA
1 + ρ
]
− θ
∗′
CIA(N
∗)
1 + ρ∗
> 0
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This implies that at the decision border, if N∗ increases, up to a first order, RHS of (21)
increases faster than the LHS, this means that if a producer is indifferent between CIA and
OA, when size of the importer increases, the exporter will prefer OA over CIA because SOA
increases more than SCIA. Finally, for 3), since at the border θOA(N,N
∗) is increasing in
both arguments, it must be the case that the policy function N∗(N) obtained from (21) is
decreasing in N , which in turn implies that small producers matched with large importers
will prefer OA.
Proposition 3 is the first testable prediction that relates to size and contract choice.
According to the model, there is a negative relationship between size and the use of CIA,
this result contrasts with the one found by Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer (2015) where they
find that CIA is positively related to size. The authors argue that this is due to bargaining
power, although they do not measure directly trade finance.
Additionally, the model has predictions regarding prices and transfers.
Proposition 4. If ρ∗ > ρ, for a given producer selling to or buying from a firm in country j
1. Conditional on q, TOA > TCIA.
2. Conditional on q, unit value, T
q
, under OA is greater than under CIA.
The proof of this proposition can be done easily just comparing the expressions of T
for each contract and including the condition that quantities under both contracts are the
same. The intuition is as follows since OA contract implies receiving the transfer next
period with default risk, TOA must be larger than TCIA. The second part of the proposition
is straightforward using the same comparison as for 1) and dividing by q. This is saying that
prices adjust for risk and interest rates, thus pOA > pCIA
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1.5 Empirical tests
1.5.1 Size and payment contract
To test the predictions 1 and 2 from Proposition 3, I will estimate the following equation
I(CIAfdpt = 1) = βYft + µdt + γit + εfpdt (1.22)
where the LHS is an indicator equal to 1 if transaction from a firm f to/from destination d
of a product p at year t. Yft is a measure of size/productivity, µdt and γit are fixed effects
at destination× year and industry × year respectively.
Figure 1.8 shows the result when I ran the regression (1.22) using the actual 13 categories
of size given by the Chilean Tax Service (expressed as the midpoint for the tax bracket in
US dollars).
Figure 1.8: Likelihood of CIA over size
Table 1.3 shows estimations of equation (1.22) for different measures of size and pro-
ductivity for exports. The last column corresponds to a subsample of firms matched to the
Manufacturing Survey (ENIA) from 2003 to 2007. In this sample, I can compute productiv-
ity using the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). As it can be seen, small(less
productive) firms are more likely to sell under CIA.
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Table 1.3: Exports data. Sample 2005-2015. CIA v/s OA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Micro 0.222***
(0.0458)
Small 0.116***
(0.0397)
Medium 0.0499***
(0.0120)
log(Emp) -0.00887*
(0.00502)
log(Equity) -0.0136**
(0.00552)
log(tot Exp) -0.0213***
(0.00569)
log(Exp/Emp) -0.0135***
(0.00319)
Age -0.00258***
(0.000852)
log(z) -0.0148***
(0.00441)
Observations 6084500 5802016 5435850 6084500 5802016 6083861 741068
R2 0.260 0.259 0.270 0.267 0.261 0.254 0.156
Robust standard errors are clustered at firm and at country level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
Similarly, table 1.4 shows estimations of equation (1.22) for different measures of size and
productivity for imports. Column (4) and (6) corresponds to a measure of productivity, in
the first case, I control for importers that also export, so I compute total export divided by
labor. The final column is as before, a subsample of firms matched to the Manufacturing
Survey (ENIA) from 2003 to 2007. In this case, small(less productive) firms are more likely
to buy under CIA.
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Table 1.4: Imports data. Sample 2005-2015. CIA v/s OA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Micro 0.460***
(0.0246)
Small 0.340***
(0.0250)
Medium 0.195***
(0.0252)
log(Emp) -0.0527***
(0.00684)
log(Equity) -0.0552***
(0.00540)
log(tot Imp) -0.0624***
(0.00617)
log(Imp/Emp) -0.0105***
(0.00319)
Age -0.0116***
(0.00174)
log(z) -0.0321***
(0.00754)
Observations 26158359 25289710 24577327 26158359 16761871 26153080 761116
R2 0.344 0.323 0.349 0.361 0.331 0.3022 0.156
Robust standard errors are clustered at firm and at country level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
As tables 3 and 4 show, the relationship between size and prepayment is very robust,
even when controlled by industry and destination. In particular, small exporters are 10-20%
more likely to sell under CIA compare to large firms. Similarly, small importers are 30-45%
more likely to buy prepaying compared to large importers.
Finally, for prediction 3 from proposition 3, I match Chilean exporters to Colombian im-
porters. Colombian data is available from 2008 to 2016. Then, I ran the following regression:
I(CIAfpt = 1) = β0Y
CHL
ft + β1Y
CHL
ft × Y COLft + γit + εfpt, (1.23)
where γit are industry × year fixed effects. Table 1.5 shows the results of the regression,
as it can be seen when a transaction is between a small exporter and a large importer, the
transaction is less likely to be under CIA. As for size, in column (1), for Chilean firms, I used
the same classification of size according to the tax agency, in columns (2) and (3) I computed
the quartiles according to employment and equity. As for Colombian firms, I computed size
using total imports for a given firm as a proxy for size, and I computed the corresponding
quartiles for that measure.
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Table 1.5: Matched CHL-COL data. Sample 2008-2016. CIA v/s OA
Y CHLft =Sales bracket Y
CHL
ft =Employment Y
CHL
ft =Equity
MicroCHL 0.026 0.044*** 0.046***
(0.018) (0.008) (0.007)
SmallCHL 0.084*** 0.015 0.017*
(0.022) (0.011) (0.009)
MediumCHL 0.041*** 0.011 0.022**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
LargeCOL -0.034*** -0.027*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.01) (0.007)
MicroCHL × LargeCOL -0.104* -0.022* -0.029**
(0.058) (0.012) (0.012)
SmallCHL × LargeCOL -0.103*** -0.013 0.007
(0.031) (0.016) (0.014)
MediumCHL × LargeCOL -0.017 -0.009 -0.025*
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 273081 266613 253221
R2 0.182 0.1769 0.1716
Robust standard errors are clustered at exporter-importer level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
Finally, using the same matched exporter-importer data, we can draw the empirical
version of Figure 1.5 that described the contract choice as a function of sizes. Figure 1.9
describes the empirical distribution of transactions as a function of the size of Colombian
importer and Chilean exporter.
For ease of exposition, I additionally plotted the centroid for each contract. It can be seen
that CIA transactions are on average related to small firms as opposed to OA transactions. I
additionally plotted a separating line9 between the two contracts. This curve, in some sense,
is the empirical counterpart of the theoretical decision curve showed in figure 1.5.
1.5.2 Transfers, prices and payment contract
To test Proposition 4, I will estimate the following equation
Yfdpt = βI(CIAfdpt = 1) + µfdpt + εfdpt (1.24)
9The separating plane is just a line that passes through the midpoint of the segment that connects both
centroids and is perpendicular to said segment. Since very few transactions are CIA in the sample (5% of
the sample) alternative techniques of classification curves did not work. This classification line does a fine
job since 60% of OA transactions are above the line and 60% of CIA transactions are below
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Figure 1.9: Empirical distribution of transactions for different measures of size
Note: Each bubble is a transaction of particular good in a given year between an exporter and importer of
given size. The size of a bubble is related to the amount of transactions in a year for the Exp-Imp match
and product.
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for exports only, where Yfdpt will be log of FOB transfer and log of price for a given firm f , sell-
ing to destination d a product p at year t, µfdpt are fixed effects at firm×destination×product×year
in order to control for demand shifters and marginal cost changes.
Table 1.6: Prices under CIA - Exports
log(q) log(TFOB) log(TFOB) log(p) log(p)
CIA -0.572*** -0.550*** -0.0517*** 0.0146 -0.0517***
(0.0495) (0.0468) (0.00875) (0.00915) (0.00875)
log(q) 0.884*** -0.116***
(0.00929) (0.00929)
Observations 609312 613865 609308 609308 609308
R2 0.817 0.717 0.969 0.932 0.941
Robust standard errors clustered at firm and at country level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
As table 6 shows, transfers and prices are lower under CIA. On average, for the same
quantity, the price/transfer is almost 5% lower with prepayment. Unfortunately, I do not
have the period for the trade credit, but according to standard practices, the post-payment
can be done between 30 and 120 days after arrival. This would imply an annual interest
rate between 15 to 60%. Similar results can be found running a specification for imports, as
table 7 below shows.
Table 1.7: Prices under CIA - Imports
log(TFOB) log(TFOB) log(p) log(p)
CIA -0.265*** -0.0626** 0.006 -0.0626***
(0.0321) (0.0071) (0.0233) (0.0071)
log(q) 0.747*** -0.253***
(0.0178) (0.0178)
Observations 4941301 4941297 4941297 4941297
R2 0.696 0.916 0.903 0.926
Robust standard errors clustered at firm and at country level
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
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1.6 Dynamics
So far, the model is static. A simple way to extend this model to include dynamics
is to introduce learning. Papers like Araujo and Ornelas (2007), Antra`s and Foley (2015)
include learning through a Bayesian updating process regarding the quality of institutions or
importer’s type. Given the structure of the model and the endogenous default probability,
I cannot introduce learning in the same fashion. To make progress, I will assume that
exporters do not know the distribution of the importer’s cost shock, in particular, producers
do not know the variance of the distribution, but they still know that the mean is zero.
The model and timing are exactly as before but now the tenure of the Exp-Imp rela-
tionship will play a role. As explained, the producer (and possibly the foreign bank) does
not know the variance of the distribution G, but she has a prior. Since defaults are public,
after a successful interaction between exporter and importer (either under CIA or OA), the
exporter learns the value of the shock λ∗ and updates her prior. I will assume that if a firm
defaults on a credit or trade credit, the firm exits and is replaced by another one with no
history. Finally, after payments are realized, each firm has a probability δ of exiting the
market. This will not play a role in this partial equilibrium framework but I assume it to
maintain stationarity.
1.6.1 Learning
For simplicity, I will assume that λ∗ ∼ N(0, σ2F ), where σ2F is unknown to the exporter.
Additionally, let me assume that the exporter has a prior distribution Gamma with shape α
and scale β (i.e. Gamma(α, β)) for σ2F . Under these parametric assumptions, the posterior
mean of σ2F for a Exp-Imp relationship with tenure t is given by:
σ2t = σ
2
0γt + σˆ
2
t (1− γt), (1.25)
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where σ20 =
β
α
is the prior mean, γt =
2α
2α+t
is the weight of the prior and σˆ2t =
∑t
n=0(λ
∗
t )
2
n
is
the sample variance. Note that for a given, σ20, α governs how fast the exporter updates her
prior or equivalently how informative is the new information. Finally, as the tenure of the
relationship increases, σ2t → σ2F , so depending on the prior, learning will imply that variance
increases or decreases with tenure.
The following proposition will help me to describe the dynamics of the model under
learning.
Proposition 5. If ρ∗ > ρ. For given sizes N and N∗:
1. If the variance of G increases, it is less likely that a transaction is under OA.
2. Similarly, if the variance of F increases, it is less likely that a transaction is under
OA.
Proof. Without loss of generality, I will assume that F and G are Normal distributions
with mean zero. Then F (x) = Φ
(
x
σ
)
, where Φ is the c.d.f. of N(0, 1). G can also be
expressed as a function of Φ. From equation (21) is easy to see that when the variance of
F or G increases, θ(N,N∗) decreases, which means the decision boundary shifts down/left
depending on which variance is changing. Then transactions that previously where done
under OA, now potentially can be conducted under CIA.
This result is intuitive since, for a given size N and N∗, an increase in the volatility of the
cost shock makes it more likely to default, thus the likelihood of OA must decrease. Figure
1.10 shows the changes in the decision border when variance of the foreign shock σ2F and
domestic shock σ2D increases.
1.6.2 Contract choice over time
Using the previous proposition and results, I can describe how learning will affect the
contract choice over time.
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Figure 1.10: Changes in policy
Corollary 1. Let pi(N,N∗) ≥ F , ρ∗ > ρ
1. If prior σ20 is greater than the true parameter σ
2
F . Likelihood of OA transaction in-
creases with the tenure of the relationship.
2. If prior σ20 is less than the true parameter σ
2
F . Likelihood of OA transaction decreases
with the tenure of the relationship.
This result does not rely on the assumption of symmetric learning, meaning foreign bank
and exporter learn as tenure increases, or asymmetric learning, only the producer learns
about the variance. Intuitively, this is saying that, as agents learn over time, all transactions
will be only under CIA or exclusively under OA. As Antra`s and Foley (2015) have pointed
out, data seems to favor that the likelihood of a transaction being under OA increases over
time. This will be one of the additional predictions that I will test.
Corollary 2. If pi(N,N∗) ≥ F , ρ∗ > ρ and σ20 > σ2F then
1. Transactions under CIA are less likely as the tenure of relationship increases.
2. Prices under OA decrease over time.
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3. Quantities and sales under OA increase over time.
The last two parts are a natural outcome since, as default probability decreases, surplus
increases, thus quantities increase therefore prices decrease. Finally, the last two statements
may be also be true under CIA, but only if the learning is symmetric, since in that case,
foreign bank will also lend more at a lower interest rate (default probability decreases), but
if the learning is asymmetric, prices and quantities under CIA will remain constant with
tenure.
1.6.3 Empirical test on Dynamics
To test the predictions from Corollary 2, I will use the identification strategy for dynamics
proposed by Piveteau (2019). He proposes the following model:
Yfdpt =
T∑
τ=1
βτI(tenurefdpt = τ) + µdpt + εfdt (1.26)
where tenurefdpt is the amount consecutive years firm f has been selling product p to des-
tination d at year t,10 µdpt is a destination× product×year fixed effect. For each part of
the corollary, Yfdpt will be either an indicator function if transaction was paid under CIA,
log prices, log quantities and log sales when transactions were under OA. Thus, for the first
prediction, I will estimate
I(CIAfdpt = 1) =
T∑
τ=1
βτI(tenurefdpt = τ) + µdpt + εfdt (1.27)
Figure 1.11 shows βτ , in particular, left panel show the plot for all the sample. As Piveteau
(2019) stresses out, in order to correct for selection bias (relationships than endure are
better firms with better products), I estimate the same regression but restricting the sample
to relationships that lasted more than 8 years, these results are shown on the right panel.
10Since in my main dataset I do not see the pair Exp-Imp, I proxy a relationship as a firm selling the same
product to the same country.
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In any case, it can be seen that probability of CIA decreases over time.
Figure 1.11: Likelihood of CIA over time
For the second prediction, I will estimate
log pOAfdpt =
T∑
τ=1
βτI(tenurefdpt = τ) + µdpt + εfdpt (1.28)
where pOAfdpt will be the unit value, but only when the transaction was paid under OA,
the rest of the model is a before. Figure 1.12 shows prices over time. As predicted by the
theory but opposed to Piveteau (2019) I find that prices, in fact, decrease11 Finally, I will
Figure 1.12: Prices over time
11Since more than 80% of the transactions are under OA, this relationship will be true even if I run the
regression over the whole sample.
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estimate the following equation
log qOAfdpt =
T∑
τ=1
βτI(tenurefdpt = τ) + µdpt + εfdpt (1.29)
As for the remainder of the predictions, I will only show the results for quantities, since
for sales the results and conclusions are identical. Figure 1.13 shows how quantities increase
with tenure.
Figure 1.13: Quantities over time
In all the cases, the data supports the predictions of the model regarding dynamics. One
of the main issues in these regressions is that I am using a proxy for relationships. To tackle
this problem, I used matched Chile-Colombia data where I can compute actual tenure of the
relationship between a Chilean Exporter and a Colombian importer and estimate a similar
equation
Yfdpt =
T∑
τ=1
βτI(tenurefpt = τ) + µpt + εft, (1.30)
the downside of the matched data is that I can only match the 2008-2016 period, so the
maximum tenure I can have is 9 years and I observed their relationship starting in 2008
whereas it could have started earlier. I show the results for the likelihood of CIA transactions,
and I leave the results for price and quantities in the Appendix.
Figure 1.14 shows similar results than before. Due to the short period of time that I have,
in the right panel, I show the results when I restrict the sample to relationships that lasted
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Figure 1.14: Likelihood of CIA over time CHL-COL data
more than 4 years. As shown in the Appendix, quantities also behave similarly compared to
the full sample, whereas the point estimates for prices are similar but in many cases, these
are not significant. Finally, to better measure tenure, I estimate the same equation but for
exporters that were born after 2006, then I am better measuring the true tenure. As Figure
17 shows results do not change qualitatively.
Figure 1.15: Likelihood of CIA over time CHL-COL data
Note: Sample restricted to exporters that were born after 2006
1.7 Conclusion
The international trade finance literature has focused on the country-specific factor that
affects the trade credit decision for exporting/importing firms, while several surveys to ex-
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porters indicate that the risk of default is an important deterrent to export. In this paper,
I introduce a simple trade finance model with firm heterogeneity and proceed to test the
implications of the model on the data.
In particular, under reasonable assumptions, the model implies that large firms give (and
receive) more trade credit compared to small firms. The model also has implications for the
exporter-importer match and their corresponding sizes. Using Chilean transaction-level data
combined with firm-level data I test and confirm these implications using several measures
of size, productivity, and exporter/importer data. In particular, small exporters are 20-
30% more likely to sell through prepayment when compared to large firms. Similarly, small
importers are 50-60% more likely to buy prepaying compared to large importers.
Extending the model to include dynamics, I can additionally test further implications
of the model. In particular, under simple assumptions that previous literature seems to
favor, the model predicts that transactions under CIA are less likely as the tenure of the
relationship increases, prices (quantities and sales) decrease (increase) with the tenure of the
relationship. These predictions are also confirmed in the data using the main dataset and
also a smaller one with matched exporter-importer.
This paper contributes to a new dimension not yet analyzed in the literature of trade
credit, namely firm-characteristics that shape the trade finance choice. Additionally, notice
that the financial friction due to the payment contract behaves as if it were an additional
fixed cost of exporting (interest rate payment).
From the policy-making perspective, these frictions could be problematic, since small
exporter matched with a large firm like Walmart will export using trade credit, which puts
an extra burden over the exporter, that in presence of additional shocks, that I abstracted
from, can have further implications like bankruptcy. A more sophisticated dynamic model
with additional shocks is necessary to understand what are the potential effects of this friction
in additional dimensions, like entry/exit and firm default risk.
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1.A Size and CIA
To make comparable, for each measure I compute 13 quantiles and plot the average share
CIA in each quantile.
Figure 1.A.1: CIA Share - Total Exp/Imp
Figure 1.A.2: CIA Share - Number of workers
As it can be seen, CIA share decreases with measures of size or related to size (produc-
tivity, age).
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Figure 1.A.3: CIA Share - Exports/Workers
Figure 1.A.4: CIA Share - Productivity
Note: Computed using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for a subset of manufacturing firms between 2003-2007
Figure 1.A.5: CIA Share - Age
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1.B Dynamics
Figure 1.B.6: Prices over time CHL-COL data
Figure 1.B.7: Quantities over time CHL-COL data
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Figure 1.B.8: Prices over time CHL-COL data. Exp born after 2006
Figure 1.B.9: Quantities over time CHL-COL data. Exp born after 2006
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Chapter 2
Trade Credit and Markups
A´lvaro Garc´ıa-Mar´ın, Universidad de los Andes
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Santiago Andre´s Justel, UCLA
Trade credit is the most important form of short-term finance for U.S. firms. In 2017,
non-financial firms had about $3 trillion in trade credit outstanding equaling 20 percent of
U.S. GDP. Why do sellers lend to their buyers in the presence of a well-developed financial
sector? This paper proposes an explanation for the puzzling dominance of trade credit:
When sellers charge markups over production costs and financial intermediation is costly,
then buyer-seller pairs can save on their overall financing costs by utilizing trade credit. We
derive a model of trade credit and markups that captures this mechanism. In the model,
the larger is the markup and the larger is the difference between the borrowing and the
deposit rate, the more attractive is trade credit. The model also implies that trade credit
use increases with repeated interactions and that this effect is stronger for complex products.
Using Chilean data at the firm-level to estimate markups and at the trade-transaction level
to analyze payment choices, we find strong support for the model.
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2.1 Introduction
Trade credit is the most important form of short-term finance for U.S. firms. In 2017,
non-financial firms had about $3 trillion in trade credit outstanding equaling 20 percent of
U.S. GDP.1 Why do sellers lend to their buyers in the presence of a well-developed financial
sector? While several theories about trade credit have been proposed, the popularity of
trade credit remains a puzzle.2 This paper proposes an explanation for why trade credit is
so popular: When sellers charge markups over production costs and financial intermediation
is costly, then buyer-seller pairs can save on their overall financing costs by utilizing trade
credit.
A buyer can pay for a purchase in two ways: through cash-in-advance, where the buyer
pays the full price of the goods before delivery, and on an open account where the buyer
has some time after delivery to pay for the goods and thus implicitly receives a trade credit
from the seller.3 Under cash-in-advance, the buyer needs to pre-pay the full amount to
the seller which requires liquidity equal to the full invoice. In contrast, extending trade
credit is cheaper in liquidity terms, as the seller only needs to cover its production costs
in advance which may be substantially lower than the sales price if there is a markup. If
financial intermediation is costly and a firm pays more to a bank for borrowing funds than it
receives for depositing them, then this difference in liquidity needs between cash-in-advance
and trade credit affects profits.
The larger is the markup and the larger the difference between the borrowing and the
1See also Figure 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A that shows the development of trade credit and markups over
time in the United States.
2See in particular Ellingsen, Jacobson, and E. L. v. Schedvin (2016) who argue that based on their
evidence there is a need for a “new theory of short term finance”.
3In international trade, additional financing options are available that are called letter of credit and
documentary collections. For these alternatives, banks act as intermediaries to reduce the risk involved in a
transaction. See Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017a) for details. They find that letters of credit cover
about 13 percent and documentary collections about 2 percent of world trade. Both payment forms do not
play a role for domestic transactions. There may also be a partial advance-payment, on which data is even
more limited. In our data from Chile two-part contracts (partial cash-in-advance) represent only 0.2% of
transactions. Similarly, Antra`s and Foley (2015) report that the firm they study does not rely on two-part
contracts.
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deposit rate, the more attractive is trade credit. All else equal, trade credit is preferred over
cash-in-advance if there is a positive markup and a positive interest rate spread. As the
world typically features positive markups and positive interest rate spreads, the theory thus
provides a clear rationale for the dominance of trade credit in firm-to-firm transactions.
We test the model using two rich panel datasets of Chilean firms. First, we construct
markup estimates at the firm-product level using detailed production data on inputs and
outputs of Chilean plants following the method developed by De Loecker, Goldberg, Khan-
delwal, and Pavcnik (2016). We then combine these markup estimates with transaction-level
trade data, which contains detailed information on the payment choice to test the predictions
of the model. We find that trade credit use increases with markups and that this effects is
larger the bigger the difference between the buyer’s borrowing rate and the seller’s deposit
rate.4 In line with the model’s prediction, the effect of the markup also increases in the
destination country’s rule of law. In addition, the results are robust to alternative measures
of markups, and to the inclusions of a large set of fixed effect and control variables. Taken
together, these results provide strong support for the main mechanism of the model.
Our results are very similar when we focus on the subset of firms with low participation
in export markets. For these firms, markups mostly reflects the firm’s pricing decisions in
the domestic market. Hence, any endogenous response of the markup to the trade credit
choice in a particular destination gets mitigated when fixing markups at their initial value
for each seller-product or computing markups at the firm-level. Jointly, these results suggest
that, even though firms charge higher markups on transactions involving trade credit, the
resulting bias should be relatively modest.
We also develop a dynamic version of the model, showing that when firms learn about
their trading partners, trade credit becomes more attractive over time. The key intuition is
that learning reduces the relevance of enforcement frictions. As trade credit has a financing
4Petersen and R. G. Rajan (1997) provided evidence that firms with larger gross profit margins over costs
extend more trade credit. As gross profit margins can arguably be seen as a rough proxy for markups, their
findings are thus consistent with the model presented here.
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cost advantage over cash-in-advance, learning thus tilts the payment choice towards trade
credit as enforcement frictions becomes less central. We show that this rationale also implies
that the effects of learning are stronger for more complex products.5 In the empirical section,
we provide evidence that strongly supports these dynamic predictions.
The model also has implications for the pricing of transactions between importers and ex-
porters. Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Antra`s and Foley (2015) also derived price predictions
in a payment terms model. We extend the analysis, showing that there is an unambiguous
ordering of prices that is independent of the distribution of bargaining power. Specifically,
a buyer has to pay a higher price to the seller when buying with trade credit than when
paying in advance. This difference should increase in the borrowing rate of the seller and
decrease in the level of contract enforcement in the buyer’s country. We find that buyers
pay a higher price when receiving trade credit and that the price difference decreases in the
destination country’s rule of law and increases in source country’s borrowing rate.
The paper contributes to the large and growing literature on trade credit.6 Several
theoretical reasons have been given for the importance of trade credit. Schwartz (1974)
and Ferris (1981) develop models where trade credit arises from a transaction motive, by
separating the exchange of goods from the exchange of money, which may simplify cash
management and allow for risk-sharing. Brennan, Maksimovics, and Zechner (1988) show
that trade credit can be used to price discriminate when cash buyers have higher reservation
values than credit buyers.7 J. K. Smith (1987) and Biais and Gollier (1997) show that firms
may extend trade credit because they have an informational advantage relative to banks.
In Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) sellers extend trade credit because this type of credit is
5Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) also look at the relationship between product type and trade
credit and find that for the case of domestic firm-to-firm transactions, trade credit is higher in differentiated
products.
6Petersen and R. G. Rajan (1997) provide an early overview of the main theories for the existence and
prevalence of trade credit and present empirical evidence.
7Petersen and R. G. Rajan (1997) argue that this channel should be stronger when gross profit margins
are higher as sellers have a stronger incentive to sell one more unit at a discount when their marginal profit
is higher. For this reason, price discrimination may also give rise to a positive correlation between markups
and trade credit use. On price discrimination through trade credit, see also Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979)
and Mian and C. W. Smith (1992).
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“in-kind” and is thus harder to divert than cash. Our model is closely related to these
earlier papers in that parts of the spreads between borrowing rates and deposit rates that
banks charge are likely attributable to the monitoring and enforcement frictions emphasized
there. However, bank spreads are also due to factors like regulation, capital requirements
and general overhead costs. The key message of our model is that firm pairs should for this
reason minimize their reliance on the financial sector for financing their transactions, and
are able to do so through trade credit if sellers charge positive markups over marginal costs.
Wilner (2000) builds a model that studies the interaction of trade credit provision and
long-term relationships, where firms are willing to give more concessions when there is a
dependency. In a related paper, Cunat (2007) shows that trade credit may work better in
buyer-supplier relationships as the supplier can threaten to cut supplies if trade credit is
not repaid. Emery (1984) argues for “a pure financial explanation of trade credit”.8 In
his model, sellers have to hold liquidity for a precautionary motive in a world characterized
by imperfect financial markets. As trade credit can be factored, lending to a buyer only
marginally reduces liquidity while it raises profits by exploiting the difference between the
buyer’s borrowing rate and the sellers deposit rate. While his explanation of trade credit
is also based on the difference between the borrowing and the lending rate, the underlying
mechanism is quite different. In his paper, sellers need to have a liquidity holding motive to
extend trade credit. In the model presented here, in contrast, trade credit is desirable even
in the absence of any liquidity holdings. With positive markups, a seller can be willing to
borrow from a bank to extend trade credit to the buyer as this saves on overall financing
costs.
Closest to our paper, Daripa and J. Nilsen (2011) develop a model of inventory holding,
demand uncertainty and trade credit. In their model, an upstream firm supplies trade credit
to a downstream buyer to alleviate an externality that arises from inventory holding costs.
If the upstream seller’s markup over production costs is larger than the downstream buyer’s
8See also Ahn (2014), who also studies this mechanism and tests it with Chilean and Colombian data.
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markup over the intermediate good’s price, then the upstream seller wants to subsidize the
downstream buyer’s inventory holdings. It does so through a lower price when it has higher
financing costs than the buyer and through trade credit when it has lower financing costs
than the buyer. In the model, trade credit is thus preferable if the upstream margin is
larger than the downstream margin and if, at the same time, the upstream firm faces lower
financing costs. While our model is also based on markups and financing costs, there are
important differences that give rise to a much more general preference for trade credit. Most
importantly, we introduce the realistic feature of a margin between the borrowing rate that
banks charge and the deposit rate that savers receive. As we show below, in the presence
of a positive financing friction, trade credit dominates cash-in-advance as long as the seller
charges a positive markup. In contrast to the model in Daripa and J. Nilsen (2011), the
preference for trade credit does not depend on the buyer’s markup, the relative markup
between the buyer and the seller or a difference in financing costs between the two firms.
Our paper also relates to a recent literature that studies the role of trade credit as a form
of limiting competition. Peura, Yang, and Laic (2017) develop a model with Bertrand com-
petition, and potential liquidity shocks, and show that trade credit exposes firms to higher
financing costs, reducing their incentives to undercut prices. Giannetti, Serrano-Velarde, and
Tarantino (2018) argue that suppliers extend trade credit to financially-unconstrained large
firms as a form to transfer surplus to these firms without cannibalizing sales to small buyers.
Chod, Lyandres, and Yang (2019) develop a model where trade credit allows buyers to use
the additional liquidity to increase their purchases of inputs. Thus, in this model sellers are
more willing to offer trade credit when competition is lower, because then they internalize
more of the benefits related to trade credit provision. Assuming that lower competition is
reflected in a higher markup, these papers would also generate a positive correlation between
trade credit and markups as our paper. However, notice that our mechanism is quite differ-
ent. In our model, trade credit arises as a way of reducing financing costs, while in their case
trade credit is chosen strategically either, as a form of limiting competition or for reaping
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benefits from the supply chains.
Our paper also adds to the empirical evidence on trade credit. Most papers have focused
on domestic data. Ng, J. K. Smith, and R. L. Smith (1999), for example, exploit detailed
data to analyze the terms of trade credit contracts. Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen
(2011) and Klapper, Laeven, and R. Rajan (2012) further tested theories of trade credit
with contract data.9 Recently, Ellingsen, Jacobson, and E. L. v. Schedvin (2016) study
detailed trade credit data from Sweden. Consistent with earlier papers, they find that when
a firm’s financial position improves, it has less accounts payable (that is trade credit that
needs to be repaid) on its balance sheet. The correlation between trade credit volume and
financial health is, however, not due to shorter trade credit terms but instead due to less
purchases by the firm from its suppliers. This finding is inconsistent with the standard view
in the literature that trade credit is less desirable to firms than bank credit.
There is a small and growing literature on international trade finance, typically study-
ing three payment forms, open account, cash-in-advance and letters of credit. While open
account corresponds to providing trade credit, letters of credit are a financing form that
is almost exclusively used international transactions due to the larger risks involved in
cross-border trade. Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), Antra`s and Foley (2015) and Niepmann and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017a) study how payment choices depend on financing cost and limited
contract enforcement. Hoefele, Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Yu (2016) extend that analysis and
look at the role of product complexity. Demir and Javorcik (2018) employ Turkish export
data, showing that the removal of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement led to more trade credit
provision by Turkish exporters.10
There is substantial evidence on the macro-economic importance of trade credit. Fisman
and Love (2003) show that trade credit can alleviate concerns of limited contract enforcement
9See also Barrot (2016) on trade credit and entry in the trucking industry and Murfin and Njoroge (2014)
on the opportunity cost of extending trade credit to large firms.
10See also Ahn (2010), Olsen (2010) and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017a). For papers studying
the broader relationship of financial constraints and trade, see among others Amiti and Weinstein (2011),
Chor and Manova (2012), Manova (2013), Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2014) and Niep-
mann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017b).
51
and thereby increase growth, while J. H. Nilsen (2002) explores the relationship between the
bank lending channel and trade credit. Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) study trade
credit use in emerging economies in the wake of financial crises. Jacobson and E. v. Schedvin
(2015) look at trade credit propagation and its effects on corporate failure.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature by proposing an explanation for the
dominance of trade credit based on markups and the costs of financial intermediation and by
providing evidence for this theory exploiting Chilean international trade data and domestic
production data. It also generalizes the standard trade finance model, allowing for arbitrary
bargaining weights between buyers and sellers and providing unambiguous predictions on
relative prices between trade credit and cash in advance. Finally, it shows that the use of
trade credit increases in the number of interactions between buyers and sellers and that this
effect is stronger for more complex products, rationalizing this finding with a simple model
of learning.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical frame-
work for trade credit use and derives the main testable predictions. Section 3 discusses the
empirical specifications, and presents the methodology for deriving firm-product markups.
Section 4 describes our dataset. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and quantifies the
general importance of trade credit. Finally, section 6 discusses implications of our study and
routes for future research.
2.2 A model of trade credit and markups
In this section, we extend the model in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and show how a positive
markup and a financial intermediation cost lead to a natural preference for trade credit. In
the model there are three key elements. First, there is a time delay between the production
of the goods by the seller and the sale of the goods by the buyer. Second, financing is costly.
To pay for goods or production costs, firms have to borrow funds from the financial sector.
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Firms can also deposit surplus liquidity as deposits with the banking sector. Importantly,
because of regulation, monitoring and general overhead costs, banks charge a higher interest
rate when lending funds to firms than the interest rates they pay to depositors.11 Third, there
is imperfect contract enforcement. When a buyer or seller do not fulfill their contractual
obligations, firms can sue them in court. This is, however, only successful with a certain
probability.12
2.2.1 Model setup
One buyer is matched with one seller. Both firms are risk neutral. A fraction η (η∗)
of sellers (buyers) is reliable, that is these firms always fulfill their contracts.13 If a firm is
unreliable and thus does not fulfill its contract voluntarily, the other firm can try to enforce
the contract in court which is successful with probability λ (λ∗). When facing an opportunity
to cheat, a random firm thus fulfills the contract with probability λ˜ = η + (1− η)λ.
There are two periods. In period 0 the seller produces the goods and sends them to the
buyer. In period 1, the buyer sells the goods to a final consumer. Because of this time gap
between production and final sale, firms have to agree on payment terms. They have two
options. First, buyers can pay in advance (cash-in-advance), that is the buyer pays before
receiving the goods. Second, they can trade on an open-account, where the buyer pays after
delivery, that is the seller extends trade credit to the buyer. A seller produces output for total
cost C and sells it to the buyer. The buyer can then sell the goods to final consumers and
generate revenues R. For now, we assume that R and C are given exogenously. To finance
their transactions, firms can borrow from banks at an interest rate rb (r
∗
b ). Firms can deposit
surplus funds at banks for a deposit rate of rd (r
∗
d). The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the buyer who can choose to accept or reject that offer.14
11This interest rate difference may be further increased by borrower risk. The point here is that abstracting
from the pricing of risk, financial intermediation by banks is costly.
12An alternative interpretation would be that all contracts get enforced in court eventually but this gen-
erates a legal cost as well as a time delay in settlement.
13For the remainder of the paper, all variables related to the buyer are denoted with an asterisk.
14In section ??, we extend the model to allow the seller and the buyer to bargain over the surplus with
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Open Account Under open account (trade credit), the seller maximizes:
E[ΠOAS ] = λ˜
∗POA − (1 + rb)C (2.1)
s.t. E[ΠOAB ] = R− POA ≥ 0
where POA is the total payment from the buyer to the seller. Under open account, the
seller gets paid POA with probability λ˜∗, while incurring the production costs C with cer-
tainty. Because production takes place in period 0 while sales only take place in period
1, the seller has to borrow the production costs C from a bank and pay the interest rate
rb. The maximization is subject to the participation constraint of a reliable buyer, which
requires non-negative profits for the buyer. Solving for the optimal POA that respects the
participation constraint implies POA = R. With expected profits of:
E[ΠOAS ] = λ˜
∗R− (1 + rb)C (2.2)
Cash-in-Advance Under cash-in-advance, the seller maximizes:
E[ΠCIAS ] = (1 + rd)(P
CIA − C) (2.3)
s.t. E[ΠCIAB ] = λ˜R− (1 + r∗b )PCIA ≥ 0
Under cash-in-advance, the seller gets paid PCIA with certainty. At the same time, a reliable
seller incurs production costs C with certainty as well. If the price charged to the buyer
exceeds production costs, the seller deposits the surplus funds at a bank for interest rate rd.
The buyer generates revenues R with probability λ˜. The buyer pays PCIA with certainty in
period 0, borrowing from a bank at interest rate r∗b . Solving for the optimal P
CIA delivers
weights θ and 1 − θ, that is they maximize the objective function (Nash product): NP = ΠθsΠ1−θb . This
generalizes the model presented in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) that focused on the case of full bargaining power
of the seller, while deriving the case of full bargaining power of the buyer in an appendix. It is easily verified
that results derived for the more general model nest these two special cases.
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PCIA = λ˜
1+r∗b
R. With expected profits of:
E[ΠCIAS ] = (1 + rd)
(
λ˜
1 + r∗b
R− C
)
(2.4)
Optimal Contract Combining equations (2.41) and (2.44) implies that a buyer-seller pair
chooses open account (trade credit) if:
λ˜∗R− (1 + rb)C − (1 + rd)
(
λ˜
1 + r∗b
R− C
)
≥ 0 (2.5)
Now, assume that firms charge a constant markup to final consumers given by µ so that
R = µC.15 Open account (trade credit) is then preferred over cash-in-advance if:
∆Π = E[ΠOAS ]− E[ΠCIAS ] = λ˜∗µ− (1 + rb)− (1 + rd)
(
λ˜
1 + r∗b
µ− 1
)
≥ 0 (2.6)
2.2.2 Trade Credit and Markups
Taking the derivative of equation (2.46) with respect to µ and rearranging delivers:
(1 + r∗b ) λ˜∗ − (1 + rd) λ˜ ≥ 0 (2.7)
The condition is quite weak. As long as the buyer’s borrowing rate is above the seller’s deposit
rate and enforcement is not too different between buyers and sellers, trade credit becomes
more attractive when the markup goes up. Consider the symmetric case to build intuition,
where the buyer and the seller face the same interest rates and enforcement frictions. The
condition then simplifies to:
rb > rd (2.8)
15We only assume this to simplify the exposition of the main mechanism. In section Appendix 2.B.2, we
show that the main results hold with endogenous revenues and costs, R and C, for the special case of CES
preferences. We discuss these results below in section 2.6.5.
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The following Proposition summarizes our results on trade credit and markups:
Proposition 1 (Trade Credit and Markups). Suppose (1 + r∗b ) λ˜
∗ > (1 + rd) λ˜. Then:
i) The use of open account increases in the markup µ
ii) This effect increases in r∗b and λ
∗ and decreases in rd and λ
Proof. Follows from equation (2.47)
Part ii) of Proposition 4 presents additional predictions to test the mechanism explaining
trade credit use: the effect of the markup should be stronger when the destination country
borrowing rate and the destination country enforcement are higher and when the source
country deposit rate and source country enforcement are lower.
2.2.3 Trade Credit and Repeated Interactions
Trade Credit and Learning Consider now the case where an importer and an exporter
interact repeatedly. Assume that the two trading partners learn over time about the re-
liability of their trading partner, so that ∂ηk/∂k > 0, where k is the number of previous
interactions and ηk is the probability that a firm is reliable after k interactions.
16
For tractability, consider the trade-off between trade credit and cash-in-advance in the
symmetric case where the buyer and the seller face the same interest rates and enforcement
frictions (e.g. because they reside in the same country). However, we allow beliefs about
types to change at different speeds over time, with ηk,B and ηk,S, representing the believe
about the probability that a buyer or seller are reliable after k interactions, respectively.
Equation (2.46) then simplifies to:
∆Π
C
= λ˜k,B µ− (1 + rb)− (1 + rd)
(
λ˜k,S
1 + rb
µ− 1
)
(2.9)
16This learning can take multiple forms. One example would be Bayesian updating as in Araujo and
Ornelas (2007), Antra`s and Foley (2015), Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) and Monarch and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2016).
56
where λ˜k is increasing in the number of previous interactions k. Taking the derivative with
respect to k delivers:
∂(∆Π/C)
∂k
= µ(1− λ) ∂ηk,B
∂k
− 1 + rd
1 + rb
µ (1− λ) ∂ηk,S
∂k
(2.10)
This derivative is positive if:
∂ηk,B
∂k
>
1 + rd
1 + rb
∂ηk,S
∂k
(2.11)
If learning about the buyer is sufficiently fast relative to learning about the seller, then trade
credit becomes more attractive as two firms repeatedly trade with each other. Importantly,
the condition allows for some asymmetry in the speed of learning.17
Product Complexity In addition, now assume that products differ by their complex-
ity. Following, Hoefele, Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Yu (2016), assume that product complexity
is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1], where a higher γ represents a more complex prod-
uct. Assume further that contract enforcement is harder for more complex products. More
specifically, assume that a contract now gets enforced exogenously with probability λγ. The
optimal decision in the symmetric case now becomes:
∆Π
C
= λ˜k,B(γ) µ− (1 + rb)− (1 + rd)
(
λ˜k,S(γ)
1 + rb
µ− 1
)
(2.12)
with λ˜k,i(γ) = ηk,i + (1− ηk,i)λγ. Taking the derivative with respect to k delivers:
∂(∆Π/C)
∂k
= µ(1− λγ)
[
∂ηk,B
∂k
− 1 + rd
1 + rb
∂ηk,S
∂k
]
(2.13)
17The speed of learning could be a function of the payment terms. In particular, there could be more
learning about the seller under cash-in-advance and more learning about the buyer under open account,
due to the asymmetry in the commitment problem. For tractability, we focus on the case where learning is
independent of the payment terms. The key assumption is that there is learning in both directions and that
the speed of learning is not too dissimilar.
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Taking the derivative with respect to γ and rearranging delivers:
∂2(∆Π/C)
∂k∂γ
= −µλγ
[
∂ηk,B
∂k
− 1 + rd
1 + rb
∂ηk,S
∂k
]
ln(λ) (2.14)
which is greater equal zero as lnλ < 0. That is, the effect of learning on the difference
between trade credit and cash-in-advance is stronger for more complex products (higher γ).
This is quite intuitive: contracts for more complex products are harder to enforce and hence
learning has a stronger effect on a firm’s decision problem for these products. The preceding
insights are summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 2 (Trade Credit and Learning). Suppose two firms face the same financing costs
and enforcement frictions, learning about the buyer is sufficiently fast
(
∂ηk,B
∂k
> 1+rd
1+rb
∂ηk,S
∂k
)
,
and the borrowing rate is above the deposit rate, rb > rd. Then:
1. Payment is more likely on open account (trade credit) terms, the longer the two firms
have traded.
2. This effect is the stronger, the more complex is the product that is traded.
The proposition is quite intuitive. The longer two firms trade with each other, the more
likely they will fulfill their contracts. The key advantage of trade credit is that it saves
on financing costs as compared to cash-in-advance. Through learning, contract enforcement
becomes less of an issue and financing costs differences matter for the contract choice. There-
fore, as firms learn that their trading partners are reliable they tend to favor trade credit over
cash-in-advance. The effect of repeated interactions is stronger for complex products. With
complex products enforcement frictions are more severe to begin with but this also creates
a stronger effect from learning, leading to a sharper rise in trade credit within relationships
over time.
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2.2.4 Price Predictions
We now look at the relationship between the payment terms and prices. To fully assess
the price effects, let revenues and final sales prices be endogenous to the payment form. Let
pOAf and p
CIA
f denote the prices charged to final consumers and c denote constant marginal
costs. Assume that firms operate under monopolistic competition and that consumers have
standard CES preferences of the form q = p−σA.18 Then, the relative (per unit) price
between open account and cash-in-advance is given by:
POA/QOA
PCIA/QCIA
=
1 + r∗b
λ˜
pOAf
pCIAf
(2.15)
Optimal final sales prices are:19
pOAf =
1 + rb
λ˜∗
σ
σ − 1c; p
CIA
f =
1 + r∗b
λ˜
σ
σ − 1c. (2.16)
Combining the equations delivers:
POA/QOA
PCIA/QCIA
=
1 + rb
λ˜∗
(2.17)
Proposition 3. All else equal, the price charged by the seller to the buyer is higher under
open account than under cash in advance. This price difference increases in the interest rate
of the seller rb and decreases in the enforcement in the country of the buyer λ
∗.
Proof. See equation (2.55).
The proposition is quite intuitive. By providing trade credit (offering open account), the
seller takes on the financing cost and the risk that the buyer does not pay after delivery.
18More specifically, assume the following demand: Q =
(∫
q (z)
σ−1
σ dz
) σ
σ−1
, with the ideal price index
P =
(∫
p (z)
1−σ
dz
) 1
1−σ
. In this context, aggregate demand A = PσQ.
19Details on the derivation of prices are provided in Appendix 2.B.1.
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The seller hence needs to be compensated for these two factors implying a higher unit price
paid by the buyer. Interestingly, with a constant markup, this price ratio is independent of
the distribution of bargaining power as we show in section ??.
2.2.5 CES Demand and Wholesale Markup
In this section we discuss the main predictions of the model for the cases of (i) endogenous
revenues and costs, and (ii) wholesale markups. This last extension is important, because
the wholesale markup is the object we use for testing the predictions of our theory.
CES Preferences We begin reviewing the case of CES preferences. To simplify the dis-
cussion, we only present the main results here. Details can be found in Appendix 2.B.3.
Assume again standard CES preferences with implied aggregate demand A = P σQ. The
Nash Products given optimal price decisions can be derived as:
NPOA = B
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ, (2.18)
NPCIA = B(1 + rd)
θ(1 + r∗b )
−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
. (2.19)
with B = θθ(1 − θ)1−θ c1−σ
σ−1A
(
σ
σ−1
)−σ
. From this, it follows that open account is preferred
over cash in advance if:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
> 0. (2.20)
In the symmetric case, this condition simplifies to:
(1 + rb)
θ >
(
λ˜
)1−θ
(1 + rd)
θ, (2.21)
the same condition we derived earlier in equation (2.48). To study the role of the markup
under CES preferences, we can take the derivative of condition (2.60) with respect to the
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elasticity of substitution σ which delivers:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ ln
(
λ˜∗
1 + rb
)
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
ln
(
λ˜
1 + r∗b
)
(2.22)
In the symmetric case, as ln
(
λ˜
1+rb
)
< 0, this derivative is negative if:
(1 + rb)
θ >
(
λ˜
)1−θ
(1 + rd)
θ, (2.23)
which is the case when rb > rd. More generally, the derivative (2.62) is negative when
r∗b > rd and interest rates and enforcement are not too different across countries. A negative
derivative implies that trade credit becomes more attractive when markups go up (lower
σ), in line with Proposition 4. Moreover, as in Proposition 4, equation (2.62) implies that
the effect of the markup is stronger when the destination country borrowing rate and the
destination country enforcement are higher, and when the source country deposit rate and
source country enforcement are lower.
Wholesale Markup So far, we have solved the model for the full markup between final
consumer prices and marginal production costs, captured by µ = R/C. In the following
we derive results as a function of the intermediate (or wholesale) markups, that is the
prices charged to the buyer by the seller over marginal costs, µOAW = P
OA/COA and µCIAW =
PCIA/CCIA.
With endogenous revenues and costs, wholesale markups differ between open account
and cash-in-advance. In appendix 2.B.3 we show that the wholesale markups are given by:
µOAW =
1 + rb
λ˜∗
(
(1− θ) + θ σ
σ − 1
)
(2.24)
µCIAW =
(
(1− θ) + θ σ
σ − 1
)
(2.25)
Equations (2.64) and (2.65) are quite intuitive. They show that the markup obtained by
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the seller is a fraction of the full markup. This fraction depends on the degree of bargaining
power the seller has. In particular, when the seller has all the bargaining power (θ = 1), she
captures the full markup between final price and marginal cost. In the other extreme, when
the buyer has all the bargaining power (θ = 0), the seller only receives the production costs
(adjusted for the financing cost and enforcement friction in the open account case).
In Appendix 2.B.3, we show that in the CES case, open account is preferred over cash in
advance if:
[
(λ˜∗)θ−1+σ(1 + rb)1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ(λ˜)σ
] (
µCIAW − 1
)
> 0. (2.26)
Or expressed as a function of the open account wholesale markup:
[
(λ˜∗)θ−1+σ(1 + rb)1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ(λ˜)σ
](
µOAW −
1 + rb
λ˜∗
)
> 0. (2.27)
This conditions imply the same predictions as those derived for the full markups. The
preference for trade credit increases in the markup and this effect becomes stronger when r∗b
and λ∗ are larger and when rb and λ are smaller.
2.3 Empirical Framework
2.3.1 Estimating Markups
In the model, markups for each seller and product vary at the level of buyers located
in different destinations. In practice, however, the computation of markups at this level
of disaggregation is unfeasible, because it imposes severe data requirements that cannot be
satisfied when using information for multiple industries and markets.20 Hence, to test the
20Deriving markups at the buyer-seller-product level requires either detailed market or production informa-
tion at the level of buyers and products. These data requirements are rarely fulfilled. A notable exception is
Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello, and Noguera (2019), who uses detailed information for the Bangladeshi garment
industry to derive markups at the buyer-seller-product level.
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predictions of the theory we shut down the seller’s dimension, and compute markups at the
seller-product level using the methodology proposed by De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal,
and Pavcnik (2016). The main advantage of this methodology is that it allows to compute
markups abstracting from market-level demand information. It only requires to assume that
firms minimize cost for each product, and that at least one input is fully flexible.
The starting point in De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016), is to
consider the firm’s cost minimization problem. After rearranging the first-order condition
of problem for any flexible input V , the markup of product p produced by firm i at time t
(µipt) can be computed as the ratio between the output elasticity of product j with respect
to the flexible input V (θVipt) and expenditure share of the flexible input V (relative to the
sales of product p; sVipt ≡ P ViptVipt/PiptQipt):21
µipt︸︷︷︸
Markup
≡ Pipt
MCipt
=
θVipt
sVipt
, (2.28)
where P (P V ) denotes the price of output Q (input V ), and MC is marginal cost. While
the numerator of equation (2.28) – the input-output elasticity of product j – needs to be
estimated, the denominator is directly observable in our data. We next explain the procedure
we follow for deriving each of these elements.
Input-output elasticity. To estimate the input-output elasticities, we specify production
functions for each product p using labor (L), capital(K) and materials (M) as production
inputs:
Qipt = ΩitF (Kipt, Lipt,Mipt) (2.29)
21The derivation of (2.28) assumes that multi-product firms are equivalent to a collection of single-product
firms; thus, this setup does not allow for economies of scope in production. Below, we show that our results
also hold for single-product firms.
63
where Q is physical output, and Ω denotes firm’s productivity. There are three important
assumptions on equation (2.29). First, the production function is product-specific, which im-
plies that single and multi-product firms use the same technology to produce a given product.
However, second, productivity is firm-specific. Finally, as is standard in the estimation of
production functions, we assume Hicks-Neutrality, so that Ω is log-additive.
The estimation of (2.29) follows De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016)
in using the subset of single-product firms to identify the coefficients of the production
function.22 Different from them, we deflate inputs expenditure with firm-specific input price
indexes to avoid that the so-called input price bias affect the estimated coefficients (see De
Loecker and Goldberg 2014).23
Our baseline specification assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, and allows for
the presence of a log-additive non-anticipated shock (ε).24 Taking logs to (2.29), we obtain
qipt = α
j
kkipt + α
j
l lipt + α
j
mmipt + ωit + εipt (2.30)
The estimation of (2.30) follows Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) (henceforth, ACF),
who extend the methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) to control for the endogeneity of firms’ inputs choice –which is based on the actual
level of firms’ productivity.25 To identify the coefficients of the production function, we build
moments based on the productivity innovation ξ. We specify the following process for the
22The reason for using only single-product firms, is that for this set of firms there is no need of specifying
how inputs are distributed across individual outputs.
23In De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016), input prices are not available in their sample
of Indian firms, so they implement a correction to control for input price variation. See the Appendix 2.C.1
for a detailed explanation on the construction of the price index we use in our sample of Chilean firms.
24A shortcoming of the Cobb-Douglas specification is that it assumes that input-output elasticities are
constant across firms, and over time. On the other hand, the Cobb-Douglas specification is widely used,
allowing for a more direct comparison of our results with other estimates in the literature. In the robustness
checks section we present results with derived using a more flexible Translog production function, which
allows for different types of complementarities among production inputs. Results are quantitatively similar,
although coefficients are slightly less precisely estimated than with the Cobb-Douglas baseline.
25ACF show that the labor elasticity is in most cases unidentified by the two-stage method of Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
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law of motion of productivity:
ωit = g(ωit−1, dxit−1, d
i
it−1, d
x
it−1 × diit−1, sˆit−1) + ξit (2.31)
where dx is an export dummy, di is a categorical variable for periods with positive investment,
and sˆ is the probability that the firm remains single-product. The endogenous productiv-
ity process (2.31) follows the corrections suggested by De Loecker (2013), allowing firms’
productivity path to be affected by past exporting and investment decisions. In addition,
it follows De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) in including the proba-
bility of remaining single-product to correct for the bias that results from firm switching
non-randomly from single to multi-product.
The first step of the ACF procedure involves expressing productivity in terms of observ-
ables. To do so, we use inverse material demand ht(·) as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
to proxy for unobserved productivity, and estimate expected output φt(kit, lit,mit; xit) to
remove the unanticipated shock component εit from (2.30).
26 Then, the ACF procedure
exploits this representation to express productivity as a function of data and parameters:
ωit(α) = φˆt(·)−αkkit−αllit−αmmit, and form the productivity innovation ξit from (2.31) as
a function of the parameters α. The second step of ACF routine forms moment conditions
on ξit to identify all parameters α through GMM:
E(ξit(α) · Zit) = 0 (2.32)
where Zit contains lagged materials, labor, and capital, and current capital. Once the
parameters are estimated, the input-output elasticities are recovered for each product as
θVipt ≡ ∂ logQipt/∂ log Vipt. For the Cobb-Douglas case, θVipt = αjV , so that the input-output
elasticity is constant for all plants producing a given product p.27
26The vector xit includes other variables affecting material demand, such as time and product dummies.
We approximate φt(·) with a full second-degree polynomial in capital, labor and materials.
27In the Translog case, the input elasticities θVipt depends on firms’ input use. This information is directly
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Implementation. To derive markups, we use materials as the relevant flexible input to
compute the output elasticity. While in principle, labor could also be used to compute
markups, the existence of long-term contracts and firing costs make firms less likely to
adjust labor after the occurrence of shocks. The second component needed in (2.28) to
compute markups is the expenditure share, which requires to identify the assignment of
firms’ inputs across outputs produced by the firm. To implement this, we follow Garcia-
Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2018) and exploit a unique feature of our data: ENIA provide
information on total variable costs (labor cost and materials) for each product produced by
the firms. We use this information to proxy for product-specific input use assuming that
inputs are used approximately in proportion to the variable cost shares, so that the value of
materials’ expenditure Mipt = P
V
iptVipt is computed as
M˜ipt = ρipt · M˜it, where ρipt = TV Cipt∑
j TV Cipt
. (2.33)
Finally, we compute the expenditure share dividing the value of material inputs by product-
specific revenues, which are observed in the data.
Note that the markup measure we compute corresponds to wholesale markups, because
our data only provide information for wholesale revenues. Nevertheless, as we discuss in
section 2.6.5, all the main predictions of the baseline model hold both when markups are in
terms of final consumer and for wholesale price.
2.3.2 Empirical Specifications
Trade Credit and Markups We first test the theoretical predictions on the choice be-
tween open account (trade credit) and cash-in-advance. We start with the following baseline
observed in single-product firms. For multi-product firms, we derive inputs’ use by each output following
the same procedure we apply for computing the expenditure share of the inputs sVipt explained next.
66
regression:
ρipjt = β1 ln(µipt) + γ1 ln(Lit) + δi + δp + δjt + ipjt, (2.34)
where ρipjt denotes the share of open account value exported by firm i shipping product
p to country j at time t, and µipt corresponds to firm-product level markups. The main
prediction of the model is that β1 > 0, that is, all else equal, firms with larger markups
should sell more on open account. The baseline specification include firm fixed-effects (δi)
to control for time-invariant factors affecting firms’ open account share, and product-fixed
effects (δj) to account for differences in product characteristics leading to dispersion in trade
credit use. In addition, we include destination-year fixed effects (δjt) to account for country-
level characteristics directly affecting trade credit choice for all firms, such as the strength
of contract enforcement in the destination country (Antra`s and Foley 2015). Finally, we
include firm employment (Lit) to control for the effect of differences in firm size on trade
credit use.
Next, we test the second main prediction of the model. According to our theory, the
effect of markups on trade credit decreases in the seller’s deposit rate and increases in the
buyer’s borrowing rate and the destination country’s contract enforcement. To test these
predictions, we modify the baseline specification (2.34) including interaction terms between
firm-product markups, interest rates and contract enforcement:
ρijpt = β1 ln(µipt) + β2 ln(µipt) r
∗
b,jt + β3 ln(µipt) rd,jt
+β4 ln(µipt) λ
∗
jt + δit + δjt + δp + ijpt, (2.35)
From the theory we expect β2 > 0, β3 < 0, and β4 > 0: the positive effect of markups
increases with the destination-country borrowing rate, r∗b , decreases with the source-country
deposit rate, rd, and increases with the destination-country enforcement, λ
∗.
One potential concern with respect to our baseline specification is that it relies on the
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exogeneity of markups, which may not hold if exporters charge higher markups in transac-
tions involving trade credit. Our discussion in 2.6.5 reveals that this is indeed the case in
the case of CES demand. This concern is, however, mitigated to a large extent when we
compute markups at the seller-product level, because the endogenous response of markup
to trade credit choice is mitigated when averaging across destinations. Thus, even if firms
charge higher markups on transactions involving trade credit, the resulting bias should be
relatively modest, especially for firm-products with sales well diversified across markets, or
with low participation in export markets. Later in the next section we build on this insight
and show that our results largely hold for the subset of firms with low exposure to export
markets.
We note, however, that the endogeneity of markups to trade credit choice does not
disappear when averaging markups across destinations. To address this concern, we apply a
battery of additional tests to evaluate if the bias is substantial, including fixing markups at
their initial value for each seller-product, and computing markups at the firm-level (diluting
even more the markups’ endogeneity). In all cases, results hold to a great extent, suggesting
that the potential endogeneity of markups does not drive the correlation between markups
and trade credit choice. Finally, note that when testing predictions involving interactions
between markups and importing country characteristics, we apply an even more strict test
for our theory including firm-year, and firm-product-year fixed effects. The fact that the
results are in line with the main theory in this case as well is reassuring and suggests that
the overall mechanism holds in the data.
Prices and Trade Credit To test the price predictions of the model, we specify a simple
baseline regression testing for a price difference between open account and cash-in-advance
by estimating the following regression at the transaction level:
ln UVipjt = β1 IOAipjt + Γ′Xijpt + δipj + δit + δjt + εipjt, (2.36)
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where UVipjt is the unit values of sales by firm i of product p to destination j at time t and
Xipjt is a vector of controls including the value of the shipment and the total value of all
previous shipments for the same firm-product-destination. The model predicts a higher price
for open-account transactions, that is β1 > 0. Next, we check the model prediction that the
seller interest rate and the buyer enforcement should affect the price difference between open
account and cash-in-advance transactions. We thus estimate:
ln UVipjt = β1 IOAipjt + β2 ILAW∗jt · IOA + β3 rbjt · IOA + Γ′Xijpt + δipj + δit + δjt + εipjt (2.37)
Based on the theory, we expect β2 < 0 and β3 > 0. We include as controls the FOB
value of the transaction to control for the existence of volume discounts, and the cumulative
firm-product sales within each destination (excluding the value of the current transaction),
to account for the effect of buyer-seller relationships (see Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
2018).
2.4 Data
We use two main datasets to test the main predictions of the model. Both datasets cover
different pieces of information for the universe of Chilean manufacturing exporters over the
period 2003-2007. This section reviews the main features of these data sources, describes
the sample of our analysis, and provides descriptive evidence on the nature of the data.
The first data source is the Chilean National Customs Service, and provides transaction-
level data for the universe of Chilean exports. The data is available for the 90 main des-
tinations of Chilean exports, which account for over 99.7% of the value of overall national
exports in our sample period. For each export transaction, the dataset details the identity
of the exporter, the importing country, a product description and the 8-digit HS code to
which the product belongs, the date of the transaction, the FOB value and volume of the
merchandise, and the financing mode of the export transaction. While the data allows to
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identify if each transactions was paid in advance (cash-in-advance – CIA), post-shipment
(open account – OA), or with other modes (such as letters of credit, or other two-part con-
tract), we focus on open account transactions to test the trade credit theory. Open account
transactions represent about 90 percent of the transactions, and 83 percent of the export
value of manufacturing exporters in our sample (see figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Open Account Transactions in the Chilean Data
88.4
89.5 89.3
90.8
92.0
80.8
83.8
82.5
80.6 81.1
70
80
90
10
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Unweighted Weighted (FOB)
Notes: The figure shows the aggregate share of open account transactions among Chilean manufacturing
exporters, for the period 2003-2007. The blue bars show the share of open account transactions by year; the
gray bars weight transactions by their FOB value.
We complement the transaction-level data from customs with production-level data from
the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (Annual National Industrial Survey – ENIA). ENIA
is collected by the Chilean National Statistical Agency (INE), and provides annual produc-
tion information for the universe of Chilean manufacturing plants with 10 or more employees,
according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. It sur-
veys approximately 4,900 manufacturing plants per year, out of which 20% are exporters.
ENIA provides standard micro-level information (e.g., sales, inputs expenditures, employ-
ment, investment), and detailed information for each good produced (sales value, production
cost, number of unit produced and sold), and inputs purchased by the firm (value and volume
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for each input purchased by the plant). Outputs and inputs products are defined according
to Central Product Classification (CPC) at the 8-digit level, identifying 1,190 products over
2003-2007.28
We use two additional data sources to obtain information on the destination countries’
characteristics. First, we obtain information for the importing countries’ deposit and lending
rate, as well as for domestic inflation from the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics. We use this data to construct real (ex-post) interest rates as the differ-
ence between the nominal rates and the realized inflation in the respective year. Second, we
use the Rule of Law index constructed by the World Bank’s World Government Indicator
to proxy for the likelihood of contract enforcement in each country.
The main issue in combining data from Customs and ENIA at the firm-product level
is that product are classified using different nomenclatures in both datasets. To deal with
this issue, we follow several steps. First, we use United Nations’ correspondence tables to
determine the list of HS products that could potentially be matched to each CPC product
in ENIA.29 We then merge the resulting dataset with customs data at the firm-HS-year
level. This procedure results in two cases: (i) All exported HS products in customs within
a firm-year pair are merged to ENIA, and (ii) Only a fraction (or none) of the exported
products are matched to ENIA within a firm-year pair. For the latter cases, whenever there
is concordance within 4-digit HS categories, we manually merge observations based on HS
and CPC product’s descriptions. Borderline cases (no clear connection between product
descriptions), as well as cases with no concordance at the 4-digit HS level are dropped. In
addition, to ensure a consistent dataset, we exclude: (i) plant-product-year observations that
have zero values for raw materials expenditure, sales, or product quantities, with extreme
values for markups (above the 98th or below the 2nd percentiles), and (ii) destination-year
pairs with extreme values of the real borrowing rates to avoid the influence of extreme values
28For example, the wine industry (ISIC 3132) is disaggregated by CPC into 4 different categories:
“Sparkling wine”, “Wine of fresh grapes”, “Cider”, and “Mosto”.
29The correspondence table establishes matches between 5-digit CPC and 6-digit HS products. This level
of disaggregation corresponds to 783 5-digit CPC products.
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resulting from inflationary or deflationary episodes.30 Table 1 provides summary statistics
for the final dataset.31
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transaction Characteristics
Open Account Dummy 0.9006 0.2992 1 1 1 1,016,523
Export Value (US$) 82,258.1 601,595.4 3,777.2 13,638.5 35,806.8 1,016,523
Unit Value (in logs; demeaned) 0 0.4711 -0.1752 -0.0096 0.1522 1,014,147
Firm-product Characteristics
Employment (at the firm level) 273.1 522.3 51 119 283 3,546
Markups 1.255 0.538 0.882 1.111 1.466 26,584
# Transactions by firm-product-year 38.2 165.7 1 5 21 26,584
# Destinations by firm-product-year 3.5 5.3 1 1 4 26,584
Country Characteristics
Rule of Law Index 0.36189 1.00966 -0.56894 0.38070 1.26830 362
Foreign borrowing rate 0.05466 0.04521 0.02717 0.04505 0.06924 362
Chilean deposit rate 0.00929 0.00579 0.00879 0.00883 0.01202 362
Chilean borrowing rate 0.03989 0.00442 0.03625 0.04072 0.04263 362
Notes: The table lists the summary statistics for the variables used in the paper’s baseline analysis
sample. It comprises transaction-level data for the universe of Chilean manufacturing exporters that
can be matched to the Chilean Annual Manufacturing Survey (ENIA), over the period 2003-2007.
Descriptive Evidence. Before turning to the main econometric results, we explore the
raw data seeking to determine whether the main mechanism holds unconditionally. Figure
2.2 shows our main result – trade credit use increases with firm-product level markups. The
figure plots a binscatter diagram for the open account share – defined as the percent of
export value financed through open account – against firm-product markup (in logarithms).
30In practice, this correction drops country-years with real borrowing rates above 35%, and below -4%.
31Table 2.D.1 in appendix 2.D provides more detailed summary statistics for markups, aggregated at the
2-digit level.
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Both variables represent residuals after taking out country-year fixed effects. As it is evident
in the figure, there is a positive relationship between the open account share and markups in
the data. This provides support to proposition 4.i): trade credit use increases with markups.
The association is relatively stronger for the bottom half of the markup distribution, and it
fades out for high markup values. This suggests that the markup mechanism as a reason
for firm-to-firm lending is more prominent in firms with low markups. In the econometric
specifications, we study if this non-linear relation holds when controlling for other variables
affecting trade credit choice and a richer set of fixed-effects.
Figure 2.2: Open Account Share and Markups
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Notes: The figure shows a binscatter diagram for the open account share against markups for a
sample of 1,642 Chilean exporters over 2003-2007. Markups are computed at the firm-product
level following the methodology by De Loecker et al (2016). Open account share is competed at
the firm-product-destination level. Both variables control for country-year fixed effects.
The theoretical framework in section 2.6 predicts that the markup and foreign borrowing
rate are complementary in their effect on trade credit choice. To study if this prediction
holds in the data, we split the data in terms of trade credit extended to high interest rate
and low interest rate destinations, depending on whether the foreign borrowing rate is above
or below the median rate across years and destinations, respectively. The resulting binscatter
diagrams are plotted in Figure 2.3. The left panel shows trade credit in high interest rate
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countries, while the right panel focuses on low interest rate countries. Consistent with the
theory, the figure shows that the positive correlation between trade credit and markups is
stronger for exports to high interest rate countries.
Several other observations based on Figure 2.3 are noteworthy. First, trade credit differ-
ences in high- and low-interest rate destinations mostly come from firm-products with low
markups. In contrast, firm-products charging high markups extend similar high levels of
trade credit, regardless on whether destination has high or low borrowing rates. Second, one
may argue that the relatively stronger relation between trade credit and markups in high
interest rate destinations is due to other confounding factors, such as low financial devel-
opment and contract enforcement. The fact that both panels control for destination-year
fixed-effects mitigates this possibility, accounting for third factors affecting both high and
low markup firm-products.32 However, this does not completely dissipate questioning re-
garding identification. In the next section, we present a richer analysis based on regression
analysis, allowing us to include additional controls and a richer set of fixed effect to control
for alternative mechanisms.
32In a complementary exercise – available upon request – we split the sample further using using destination
countries’ rule of law and financial development. This exercise reveals that most of the effect in high interest
rate destinations comes from the fact that low markup firms extend less trade credit to buyers in countries
with low contract enforcement and financial development.
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Figure 2.3: Open Account Share, Markups and Interest Rates
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Low Interest Rate Destinations
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Notes: The figures show the open account share and markups of Chilean firms. Markups are
computed at the firm-product level following the methodology by De Loecker et al (2016). Open
account share is computed at the firm-product-destination level. Panel A considers export
destinations with borrowing rate above the median rate across destinations. Panel B considers
export destinations with borrowing rate below the median rate across destinations.
2.5 Econometric Results
In this section, we test the theoretical predictions of the model we developed in section 2.6
using the Chilean customs-level data introduced in the previous section. We begin studying
the predictions on the relationship between firm-product level markups and trade credit
choice. Next, we explore how the length of trade relationships affects the choice of contract
payment. Finally, we show results for trade credit and product prices.
2.5.1 Trade Credit, Markups and Interest Rates
Baseline Results
We first test the theoretical predictions on the choice between open account (trade credit)
and cash-in-advance. Table 2.2 presents results from the estimation of equation (2.34). In
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line with the model, the estimated coefficient for the markup has a positive sign and is
highly significant across all specifications, suggesting that that firms that have a higher
markup sell more on trade credit. Column 1 identifies the effect of firm-product markups on
trade credit exploiting temporal variation within firm-destinations. Next, in columns 2-3 we
study whether the inclusion of destination-year fixed effects changes the quantitative effect of
markups on trade credit. As it can be seen, the coefficient on markups is largely unaffected
by the inclusion of destination-year fixed-effects. Across specifications, the coefficient on
markups is very stable and fluctuates between 0.019 and 0.021. In quantitative terms, the
estimated effect suggests that an increase of one standard deviation in firm-product markup
(37.3 percent), increases the likelihood of using trade credit by 70–78 basis points.33
33The moderate magnitude of the markups effect should not be surprising after considering the pervasive-
ness of trade credit use: in our sample, about 90% of the transactions involve trade credit (see Figure 2.1).
Consequently, firm-products with already high open account share have a smaller margin to increase with
markups, attenuating the effect of markups on trade credit. Below we revisit the question on the magnitude
of the markup mechanism using a logit transformation on the open account share and show that the average
response increases substantially using this alternative specification.
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Table 2.2: Open Account Share and Firm-Product Markup: Baseline Regressions
Markup Proxy: — Baseline — Initial Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(markup) .0202*** .0211*** .0185*** .0379*** .0731***
(.00443) (.00467) (.00474) (.0133) (.0206)
ln(employment) .00109 .00152 .00248 .000792 .000893
(.00424) (.00474) (.00488) (.00469) (.00469)
Firm-Destination FE — — — —
Year FE — — — —
HS8 FE —
Firm FE — —
Destination-Year FE —
Firm-HS8 FE — — — —
Observations 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507
R2 .691 .368 .408 .368 .368
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.34). All regressions are
run at the firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open
account shares are computed as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions
to the FOB value of all export transactions over a year. Markups are computed at the
firm-product level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-product level.
Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Next, we move to study whether reverse causality from trade credit choice to markups
could explain the positive correlation reported in above. For this, we construct two alter-
native markup measures, first fixing markups at their value when firm-products are first
observed in the sample (column 4, Table 2.2), and then, computing the average markup
within firm-product across all years (column 5, Table 2.2). Note that by construction,
both specifications shut-down all temporal variation within firm-products, and since we in-
clude firm and product fixed effects, the possibility of open account choice leading to higher
markups is reduced to a great extent. Nevertheless, in both cases the coefficient on markups
is positive and highly significant – despite the limited variation we exploit by imposing firm
and product fixed effects.
Table 2.3 provides further evidence on the positive effect of markups on trade credit
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choice, restricting the sample to the set of firms with relatively low export participation.
The aim of this exercise is to check the robustness of the baseline estimates when focusing
on a sample where average markups mostly reflect firms’ pricing decision in the domestic
market. We report results for three different subsamples of firms, according to their overall
export share. We begin with the sample of exporters with at most 50% export share, and then
move to plants with less than 25%, and 10% export share. As can be seen, when using the
baseline markup measure, coefficients lie between .021 and .036 – although the coefficient
is less precisely estimated as we increasingly restrict the sample. Results in columns (4)
through (6) replicate the exercise using markups fixed at their initial value within firm-
products, while columns (7) through (9) use the average markup within firm-products. In
all these cases, coefficient are positive, and highly significant, strengthening the evidence on
the positive effect of markups on trade credit choice.
Table 2.3: Open Account Share and Markup – Sample of Firms with Low Export Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Markup measure —— Baseline —— —– Initial Markup —– —– Average Markup —–
Export share < 50% < 25% < 10% < 50% < 25% < 10% < 50% < 25% < 10%
ln(markup) .0357*** .0213* .0251 .0723*** .1010*** .0952*** .1132*** .1298*** .0629*
(.00903) (.0122) (.0194) (.0181) (.0208) (.0289) (.0255) (.0287) (.0357)
ln(employment) -.0287*** -.0132 -.0189 -.0291*** -.0132 -.0184 -.0287*** -.0126 -.0189
(.00759) (.0122) (.0206) (.00761) (.0122) (.0205) (.00761) (.0122) (.0205)
HS8 FE
Firm FE
Country-Year FE
Observations 40,011 26,655 14,762 40,011 26,655 14,762 40,011 26,655 14,762
R2 .441 .493 .540 .441 .494 .541 .441 .494 .540
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.34). All regressions are run at the
firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account shares are computed
as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of all export transactions over
a year. Markups are computed at the firm-product level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the firm-product level. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Interactions
We now analyze the second main prediction of the model. According to our theory,
the effect of markups on trade credit decreases in the seller’s deposit rate and increases in
the buyer’s borrowing rate and the destination country’s contract enforcement. This is an
important check for the mechanism, as testing the interaction terms allows for the inclusion
of a more complete set of fixed effects, thereby reducing concerns of omitted variable bias.
Table 2.4: Open Account Share and Firm-Product Markup: Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(markup) -.0215 -.0182 -.0264 -.0373 — — — —
(.0199) (.0310) (.0316) (.0328)
ln(markup)×(r∗b -rd) .291** — — — .308** — — —
(.121) (.136)
ln(markup)×r∗b — .291** .325*** .343*** — .308** .342** .364**
(.121) (.126) (.128) (.136) (.141) (.143)
ln(markup)×rd — -.661 -.612 -.682 — — — —
(2.487) (2.489) (2.492)
ln(markup)× Law — — .0211 — — — .0212 —
(.0151) (.0164)
ln(markup)× DomCred — — — .0234* — — — .0252*
(.0123) (.0134)
Firm-Year FE — — — —
HS8 FE — — — —
Destination-Year FE
Firm-HS8-Year FE — — — —
Observations 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507 93,507
R2 .420 .420 .420 .420 .437 .437 .438 .438
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.35). All regressions are run at
the firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account shares are
computed as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of all export
transactions over a year. Markups are computed at the firm-product level (product are defined at the
5-digit CPC level). All regressions control for the logarithm of firm employment. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the firm-destination level. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Table 2.4 present the results from estimating (2.35); we report standard errors clustered
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at the firm-destination level. Columns (1) through (4) show results using separate firm-year
and product (defined at the 8-digit HS level) fixed-effects, while columns (5) through (8)
use firm-product-year fixed effects. Consequently, in the latter set of regressions, the level of
markups, and its interaction with the domestic lending rate is not identified.
Results in Table 2.4 confirm the main predictions of the model. In Column (1) the coeffi-
cient on the interaction between markups and the difference between the buyer’s borrowing
rate and the seller’s deposit rate is positive and significant. Splitting the effects of the inter-
est rate difference into the effects of the two individual interest rates in Columns (2) through
(4) further confirms the theory. The coefficient on the seller’s deposit rate, rd, is negative
and the coefficient on the buyer’s borrowing rate, r∗b is positive, although only the latter
is statistically significant. The interaction interest rate terms have a similar quantitative
effect as the baseline markup effect. Consider two firms at the 25th (markup 0.88) and
75th percentile (markup 1.47) of the markup distribution. A one standard deviation higher
borrowing rate (4.5 percentage points) in the destination country makes trade credit use in
about 77 basis points more likely. Columns (3) and (4) present results on contract enforce-
ment using the destination country’s rule of law index, and domestic credit in the destination
countries as proxies for contract enforcement. As predicted by the theory, a stronger enforce-
ment abroad strengthens the relationship between the markup and trade credit provision,
although the coefficient on the interaction term is only significant at the 10% level for the
latter case. Next, columns (5) through (8) repeat the analysis in the previous columns, but
include firm-product-year fixed-effects. Results are largely consistent with estimates in the
previous columns and the magnitudes of the coefficients are very stable, suggesting that the
coefficients are most likely not subject to omitted variable bias occurring at the firm-product
level.
To summarize, we find evidence that firms with larger markups extend more trade credit.
Moreover, as predicted by the theory, this effect increases in the buyer’s borrowing rate and
the destination country’s rule of law and decreases in the seller’s deposit rate.
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Robustness and Additional Results
We performed a number of robustness tests using alternative specifications, and consid-
ered a series of extensions. In this subsection we discuss the most important of them (in some
cases we summarize the results without providing detailed tables; many of these, however,
are provided in the Appendix and/or are available on request):
Translog Markups. One potential concern with respect to our results is that they rely on
the correct estimation of markups. Our baseline markup measures are computed using input-
ouput elasticities derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function (see equation 2.28).
One shortcoming of this specification is that it imposes constant elasticities across all firms
producing the same product. If firms with higher trade credit use have a lower input-
output elasticity, then imposing constant input elasticities would lead us to overestimate
the positive relationship between trade credit and markups. To analyze whether the Cobb-
Douglas specification drives our results, in Table 2.5, we present results using markups
derived from the more flexible translog production function, which allows for a rich set of
interactions between the different inputs.34 Columns (1) through (3) of Table 2.5 estimate
the baseline level regression using average translog markups. As in the baseline case, the
open account share shows a strong positive relationship with markups. The coefficients in
Table 2.5 are very similar and not statistically different than the baseline case (compare
them with the corresponding coefficients in Table 2.2). This suggests that input elasticities
do not systematically vary with trade credit across firm-products.35
34We use a second order Translog specification. In this case, materials input elasticity varies with the
usage of all input, and is computed as θMipt = α
p
m + 2α
p
mmmipt + α
p
kmkipt + α
p
lmlipt.
35In Table 2.D.3 the appendix we replicate Table 2.4 using the interaction between translog markups,
interest rates and rule of law. Again, results are very similar to the baseline Cobb-Douglas markups.
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Table 2.5: Markups and Open Account Share: Alternative Markup Proxies
Markup Proxy: — Translog Markup — — Avg. Price-Cost Margin —
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(markup) .0205*** .0187*** .0206*** .0324*** .0324*** .0361*
(.00452) (.00447) (.00493) (.0116) (.0116) (.0187)
ln(employment) .00645 .00222 .00526 .000602 -.00310 .000267
(.00429) (.00445) (.00497) (.00407) (.00416) (.00474)
Firm-Destination FE — —
Year FE — — — —
HS8 FE — —
Firm FE — — — —
Destination-Year FE — — — —
Observations 91,291 91,291 91,291 86,746 86,746 86,746
R2 .664 .665 .368 .668 .669 .361
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.34). All regressions are run at
the firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account shares are
computed as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of all export
transactions over a year. Markups in columns 1–3 are computed at the firm-product-year level; average
price-cost margins in columns 4–6 are computed at the firm-product level (products are defined at the
5-digit CPC level). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-product level. Key: ***
significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Average product margin. An additional proxy for markups that we can compute in
our sample are product-level price-cost margins. ENIA report the variable production cost
per product, defined as the sum of raw material and direct labor costs involved in the
production of each product. Product margins can be derived dividing prices (unit values)
over this reported measure of average variable cost. Note that average variable cost are self-
reported by managers, making the application of rules of thumb likely. As we discuss in the
Appendix, reported margins tend to align more closely with markups and other measures of
profitability over longer time periods. Consequently, we use firm-product average margins
computed over all periods as an alternative measure of markups. Columns (4) through (6)
of Table 2.5 estimate our baseline level regression using average price-cost margins. As can
be seen, using margins as a proxy for markups does not affect our results qualitatively.
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Coefficients are significantly larger than in the baseline case, but the range of variation of
the margins measure is smaller. Standard errors are slightly larger than in our baseline
case, which is consistent with the more limited variation of the average margin measure (the
unconditional standard deviation of average margins is about one-third smaller than in the
Cobb-Douglas benchmark).
Censoring. The dependent variable we use to analyze the effect of markups on trade credit
is a proportion with limited variation in the range 0-1. Since average trade credit is relatively
high in our sample (around 90% according to Figure 2.1), using the open account share as
the main dependent variable limits the potential response of trade credit use to markups for
firm-products with initially high trade credit use. In Table 2.6 we revisit the question on the
magnitude of the markup mechanism using a logit transformation on the open account share,
to pull out its variation over all of the real numbers. We run the following specification:
ln
(
ρijpt
1− ρijpt
)
= β1 ln(µipt) + γ1 ln(Lit) + δi + δp + δjt + ijpt, (2.38)
where ρ denotes the open account share. In this alternative specification, the marginal
response of the open account share ρ to markups is non-linear and varies with the amount of
trade credit use. In particular, it can be shown that the effect of log-markups over the open
account share can be computed as β1 × ρijpt × (1− ρijpt). Plugging in the coefficients from
Table 2.6, leads to an estimated implied open account share-markup elasticity of 0.041-0.044
for firm-products with open account share equal to the mean (90 percent in our sample).
This is almost twice the baseline coefficients estimated in Table 2.2.
Single-product firms. In order to estimate product-level and markups, we needed to
assign inputs to individual outputs in multi-product plants. This is not needed in single-
product plants, where inputs are used in the production of a single final product. Columns
(1) through (3) in Table 2.7 use only the subset of single-product firms to estimate the
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relationship between markups and trade credit use following equation (2.34). Despite the
fact that the sample is smaller, results for single-product plants remain statistically highly
significant and quantitatively similar to the full sample, with a coefficient of 0.036-0.039.
Table 2.6: Logistic Open Account Share Transformation
(1) (2) (3)
log(Markup) .491*** .465*** .461***
(.105) (.102) (.110)
ln(employment) .0447 -.0535 .0250
(.0999) (.102) (.113)
Implied Avg. Markup Semi-elasticity .0442 .0419 .0415
Firm-Destination FE —
Year FE — —
HS8 FE —
Firm FE — —
Destination-Year FE — —
Observations 93,507 93,507 93,507
R2 .645 .646 .365
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.34) using a logistic transformation
on the open account share as dependent variable. All regressions are run at the firm-product-destination
level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account shares are computed as the ratio of the
FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of all export transactions over a year.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-product level. Key: *** significant at 1%;
** 5%; * 10%.
Firm-level markups. An alternative strategy to determine the robustness of our results
is to compute markups at the firm-level. As in the case of single-product firms, computing
markups at the firm-level has the advantage that it avoids assigning inputs to individual
outputs. Results in columns (4) through (6) in Table 2.7 show that coefficients remain
quantitatively similar and stay statistically significant at the 1% level.
Further Robustness Checks. We performed a number of additional robustness checks;
here we discuss the results shown in more details in the appendix. The descriptive evidence
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presented in section 2.4 suggests a nonlinear relationship between markups trade credit use
in the raw data. However, when we include a quadratic markup term to the baseline re-
gression, the coefficient – although negative – is typically small and statistically insignificant
(t-statistic -0.20). In contrast, the linear markup term stays positive and its magnitude is
very similar to the baseline linear specification.36 We also tested whether adding further
control affected the main relation between markups and trade credit. First, we added the
log FOB value of firm-product level exports to control for the size of the export shipments.
The coefficient on the log FOB value is positive and statistically significant, but the markup
coefficient stayed unchanged. Next, to test whether the existence of previous export relations
could drive our results, we included the cumulative sum of the FOB value of all previous
shipments of the same product to each destination. While the cumulative exports coefficient
turned positive and statistically significant, the markup coefficient didn’t vary significantly,
confirming our main finding.
36We also tested potential non-linearities using markup quintiles instead of quadratic terms. Results
provide no evidence of a non-linear relation between markups and trade credit use.
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Table 2.7: Markups and Open Account Share: Alternative Markup Proxies
Sample/Markup Measure: — Single-Product Firms — — Firm-Level Markup —
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Markup) .0359*** .0377*** .0385*** .0275*** .0272*** .0270***
(.00726) (.00745) (.00782) (.00511) (.00510) (.00536)
ln(employment) -.0141** -.0158*** -.0122 .00765* .00365 .00566
(.00586) (.00598) (.00746) (.00420) (.00436) (.00486)
Firm-Destination FE — —
Year FE — — — —
HS8 FE — —
Firm FE — — — —
Destination-Year FE — — — —
Observations 44,589 44,589 44,589 94,184 94,184 94,184
R2 .688 .719 .384 .661 .662 .370
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.34). All regressions are run at
the firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account shares are
computed as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of all export
transactions over a year. Markups in columns 1–3 are computed at the firm-product-year level; average
price-cost margins in columns 4–6 are computed at the firm-product level (products are defined at the
5-digit CPC level). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-product level. Key: ***
significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
2.5.2 Trade Credit and Repeated Interactions
We now turn to evidence on trade credit and seller-buyer relationship length. According
to proposition 5, trade credit use tends to increase with the length of the relationships.
Moreover, the effect is larger for more complex products. To test these predictions, we
exploit the data at the transaction-level, and define relationships as in Antra`s and Foley
(2015) in terms of customer locations.
We begin exploring the relative use of financing terms in our data. Table 2.8 shows the
share of transactions financed through the main contracts in our data. Two broad patterns
emerge from the data. First, consistent with Figure 2.1, open account is the dominant
financing contract in the data. Almost 90 percent of the transactions are paid for this way.
In contrast, only 4 percent of the transactions are financed in cash-in-advance terms, and 5
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percent in letters of credit terms. Second, when focusing in new customers, the dominance of
open account is significantly dampened. Considering only first transactions for new export
destinations, 73 percent of them occur on open account terms, 15 percent in cash-in-advance
terms, and 8 percent in letter of credits terms. These patterns are strengthened when defining
relationships at the location-product level. In this case, open account transactions decrease
to 64 percent. Cash-in-advance increases to 20 percent, while the share of letters of credit
remains unchanged.
Table 2.8: Relative use of Financing Terms (%)
Open Account Cash in Letter of Other
Share Advance Share Credit Share Payment Forms
All customers 90.0 3.9 5.2 0.9
New Destinations 75.0 13.9 8.7 2.4
New Product and new Destination 67.9 16.6 8.6 6.9
Notes: The Table shows the percentage of transactions financed through open account terms (column
1), cash-in-advance terms (column2), letter of credit terms (column 3) and other forms of payment
(column 4). ‘New Destinations’ and ‘New Product and Destinations’ only considers the first day of the
relationship, defined at the destination and destination-product level, respectively.
This evidence is broadly consistent with results in Antra`s and Foley (2015), and suggests
that exporters tend to extend more trade credit to repeat as opposed to new customers.
Note however, that this finding is more surprising than may be evident. Antra`s and Foley
(2015) studied the special case of a large U.S. food exporter. From the perspective of buyers,
that firm was very reliable both because it was large and had been around for a long time
and because it was located in the Unites States, a country with strong contract enforcement.
In that special case, it is natural to start with cash-in-advance (or letters of credit) and then
move to open account over time. Our empirical analysis show that this pattern holds for the
universe of Chilean exporters: many relationships start on cash-in-advance terms and then
move to open account. This general pattern does not follow from the basic trade finance
model as developed in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Antra`s and Foley (2015) but can only be
rationalized by the model with costly financial intermediation and positive markups derived
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in this paper.
Next, we look at the role of relationship length. We define relationship length as the
cumulative number of transactions occurring from the beginning of the relationship.37 A
potential problem for computing this metric lies in the identification of the starting point of
the relation. We avoid this issue using transaction level-data from 2001 – two year before the
start of our sample – to identify the first time the firm exports to a given customer location.38
In this way, we reduce the possibility of bias in our results coming from censoring on the
starting date of the relationship. Note that we do not have a firm identifier in the destination
country. So when we observe a firm’s second trade transaction with a destination-product,
we do not know if the firm sells to the same buyer or a new buyer. While we acknowledge
this data limitation, we see our relationship length measure as a good proxy for the actual
underlying relationship length at the firm-pair-product level.
Figure 2.4 plots a binscatter diagram for the logarithm of relationship length and the
average use of three main financing contracts in our data. Panel A shows that the use
of open account increases almost monotonically with the length of the relationship. Only
75 percent of first transactions are financed in open account terms, but this percentage
increases with the age of the relationship, until that eventually all relationships use open
account. Panels B and C shows that the opposite occurs with transactions financed through
cash-in advance and letters of credit: these contracts tend to be used at the beginning of a
relationship, and cease to be used as a relationship ages. These evidence is consistent with
proposition 5.1, and suggests that firms are more likely to use trade credit as they learn
about their partner’s reliability.
37An alternative definition of relationship length is in terms of cumulative FOB sales within the relation-
ship. Since results are very similar to the main case, we relegate these results to the appendix.
38We have access to transaction-level data for the period 2001-2007, but we can only identify the use of
trade credit in a reliable way for the period 2003-2007. This explains the shorter time span used in the main
analysis involving trade credit use. See data section.
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Figure 2.4: Open Account Share and the the Length of the Relationship
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C. Letter of Credit
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Notes: The figure plots the frequency of use of the three main financial contracts in the Chilean data, and the length of the
buyer-seller relationship. Relationship length is defined as the cumulative number of transactions occurring from the beginning
of the relation. Relationships are defined as customer locations as in Antra`s and Foley (2015).
Finally, we study whether the pattern for open account and relationship length varies
with the degree of product complexity. We proxy for product complexity using the degree of
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product differentiation, as defined by Rauch’s (1999). Results are shown in Figure 2.5. The
plots show that the pattern for the open account share and the length of the relationship
is stronger for differentiated (left panel) than for non-differentiated products (right panel).
This provides support to proposition 5.2: learning has a stronger effect on trade credit
choice for differentiated (complex) products. According to our theory, this is due to the
fact that contract enforcement is harder in more complex products and thus learning has a
disproportionate effect on the payment choice for these products.
Figure 2.5: Relationships and Open Account Share
A. Differentiated
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B. Non-differentiated
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Notes: The figure plots the frequency of use of open account contracts and the length of the buyer-seller relationship.
Differentiated products are defined (at the 6-digit HS level) according to the liberal product classification of Rauch
(1999). Relationship length is defined as the cumulative number of transactions occurring from the beginning of the
relation. Relationships are defined as customer locations as in Antra`s and Foley (2015).
2.5.3 Trade Credit and Export Prices
We now turn to the price predictions of the model. Results are shown in Table 2.9. We
first estimate equation (2.36). As Column (1)-(2) show, the buyer pays a strictly higher price
to the seller when trade credit is provided. This is intuitive as the lower price both reflects
the fact that the seller bears the financing costs and also faces the risk of non-payment by
the buyer. We next present results in columns (3)-(4) on interactions between trade credit
use and the destination country rule of law and the seller’s borrowing rate (equation 2.37).
In line with the model, the open account price decreases with the destination country’s rule
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of law, and increases with the domestic borrowing rate.
Table 2.9: Trade Credit and Export Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Account Dummy .0213*** .0179*** -.0246 -.0302
(.00679) (.00685) (.0269) (.0266)
log(FOB sales) — .0154*** — .0155***
(.00243) (.00243)
log(Cum. FOB sales) — .00238*** — .00239***
(.000472) (.000472)
Open Account Interactions:
× rb — — 1.395* 1.464**
(.734) (.724)
× ILAW — — -.0284* -.0302*
(.0155) (.0157)
Firm-HS8-Destination FE
Firm-Year FE
Destination Year FE
Observations 1,006,903 1,006,903 1,006,903 1,006,903
R2 .971 .971 .971 .971
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.36) (column 1-2) and (2.37) columns
3-4). All regressions are run at the level of individual export transactions for each firm-product-
destination (with products defined at the HS8-level). Export prices (in logs) are computed as the ratio
of FOB value and volume of the transaction. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
firm-product-destination level. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
The quantitative effect of trade credit on prices is moderate. According to columns (1)–
(2), prices are 1.8%–2.1% higher when transactions are financed with trade credit. Results in
columns (3)–(4) also show moderate effects for the domestic borrowing rate and the rule of
law interactions. Consider the increase in the Chilean borrowing rate between 2003 (3.4%)
and 2007 (4.6%). The results suggest that the higher rate in 2007 led prices to be 1.7% –
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1.8% higher than in 2003. Our estimates show a similar quantitative effect for the rule of
law interaction. In effect, in destinations with high contract enforcement, prices are between
2.8% and 3.0% lower.
2.6 A model of trade credit and markups
In this section, we extend the model in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and show how a positive
markup and a financial intermediation cost lead to a natural preference for trade credit. In
the model there are three key elements. First, there is a time delay between the production
of the goods by the seller and the sale of the goods by the buyer. Second, financing is costly.
To pay for goods or production costs, firms have to borrow funds from the financial sector.
Firms can also deposit surplus liquidity as deposits with the banking sector. Importantly,
because of regulation, monitoring and general overhead costs, banks charge a higher interest
rate when lending funds to firms than the interest rates they pay to depositors.39 Third, there
is imperfect contract enforcement. When a buyer or seller do not fulfill their contractual
obligations, firms can sue them in court. This is, however, only successful with a certain
probability.40
2.6.1 Model setup
One buyer is matched with one seller. Both firms are risk neutral. A fraction η (η∗)
of sellers (buyers) is reliable, that is these firms always fulfill their contracts.41 If a firm is
unreliable and thus does not fulfill its contract voluntarily, the other firm can try to enforce
the contract in court which is successful with probability λ (λ∗). When facing an opportunity
to cheat, a random firm thus fulfills the contract with probability λ˜ = η + (1− η)λ.
39This interest rate difference may be further increased by borrower risk. The point here is that abstracting
from the pricing of risk, financial intermediation by banks is costly.
40An alternative interpretation would be that all contracts get enforced in court eventually but this gen-
erates a legal cost as well as a time delay in settlement.
41For the remainder of the paper, all variables related to the buyer are denoted with an asterisk.
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There are two periods. In period 0 the seller produces the goods and sends them to the
buyer. In period 1, the buyer sells the goods to a final consumer. Because of this time gap
between production and final sale, firms have to agree on payment terms. They have two
options. First, buyers can pay in advance (cash-in-advance), that is the buyer pays before
receiving the goods. Second, they can trade on an open-account, where the buyer pays after
delivery, that is the seller extends trade credit to the buyer. A seller produces output for
total cost C and sells it to the buyer. The buyer can then sell the goods to final consumers
and generate revenues R. For now, we assume that R and C are given exogenously. To
finance their transactions, firms can borrow from banks at an interest rate rb (r
∗
b ). Firms
can deposit surplus funds at banks for a deposit rate of rd (r
∗
d).
The seller and the buyer bargain over the surplus with weights θ and 1− θ, that is they
maximize the objective function (Nash product): NP = ΠθsΠ
1−θ
b .
42 Bargaining takes place
under the assumption that the sharing rule has to be acceptable to a reliable trading partner,
while payoffs account for the fact that a firm may be matched with an unreliable firm.43
Open Account Under open account (trade credit), the two firms solve the following prob-
lem:
NPOA = E[ΠOAS ]
θ[ΠOAB ]
1−θ = (λ˜∗POA − (1 + rb)C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller Profit
)θ(R− POA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer Profit
)1−θ (2.39)
where POA is the total payment from the buyer to the seller. The first part of the Nash
product represents the expected profits of the seller. Under open account, the seller gets paid
POA with probability λ˜∗, while incurring the production costs C with certainty. Because
production takes place in period 0 while sales only take place in period 1, the seller has to
borrow the production costs C from a bank and pay the interest rate rb. The second part of
42This generalizes the model presented in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) that focused on the case of full bar-
gaining power of the seller, while deriving the case of full bargaining power of the buyer in an appendix. It
is easily verified that results derived for the more general model nest these two special cases.
43That is, we focus on contracts that are determined by reliable firms, with unreliable firms imitating the
contract choice of reliable firms.
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the Nash product represents the expected profits of the buyer. Solving for the optimal POA
that maximizes NPOA delivers:
POA =
θλ˜∗R + (1− θ)(1 + rb)C
λ˜∗
(2.40)
The expected Nash product under open account is thus:
NPOA = θθ(1− θ)1−θ(λ˜∗)θ−1
(
λ˜∗R− (1 + rb)C
)
(2.41)
Cash-in-Advance Under cash-in-advance, the two firms solve the following problem:
NPCIA = E[ΠCIAS ]
θ[ΠCIAB ]
1−θ = ((1 + rd)(PCIA − C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller Profit
)θ(λ˜R− (1 + r∗b )PCIA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer Profit
)1−θ (2.42)
The first part of the Nash product again shows the expected profits of a reliable seller. Under
cash-in-advance, the seller gets paid PCIA with certainty. At the same time, a reliable seller
incurs production costs C with certainty as well. If the price charged to the buyer exceeds
production costs, the seller deposits the surplus funds at a bank for interest rate rd. The
second part of the Nash product captures the expected profits of the buyer. Now, the buyer
generates revenues R with probability λ˜. The buyer pays PCIA with certainty in period 0,
borrowing from a bank at interest rate r∗b . Solving for the optimal P
CIA that maximizes
NPCIA delivers:
PCIA =
θλ˜R + (1− θ)(1 + r∗b )C
1 + r∗b
(2.43)
With an expected Nash product of:
NPCIA = θθ(1− θ)1−θ(1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ
(
λ˜R− (1 + r∗b )C
)
(2.44)
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Optimal Contract Combining equations (2.41) and (2.44) implies that a buyer-seller pair
chooses open account (trade credit) if:
θθ(1− θ)1−θ
[
(λ˜∗)θ−1
(
λ˜∗R− (1 + rb)C
)
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ
(
λ˜R− (1 + r∗b )C
)]
> 0(2.45)
Now, assume that firms charge a constant markup to final consumers given by µ so that
R = µC.44 Open account (trade credit) is then preferred over cash-in-advance if:
(λ˜∗)θ−1
(
λ˜∗µ− (1 + rb)
)
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ
(
λ˜µ− (1 + r∗b )
)
> 0 (2.46)
2.6.2 Trade Credit and Markups
Taking the derivative of equation (2.46) with respect to µ and rearranging delivers:
(1 + r∗b )
θ
(
λ˜∗
)θ
− (1 + rd)θ λ˜ > 0 (2.47)
The condition is quite weak. As long as the buyer’s borrowing rate is above the seller’s deposit
rate and enforcement is not too different between buyers and sellers, trade credit becomes
more attractive when the markup goes up. Consider the symmetric case to build intuition,
where the buyer and the seller face the same interest rates and enforcement frictions. The
condition then simplifies to:
(1 + rb)
θ > (λ˜)1−θ(1 + rd)θ. (2.48)
It is easy to see that a sufficient condition for (2.48) to hold is that the borrowing rate
exceeds the deposit rate. The following Proposition summarizes our results on trade credit
and markups:
44We only assume this to simplify the exposition of the main mechanism. In section Appendix 2.B.2, we
show that the main results hold with endogenous revenues and costs, R and C, for the special case of CES
preferences. We discuss these results below in section 2.6.5.
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Proposition 4 (Trade Credit and Markups). Suppose (1 + r∗b )
θ
(
λ˜∗
)θ
> (1 + rd)
θ λ˜. Then:
i) The use of open account increases in the markup µ
ii) This effect increases in r∗b and λ
∗ and decreases in rd and λ
Proof. Follows from equation (2.47)
Part ii) of Proposition 4 presents additional predictions to test the mechanism explaining
trade credit use: the effect of the markup should be stronger when the destination country
borrowing rate and the destination country enforcement are higher and when the source
country deposit rate and source country enforcement are lower.
2.6.3 Trade Credit and Repeated Interactions
Trade Credit and Learning Consider now the case where an importer and an exporter
interact repeatedly. Assume that the two trading partners learn over time about the re-
liability of their trading partner, so that ∂ηk/∂k > 0, where k is the number of previous
interactions and ηk is the probability that a firm is reliable after k interactions.
45
For tractability, consider the trade-off between trade credit and cash-in-advance in the
symmetric case where the buyer and the seller face the same interest rates and enforcement
frictions (e.g. because they reside in the same country). Equation (2.46) then simplifies to:
(λ˜k)
θ−1
(
λ˜kµ− (1 + rb)
)
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + rb)−θ
(
λ˜kµ− (1 + rb)
)
> 0 (2.49)
where λ˜k is increasing in the number of previous interactions k. Assume further that learning
is symmetric, that is with each interaction, independent of the payment form used - the two
45This learning can take multiple forms. One example would be Bayesian updating as in Araujo and
Ornelas (2007), Antra`s and Foley (2015), Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) and Monarch and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2016).
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trading partners learn about each other.46 Taking the derivative with respect to ηk delivers:
∂
(
NPOA −NPCIA)
∂ηk
=
(
µ
[
θλ˜θ−1k −
(
1 + rd
1 + rb
)θ]
+ (1− θ)(1 + rb)
(
λ˜k
)θ−2)
(1− λ)(2.50)
First, consider the special case θ = 1 where the seller has all bargaining power. Then, the
condition simplifies to:
∂
(
NPOA −NPCIA)
∂ηk
|θ=1 = µ
[
1− 1 + rd
1 + rb
]
(1− λ) (2.51)
This derivative is positive as long as the borrowing rate exceeds the deposit rate. Then, open
account becomes more attractive the more often the two firms interacted with each other.
As the bargaining power of the seller, θ, declines, this effect becomes less clear-cut. For the
other extreme case where the buyer has all bargaining power, the derivative changes to:
∂
(
NPOA −NPCIA)
∂ηk
|θ=0 =
(
1 + rb
(λ˜)2
− µ
)
(1− λ), (2.52)
which does not have a clear sign.
Product Complexity In addition, now assume that products differ by their complex-
ity. Following, Hoefele, Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Yu (2016), assume that product complexity
is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1], where a higher γ represents a more complex prod-
uct. Assume further that contract enforcement is harder for more complex products. More
specifically, assume that a contract now gets enforced exogenously with probability λγ. The
optimal decision in the symmetric case now becomes:
(λ˜k(γ))
θ−1
(
λ˜k(γ)µ− (1 + rb)
)
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + rb)−θ
(
λ˜k(γ)µ− (1 + rb)
)
> 0 (2.53)
46In principle, the speed of learning could be a function of the payment terms. That is there could be
more learning about the seller under cash-in-advance and vice versa. As the general case becomes intractable
quite quickly, we restrict the analysis to the symmetric case here to show the general intuition.
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with λ˜k(γ) = ηk + (1− ηk)λγ. Taking the derivative with respect to ηk delivers:
∂
(
NPOA −NPCIA)
∂ηk
=
(
µ
[
θλ˜k(γ)
θ−1 −
(
1 + rd
1 + rb
)θ]
+ (1− θ)(1 + rb)
(
λ˜k(γ)
)θ−2)
(1− λγ)(2.54)
Taking the derivative with respect to γ and rearranging delivers:
∂
(
NPOA −NPCIA)
∂ηk∂γ
= −
(
(1− λγ)
(
µθ + (2− θ)(1 + rb)
λ˜k(γ)
)
(1− ηk) + (1 + rb)
)
(
λ˜k(γ)
)θ−2
(1− θ)λγ lnλ,
which is greater equal zero as lnλ < 0. That is, the effect of learning on the difference
between trade credit and cash-in-advance is stronger for more complex products (higher γ).
This is quite intuitive: contracts for more complex products are harder to enforce and hence
learning has a stronger effect on a firm’s decision problem for these products. The preceding
insights are summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (Trade Credit and Learning). Suppose two firms in the same country trade
with each other, learning is symmetric and the borrowing rate is above the deposit rate,
rb > rd. Then:
1. If the seller has all bargaining power (θ = 1), payment is more likely on open account
(trade credit) terms, the longer the two firms have traded.
2. If the seller does not have all bargaining power (θ < 1), learning increases the attrac-
tiveness of trade credit, the more complex is the product that is traded.
The proposition is quite intuitive. The longer two firms trade with each other, the more
likely they will fulfill their contracts. The key advantage of trade credit is that it saves
on financing costs as compared to cash-in-advance. Through learning, contract enforcement
becomes less of an issue and financing costs differences matter for the contract choice. There-
fore, as firms learn that their trading partners are reliable they tend to favor trade credit over
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cash-in-advance. The effect of repeated interactions is stronger for complex products. With
complex products enforcement frictions are more severe to begin with but this also creates
a stronger effect from learning, leading to a sharper rise in trade credit within relationships
over time.
2.6.4 Price Predictions
We now look at the relationship between the payment terms and prices. To fully assess
the price effects, let revenues and final sales prices be endogenous to the payment form. Let
pOAf and p
CIA
f denote the prices charged to final consumers and c denote constant marginal
costs. Assume that firms operate under monopolistic competition and that consumers have
standard CES preferences of the form q = p−σA.47 Then, the relative (per unit) price
between open account and cash-in-advance is given by:
POA/QOA
PCIA/QCIA
=
1 + r∗b
λ˜∗
[
θλ˜∗pOAf + (1− θ)(1 + rb)c
θλ˜pCIAf + (1− θ)(1 + r∗b )c
]
(2.55)
Optimal final sales prices are:48
pOAf =
1 + rb
λ˜∗
σ
σ − 1c; p
CIA
f =
1 + r∗b
λ˜
σ
σ − 1c. (2.56)
Combining the equations delivers:
POA/QOA
PCIA/QCIA
=
1 + rb
λ˜∗
(2.57)
Proposition 6. All else equal, the price charged by the seller to the buyer is higher under
open account than under cash in advance. This price difference increases in the interest rate
47More specifically, assume the following demand: Q =
(∫
q (z)
σ−1
σ dz
) σ
σ−1
, with the ideal price index
P =
(∫
p (z)
1−σ
dz
) 1
1−σ
. In this context, aggregate demand A = PσQ.
48Details on the derivation of prices are provided in Appendix 2.B.1.
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of the seller rb and decreases in the enforcement in the country of the buyer λ
∗.
Proof. See equation (2.55).
The proposition is quite intuitive. By providing trade credit (offering open account), the
seller takes on the financing cost and the risk that the buyer does not pay after delivery.
The seller hence needs to be compensated for these two factors implying a higher unit price
paid by the buyer. Interestingly, with a constant markup, this price ratio is independent of
the distribution of bargaining power.
2.6.5 CES Demand and Wholesale Markup
In this section we discuss the main predictions of the model for the cases of (i) endogenous
revenues and costs, and (ii) wholesale markups. This last extension is important, because
the wholesale markup is the object we use for testing the predictions of our theory.
CES Preferences We begin reviewing the case of CES preferences. To simplify the dis-
cussion, we only present the main results here. Details can be found in Appendix 2.B.3.
Assume again standard CES preferences with implied aggregate demand A = P σQ. The
Nash Products given optimal price decisions can be derived as:
NPOA = B
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ, (2.58)
NPCIA = B(1 + rd)
θ(1 + r∗b )
−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
. (2.59)
with B = θθ(1 − θ)1−θ c1−σ
σ−1A
(
σ
σ−1
)−σ
. From this, it follows that open account is preferred
over cash in advance if:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
> 0. (2.60)
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In the symmetric case, this condition simplifies to:
(1 + rb)
θ >
(
λ˜
)1−θ
(1 + rd)
θ, (2.61)
the same condition we derived earlier in equation (2.48). To study the role of the markup
under CES preferences, we can take the derivative of condition (2.60) with respect to the
elasticity of substitution σ which delivers:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ ln
(
λ˜∗
1 + rb
)
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
ln
(
λ˜
1 + r∗b
)
(2.62)
In the symmetric case, as ln
(
λ˜
1+rb
)
< 0, this derivative is negative if:
(1 + rb)
θ >
(
λ˜
)1−θ
(1 + rd)
θ, (2.63)
which is the case when rb > rd. More generally, the derivative (2.62) is negative when
r∗b > rd and interest rates and enforcement are not too different across countries. A negative
derivative implies that trade credit becomes more attractive when markups go up (lower
σ), in line with Proposition 4. Moreover, as in Proposition 4, equation (2.62) implies that
the effect of the markup is stronger when the destination country borrowing rate and the
destination country enforcement are higher, and when the source country deposit rate and
source country enforcement are lower.
Wholesale Markup So far, we have solved the model for the full markup between final
consumer prices and marginal production costs, captured by µ = R/C. In the following
we derive results as a function of the intermediate (or wholesale) markups, that is the
prices charged to the buyer by the seller over marginal costs, µOAW = P
OA/COA and µCIAW =
PCIA/CCIA.
With endogenous revenues and costs, wholesale markups differ between open account
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and cash-in-advance. In appendix 2.B.3 we show that the wholesale markups are given by:
µOAW =
1 + rb
λ˜∗
(
(1− θ) + θ σ
σ − 1
)
(2.64)
µCIAW =
(
(1− θ) + θ σ
σ − 1
)
(2.65)
Equations (2.64) and (2.65) are quite intuitive. They show that the markup obtained by
the seller is a fraction of the full markup. This fraction depends on the degree of bargaining
power the seller has. In particular, when the seller has all the bargaining power (θ = 1), she
captures the full markup between final price and marginal cost. In the other extreme, when
the buyer has all the bargaining power (θ = 0), the seller only receives the production costs
(adjusted for the financing cost and enforcement friction in the open account case).
In Appendix 2.B.3, we show that in the CES case, open account is preferred over cash in
advance if:
[
(λ˜∗)θ−1+σ(1 + rb)1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ(λ˜)σ
] (
µCIAW − 1
)
> 0. (2.66)
Or expressed as a function of the open account wholesale markup:
[
(λ˜∗)θ−1+σ(1 + rb)1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ(λ˜)σ
](
µOAW −
1 + rb
λ˜∗
)
> 0. (2.67)
This conditions imply the same predictions as those derived for the full markups. The
preference for trade credit increases in the markup and this effect becomes stronger when r∗b
and λ∗ are larger and when rb and λ are smaller.
2.7 Conclusions
Trade credit is the most important form of short-term finance for U.S. firms. This paper
presented a theory that explains the prominence of trade credit for firm-to-firm transactions
102
by the ability of firms to save on financial costs when there are positive markups and when
financial intermediation is costly. The theory also predicts that trade credit use should
become more prevalent the longer two firms trade with each other, an effect that should be
stronger for complex products. Chilean firm-level data supports all predictions of the model.
The model is also qualitatively consistent with recent developments in aggregate U.S.
data that show rising markups and more use of trade credit over time. Based on our model,
the rise in markups identified by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) should affect financial
markets. As higher markups make trade credit more attractive, firms may rely more on that
financing form and less on the formal financial sector. Future work should shed more light
on the macro implications of our findings and on how heterogeneity in the adoption of trade
credit may affect the size and the development of the financial sector. The last point may
be particularly relevant in the context of developing and emerging economies where financial
frictions are larger and hence the potential savings from using trade credit more prominent.
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2.A Trade Credit and Markups in the United States
over time
Figure 2.A.1: Trade Credit and Markups in the U.S.
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Notes: This figure shows the time series of the total trade credit receivables of the non-financial
corporate and non-corporate sectors over GDP on the left Y-axis. On the right Y-axis it shows
the markups as estimated by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).
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Figure 2.A.2: Trade Credit and Markups in the U.S.
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Notes: This figure plots the total trade credit receivables of the non-financial corporate and
non-corporate sectors against the markups as estimated by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).
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2.B Theory Appendix
2.B.1 Derivation of Final Consumer Prices
In this subsection, we derive the prices charged to final consumers under CES preferences.
Open Account The Nash Product under Open Account is given by:
NPOA = BOA
(
λ˜∗R− (1 + rb)C
)
, (68)
with BOA = θθ(1− θ)1−θ(λ˜∗)θ−1. Plugging in the demand q = p−σf A delivers:
NPOA = ABOA
(
λ˜∗(pOAf )
1−σ − (1 + rb)c(pOAf )−σ
)
, (69)
Solving for the optimal price delivers:
pOAf =
1 + rb
λ˜∗
σ
σ − 1c. (70)
Cash in Advance The Nash Product under Cash in Advance is given by:
NPCIA = BCIA
(
λ˜R− (1 + r∗b )C
)
, (71)
with BCIA = θθ(1− θ)1−θ
(
1+rd
1+r∗b
)θ
. Plugging in the demand q = pσfA delivers:
NPCIA = ABCIA
(
λ˜(pCIAf )
1−σ − (1 + r∗b )c(pCIAf )−σ
)
, (72)
Solving for the optimal price delivers:
pCIAf =
1 + r∗b
λ˜
σ
σ − 1c. (73)
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2.B.2 Solving the model with CES
We can plug in the CES revenues R and total cost C into the Nash Product for Open
Account to get:
NPOA = θθ(1− θ)1−θ c
1−σ
σ − 1A
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ (
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ (74)
For Cash in Advance, we get:
NPCIA = θθ(1− θ)1−θ c
1−σ
σ − 1A
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(1 + rd)
θ(1 + r∗b )
−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
(75)
Combining the two conditions, we get that Open Account is preferred over Cash in Advance
if:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
> 0 (76)
Or, rewriting for interpretation:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1 (
λ˜∗
)σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ −
(
1 + rd
1 + r∗b
)θ
(1 + r∗b )
1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ
> 0 (77)
Within a country, the equation simplifies to:
(
λ˜
)θ−1
−
(
1 + rd
1 + rb
)θ
> 0, (78)
which always holds when rb > rd. We can also take the derivative of equation (2.60) with
respect to σ. This delivers:
(
λ˜∗
)θ−1+σ
(1 + rb)
1−σ
(
ln λ˜∗ + ln
(
1
1 + rb
))
− (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ
(
λ˜
)σ (
ln λ˜+ ln
(
1
1 + r∗b
))
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2.B.3 Trade Credit and Wholesale Markup
In this appendix we show that proposition 4 also holds for the markup in terms of the
wholesale price that the seller charges to the buyer.
Note that the Nash products for the open account (equation 2.41) and cash-in-advance
cases (equation 2.44) can be written in terms of the ratio of their respective prices to marginal
costs replacing λ˜R and λ˜∗R with the optimal open account and cash-in-advance prices:
NPOA =
(
1− θ
θ
)1−θ
(λ˜∗)θ
(
POA − (1 + rb)
λ˜∗
COA
)
(79)
NPCIA =
(
1− θ
θ
)1−θ
(1 + rd)
θ(1 + r∗b )
1−θ (PCIA − CCIA) (80)
Recall from section 2.6.4 (under the CES assumption) that the buyer-seller open account
price can be expressed in terms of the buyer-seller cash-in-advance price as:
POA =
1 + rb
λ˜∗
(
1 + rb
1 + r∗b
)−σ(
λ˜
λ˜∗
)−σ
PCIA (81)
In addition, assuming CES, we can derive:
COA = CCIA
(
pOAf
pCIAf
)−σ
= CCIA
(
1 + rb
1 + r∗b
)−σ(
λ˜
λ˜∗
)−σ
(82)
Combining equations (79) and (80) implies that a buyer-seller pair chooses open account if:
(
1− θ
θ
)1−θ [(
1 + rb
1 + r∗b
)−σ(
λ˜
λ˜∗
)−σ
(λ˜∗)θ−1(1 + rb)− (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )1−θ
]
(PCIA−CCIA)> 0
Which can be simplified to:
[
(λ˜∗)θ−1+σ(1 + rb)1−σ − (1 + rd)θ(1 + r∗b )−θ+1−σ(λ˜)σ
](PCIA/QCIA
c
− 1
)
> 0 (83)
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Deriving the markups: Open Account Under CES preferences, note that:
ROA
COA
=
pOAf
c
=
1 + rb
λ˜∗
σ
σ − 1 (84)
From this, we can derive that:
µOAW ≡
POA/QOA
c
=
1 + rb
λ˜∗
(
1 +
θ
σ − 1
)
(85)
Deriving the markups: Cash in Advance For CIA, note that:
RCIA
CCIA
=
pCIAf
c
=
1 + r∗b
λ˜
σ
σ − 1 (86)
Which delivers:
µCIAW ≡
PCIA/QCIA
c
= 1 +
θ
σ − 1 (87)
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2.C Additional Details on Markups Estimation
2.C.1 Input Price Index
In this appendix we explain the construction of the firm-specific price index we construct
to deflate materials’ expenditure at the firm-level. This is necessary to avoid that the pro-
duction function parameters we estimate are affected by input price bias (see De Loecker
and Goldberg 2014 for details).
The construction of the firm-specific input price deflator involves five steps. First, we
define the unit value of input j puchased by firm i in period t as Pijt = Vijt/Qijt, where
Vijt denotes input j value, and Qijt denotes the corresponding quantity purchased. Next, we
calculate the (weighted) average unit value of input j across all firms purchasing the input at
time t. Then, for each firm we compute the (log) price deviation from the (weighted) average
for all the inputs purchased by the firm at time t. The next step involves averageing the
resulting price deviations at the firm level, using inputs’ expenditure as weight.49 Finally,
we anchor the resulting average firm-level input price deviation to aggregate (4-digit) input
price deflators provided by the Chilean statistical agency. Therefore, the resulting input
price index reflects both, changes in the aggregate input price inflation, as well as firm-level
heterogeneity in the price paid by firms for their inputs.
2.C.2 Markups and its relation with self-reported average margins
A unique feature of ENIA is that it provides information for the variable production
cost per product defined as the product-specific sum of raw material costs and direct labor
involved in production). Consequently, dividing sales by the reported total variable cost by
the units produced of a given product yields the average product margin that we use as an
alternative rough approximation for markups in the main text.
49Note that up to this point we have derived a unit-free input price index, that can be interpreted as
the average firm-level input price deviation from the average. However, this price index will fail to detect
aggregate changes in input prices.
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Figure 2.C.1 plots binscatters diagram for firm-product markups and sales-cost margins
(with products defined at the HS-8 level), for the raw data (left panel), and averaging across
observations within firm-product pairs (right panel). Both figures control for country-year
fixed effects (that is, the figure plots the within plant-product variation that we exploit empir-
ically). There is a remarkable positive relationship between markups and reported margins,
suggesting that our markup estimates yield sensible information about the profitability for
the products produced by the firm. This lends strong support to the markup-based method-
ology for backing out marginal costs by De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik
(2016). In addition, there seems to be a tighter relationship between markups and margins
when both variables are averaged within firm-products.50 Consequently, in the main text we
use firm-product average margins computed over all periods for as an alternative measure of
markups (see Table 2.5).
Figure 2.C.1: Firm-Product level Markup and Sales-Cost Margin
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Notes: The figure plots a binscatters diagram for firm-product markups and sales-cost margins. Both
plots controls for country-year fixed effects.
For completeness, Table 2.D.2 replicates columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.5 using sales-cost
50One reason why both measures could be more correlated over longer periods of time is that the sales-cost
margin measure relies on self-reported average variable cost. If managers measure product-level variable costs
with error, then sales-cost margin may be a poorer approximation of markups in the short run. However, if
managers does not make systematic mistakes when reporting average variable costs, the measurement error
cancels out when averaging over longer periods.
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margin in levels. As it can be seen, the positive relationship reported in the main text
remains, but the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients are smaller than
in the baseline analysis.
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2.D Additional Results
2.D.1 Average Markups by 2-digit industries
This appendix performs a number of additional robustness checks. Table 2.D.1 presents
the estimated markups at the level of 2-digit industries. Note that the average markups are
somewhat lower than the average markups estimated for the entire manufacturing industry
in Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2018).
Table 2.D.1: Estimated Markups
Product Mean Median St. Deviation
Food and Beverages 1.344 1.2189 0.5711
Textiles 1.581 1.4491 0.6420
Apparel 1.267 1.2261 0.4649
Wood and Furniture 1.123 1.0070 0.4455
Paper 1.273 1.1214 0.5687
Basic Chemicals 1.389 1.2236 0.6555
Plastic and Rubber 1.241 1.0924 0.5305
Non-Metallic Manufactures 1.779 1.5555 0.8774
Metallic Manufactures 1.316 1.0241 0.7156
Machinery and Equipment 1.146 1.0102 0.4986
Total 1.318 1.178 0.583
Notes: This table reports the estimated markup by aggregate sector for the sample
of exporting firms over the period 2003-2007 (see section 2.3.1 for details on the
computation). Columns 1 displays the unweighted average markup.
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Table 2.D.2: Sales-cost Margin (levels) and Open Account Share
(1) (2) (3)
log(markup) .0102** .00902* .00692
(.00500) (.00498) (.00591)
ln(employment) -.000829 -.00425 -.00141
(.00418) (.00428) (.00494)
Firm-Destination FE —
Year FE — —
HS8 FE —
Firm FE — —
Destination-Year FE — —
Observations 87,295 87,295 87,295
R2 .662 .663 .368
Notes: The table replicates columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.5 using sales-cost margin in levels. All regressions
are run at the firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account
shares are computed as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of
all export transactions over a year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-product
level. Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Table 2.D.3: Translog Markups and Open Account Share: Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
log(markup) -.0150 -.00642 -.0161
(.0203) (.0292) (.0299)
ln(markup)×r∗b .205* .205* .247**
(.107) (.107) (.112)
ln(markup)×rd —- -.978 -.892
(2.370) (2.373)
ln(markup)× Law — — .0251
(.0161)
Firm-year FE
HS8 FE
Destination-Year FE
Observations 91,291 91,291 91,291
R2 .421 .421 .421
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates from equation (2.34). All regressions are run at
the firm-product-destination level (with products defined at the HS8-level). Open account shares are
computed as the ratio of the FOB value of open account transactions to the FOB value of all export
transactions over a year. Markups are computed at the firm-product-year level (products are defined
at the 8-digit HS level). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the destination-year level.
Key: *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Chapter 3
Quality Guarantee and Trade Credit.
Evidence from Chilean Exporters
Santiago Andre´s Justel, UCLA
What explains the provision and maturity of trade credit contracts? The existing liter-
ature has focused mainly on explaining the empirical regularity that firms consistently use
trade credit, but has struggled to explain why one side of the market –sellers– systemati-
cally provide most of the credit. This paper develops a model where trade credit is used
by sellers to signal product quality and documents empirical support for predictions of the
model. In an equilibrium of the model, by offering products on credit, the producer is sig-
naling that her products are of high quality. In addition, through the duration of credit, the
seller provides a quality guarantee by allowing the buyer to certify the quality of the product
before payment. The theory predicts a positive relationship between product quality, the
likelihood of providing credit, and the maturity of trade credit. Furthermore, the model
predicts positive correlations between credit maturity and other factors such as better legal
institutions, product market competition , and difficulty of quality assessments. Using the
universe of Chilean transaction-level customs data, I confirm these predictions. Finally, the
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paper considers the model’s implications for recent policy changes in the U.S., France, and
Chile to limit the maturity of trade credit.
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3.1 Introduction
Trade credit (delayed payment) is widely used among firms domestically, and interna-
tionally1, and is one of the primary sources of short-term financing for both small and large
firms.2 Despite its ubiquity and importance, there is not a clear understanding of the reasons
that firms provide credit to each other when there is a financial sector that specializes in the
provision of funding.
Most existing theories explain the use of trade credit as an efficient mechanism that helps
to reduce a financial/transaction cost or to address some form of uncertainty. Although
these theories are not mutually exclusive, some of their implications are at odds with the
empirical evidence. For example, the financial motive is hard to square with the fact that
small firms that have no financial advantage in credit provision - due to being more credit and
liquidity constrained - commonly extend trade credit to large buyers who are not financially
restricted.3
More importantly, all existing theories focus on the provision of trade credit (extensive
margin), while being are silent on the maturity of said credit (intensive margin). The ma-
turity of trade credit is a relevant dimension for many reasons. First, the number of days of
credit can explain part of the financial constraints that a firm faces. Secondly, studying the
different maturities can help to favor or disregard a particular theory of trade credit. For
example, theories based on inventory costs or delayed-sales motive for trade credit suggest
a trade credit maturity of similar duration to average inventory cycles, while observed trade
credit periods are generally longer.4. Related to this, trade credit is used extensively in the
1According to Parlhem (2016), 97 percent of the transactions are conducted under trade credit. In-
ternationally, Antras and Foley (2015) for a single US exporter, Demir and Javorcik (2018) Turkish data,
Ahn (2011) Colombia and Garc´ıa-Mar´ın, Justel, and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2019) for Chilean exporters and
importers, report that around 90% of international trade involves some form of delayed payment
2See Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002)
3See Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011), Justel (2019), McMillan and Woodruff (1999), and Marotta
(2005) for evidence of size and trade credit
4In the sample of international transactions that I use, the average trade credit maturity is around 130
days for exports 80 days for imports. However, the average number of days of inventory in tradable sectors
is between 50 to 80 days according to Chen, Frank, and Wu (2005) and Chen, Frank, and Wu (2007)
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service sector, where inventories play no role.5
To address this gap in our understanding of trade credit, in this paper, I propose a theory
where sellers use trade credit because it acts as a signal and a guarantee of the product’s
quality. The mechanism, similar to Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993), is as follows: by offering
products on credit, two things happen. On the one hand, through the provision of credit, the
producer is signaling to a buyer that her products are of high quality since the producer is
saying “pay me only if you are satisfied”. Given this costly commitment, the buyer believes
the product is of high quality. Besides, through the duration of the credit itself, the buyer is
better able to certify the quality of the product before paying, allowing trade credit to also
act as a quality guarantee.6
To formalize this idea, I propose a model where product quality is known to sellers but
not known to buyers ex-ante, while buyers can (eventually) obtain a signal of product quality
after delivery. Because of this, firms can use a combination of pricing and trade credit terms
to signal the quality of their products, even when, from a strictly financial perspective, it
is more costly for sellers to provide credit directly. The model predicts that high-quality
goods are more likely to be traded under trade credit and also that higher quality goods
will have longer maturities. Additionally, the theory also implies that countries with better
legal institutions and industries with higher levels of competition will receive longer trade
credit periods. Finally, the model predicts that products in which quality is hard to verify
experience longer trade credit maturities.
These theoretical implications are tested using the universe of Chilean transaction-level
trade data from the Chilean Customs Administration. This data set includes a trade credit
maturity measure for each transaction, namely, the number of days in which a given purchase
will be paid. To compute product quality, I will use two approaches. Following Khandelwal,
Schott, and Wei (2013) and Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2015), I will infer product quality from
prices and quantities directly from the data. Alternatively, due to endogeneity concerns
5In my sample, exported services have, on average, 80 days of trade credit.
6It is worth noting that this mechanism is analog to a money-back guarantee.
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and measurement errors, I will focus on the Chilean wine industry. This specific sector has
several measures that are commonly accepted as indicators of product quality (e.g., ratings,
awards). In the empirical exercise, I will use these metrics as proxies of product quality.
My empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model. In particular, I
find that high-quality goods are 8% more likely to be traded under trade credit and high-
quality products have, on average, 20 more days of trade credit.7 Moreover, countries with
better institutions have trade credit periods that are 5 days longer, firms that face higher
competition provide 20 to 50 more days of trade credit, and products for which quality is
harder to assess are sold with trade credit maturities that are 5 to 20 days longer.
Since many different data sets are used for studying trade credit, I check to see if pre-
viously documented regularities are present in the Chilean data. Following the existing
literature, I compute the implied interest rate embedded in trade credit-mediated shipments
and the effect of repeated transactions on the provision and maturity of trade credit. I
obtain an implied annual interest rate of 25%, which is similar to other estimates. Also,
I find that repeated interactions increase the likelihood of providing trade credit; however,
repeated interaction does not significantly affect the maturity of the loan.
This paper contributes to the growing literature that tries to explain the motives for
trade credit. These theories can be broadly grouped into financial, transaction costs, and
asymmetric information models.8 My model fits into the asymmetric information strand of
the literature by expanding on the non-financial reasons for trade credit.
This paper also adds to the empirical evidence on trade credit. Most articles focus the
empirical analysis on domestic firm-level data obtained through surveys e.g. Ng, J. Smith,
and R. Smith (1999), using the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) e.g Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) or proprietary data e.g Cun˜at
(2006) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011). In general, they find support for financial
7In the sample, 7% of transactions are paid in advance, while the rest is paid under some form of trade
credit. Additionally, the average maturity for a trade credit contract is 130 days.
8Next section will provide more details and references for each approach.
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and asymmetric information theories of trade credit.
My paper, through the use of international trade data, also contributes to growing lit-
erature on international trade finance. Authors like Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), Antras and
Foley (2015), Hoefele, Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Yu (2016), Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2017), and Ahn (2011) study how payment choices depend on country-specific character-
istics such as financing cost, limited contract enforcement, capital controls and on industry
complexity. Demir and Javorcik (2018) study the positive effect of competition on trade
credit provision. Garc´ıa-Mar´ın, Justel, and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2019) propose and test a
theory where trade credit is used to minimize transaction costs related to the presence of
markups, and interest rate spreads. This paper includes some of the previous mechanisms,
but it additionally studies the role of asymmetric information at the firm-product level and
how it rationalizes the provision of trade credit and its maturity.
The model in this paper fits in the broader literature on quality signaling and the use
of different types of signaling mechanisms. For example, firms can signal quality through:
prices as in Wolinsky (1983), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Tirole (1988), and Balachander
and Srinivasan (1994); advertising like in Nelson (1974), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and
Bagwell and Ramey (1988); warranties as in Spence (1977), Lutz (1989), Dybvig and Lutz
(1993), and Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995); branding e.g. Wernerfelt (1988), the reputation
of the retailer as in Chu and Chu (1994). Authors have explored the use of trade credit also
a signal for quality e.g. J. K. Smith (1987), Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993), and Lee and
Stowe (1993). The model presented in this paper builds on the existing theoretical literature
by highlighting the maturity of the credit as a signal of quality, in addition to the offering
of credit and interest rate terms. Most importantly, I offer micro-level evidence to support
the novel mechanism suggested by the theory.
Given that it is costly for sellers to provide trade credit (accept delayed payment), and
the near-ubiquity of this practice in international trade despite the credit constraints faced
by many exporters, this paper contributes to the vast literature on credit constraints and
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international trade9 since it provides a rationale for the existence of these restrictions.10
From a policymaking perspective, there is not much discussion about the importance
of trade credit. However, the insights of this model are crucial since it implies that trade
credit is not purely a financial tool. Therefore, trade credit facilitates trade for sellers, even
when it is costly. This concern has policy relevance, as countries including the U.S., France,
and Chile have recently implemented regulations setting a limit on the maturity of trade
credit, based in part on the idea that long trade credit periods increase the financial burden
for producers. My model predicts, however, that reducing trade credit maturity will reduce
both the likelihood and volume of trade, a prediction consistent with recent empirical work
in Breza and Liberman (2017).
In the next section, I present a review of the existing theories that explain the use of trade
credit. In section 3, I develop the theoretical model of trade credit terms and establish the
predictions of the model regarding correlates of trade credit maturity and product quality. In
section 4, I introduce some definitions and the data that I will use to validate the predictions
of the model. In section 5, I test empirically for the predictions of the model in the Chilean
trade data. Finally, section 6 presents a discussion of the results and suggests avenues for
further research.
3.2 Trade credit motives
The reasons why firms provide credit has been studied for more than 30 years. Because
trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term finance for a firm, one
question commonly arises: What are the motives for a firm to lend to another firm, even
in the presence of a developed financial sector? Four main theories explain the use and
provision of trade credit.
9See Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Muuˆls (2015), Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2014),
Leibovici (2018), and Manova (2012) for some examples.
10For domestic trade, there are market solutions to obtain liquidity from trade credit transactions (e.g.,
invoice factoring). This short-term financing mechanism is not available for international transactions. Thus
exporters need to rely on financial markets or own funds for short-term financing.
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3.2.1 Financial Motives
This theory says that the producer may have an advantage over traditional lenders. The
most basic one is, as in Schwartz (1974), that the producer has access to credit whereas
the seller does not. Therefore the producer extends credit, in the form of trade credit, to
the buyer. This financial advantage may come from the fact that the producer has better
access to buyer’s information (J. K. Smith 1987; Biais and Gollier 1997), has better ability to
monitor the buyer (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004; Cun˜at 2006) or has advantage in liquidating
collateral over the financial sector (Mian and Smith Jr 1992; Maksimovic and Frank 2005).
3.2.2 Transaction Cost Motive
An alternative theory states that trade credit can reduce the transaction/inventory costs
that can result from demand or delivery uncertainty as in Ferris (1981), Emery (1987), and
Daripa and Nilsen (2011). The key mechanism is that in the presence of uncertainty on the
delivery of goods, if the buyer pays them as they arrive, the buyer incurs in additional costs of
money holdings. Alternatively, if there is uncertainty on the demand side, a buyer that pays
earlier has a cash flow mismatch and bares the inventory costs (or missing sales). Therefore,
trade credit might mitigate these problems since it helps to coordinate cash inflows and
outflows.
3.2.3 Asymmetric Information Motives
Related, in part, to the financial motives is the theory that the producers have information
that the buyers do not, in this case, the provision of trade credit may ease the “lemons
problem.” The asymmetry could be that the producer knows the quality of the product, and
the seller does not (Long, Malitz, and Ravid 1993; Lee and Stowe 1993), or there are some
“bad” firms that have incentives to default in the presence of limited commitment (Antras
and Foley 2015; Schmidt-Eisenlohr 2013). In both cases, trade credit alleviates the problem
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since it acts as a contract enforcement mechanism.
3.2.4 Price Discrimination Motive
Because trade credit implies late payment of a product, it is natural to expect that cash
prices are lower than trade credit prices.11 Because of this, firms can use trade credit as a
way of providing a menu of prices for the same good when buyers have different valuations
or when some buyers are credit constraint therefore since they cannot take advantage of the
discount, they are willing to pay higher prices to buy the product. Brennan, Maksimovics,
and Zechner (1988) and Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979) are some examples of this theory.
From the empirical perspective, as surveyed in Cun˜at and Garcia-Appendini (2012),
the evidence seems to favor theories of information asymmetries and financial motives, but
do not favor a particular mechanism. Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) explicitly
argue that the product quality theory finds limited support in the data.12 One issue is
that they conclude this using aggregate indicators of trade credit at the firm level (accounts
receivable/payable) and indirect measures of quality/reputation (firm size). Alternatively,
Pike, Cheng, Cravens, and Lamminmaki (2005), through a survey conducted to 700 firms in
the US, UK, and Australia, explore the different theories and uses for trade credit. They also
find support for models of information asymmetries; in particular, the authors find evidence
for the product quality theory.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that studies empirically the direct
relationship between trade credit and product quality at the transaction-level for a broad
class of firms.
11This can be achieved implicitly through volume discounts and payment plans or explicitly offering
discounts for early payment
12Particularly, they say that according to this theory producers with established reputation should extend
less trade credit since it is likely that they produce high-quality goods, whereas, in reality, large, well-known
firms extend more trade credit.
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3.3 Model
To motivate my empirical analysis and shed light on the mechanisms that drive my
results, I consider a partial equilibrium model of payment choices in international trade in
the spirit of Antras and Foley (2015) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013). The key difference
with these models is that I will include quality as a distinctive characteristic of the good.
Moreover, the quality will not be observable. However, it can be verifiable over time. Thus
trade credit, particularly the maturity of the credit, will have two functions: a signal of the
quality of the good and a quality guarantee. A similar mechanism is proposed by J. K. Smith
(1987) and Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993).
In a nutshell, the model consists of a profit-maximizing producer (hereafter referred to
as ‘he’) who supplies a variety s of a differentiated good to a profit-maximizing retailer
(hereafter referred to as ‘she’). The traded good will differ in its quality, which is known
by the producer but is not observable immediately by the retailer. The producer offers a
trade credit contract specifying a wholesale price w > 0 and a trade credit period M ≥ 0, at
which the retailer will pay back the total value of the transaction after M days. The timing
of the decisions is as follows. The producer chooses the terms of the trade credit contract.
The retailer chooses the quantity and the final price, taking the contract as given. Figure
3.1 describes sequence of events.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
Producer offers a con-
tract (w,M) for prod-
uct of quality α.
Retailer updates be-
liefs about α and orders
quantity q
Retailer receives goods
and verifies quality
Retailer pays wq to pro-
ducer after M periods,
only if quality is α
t
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3.3.1 Consumers
For tractability and clarity, I assume a specific linear demand system as in Foster, Halti-
wanger, and Syverson (2008), Di Comite, Thisse, and Vandenbussche (2014), and Antoniades
(2015)13 for a particular product. This demand structure delivers simple analytical expres-
sions. However, the main theoretical result does not rely on this particular demand since it
also can be obtained through alternative demands systems.
I will assume the economy is endowed with a unit mass of consumers with the following
preferences:
U = q0 +
∫
S
αsqsds− γ
2
∫
S
[qs]
2 ds− η
2
[∫
S
qsds
]2
, (3.1)
where q0 and qs correspond to the individual level consumption of the numeraire and the
variety s ∈ S respectively. As stressed out by Di Comite et al. (2014), the parameter αs > 0
reflects the vertical differentiation between varieties (with respect to the numeraire).14 From
now on, I will refer to αs as quality.
15 The parameter γ > 0 indexes the degree of product
differentiation between varieties. Finally, η > 0 represents the degree of substitutability
between varieties. The inverse demand for a variety s implied by these preferences is given
by
ps = αs − γqs − ηQ, Q ≡
∫
S
qsds. (3.2)
Inverting (3.2), total quantity Q of differentiated variety can be defined as a function of
aggregates as
Q =
(
N
γ + ηN
)
[α¯− p¯]
where N ≡ ∫
S
ds is the number of varieties consumed, α¯ ≡ 1
N
∫
S
αsds and p¯ ≡ 1N
∫
S
psds are
the average quality and price respectively.
13Although many other authors have used a similar specification. The cited authors explicitly include a
demand shifter or ‘quality’ characteristic.
14To be precise, αs reflects the willingness-to-pay for the first unit of variety of s.
15Antoniades (2015) assumes more structure on the preferences for quality, in any case, these preferences
deliver a similar demand system.
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3.3.2 Firms
There are two types of firms. Retailers and Producers. Retailers buy from Producers
and sell directly to consumers. The trade credit decision comes from solving the problem
between these two types of firms when product quality is not observable.
Retailers
Retailers are profit-maximizers that take the demand defined by (3.2), the quality of the
product, and the cost of the product as given to choose retail prices and quantities.
For a given variety s, producers offered the following contract to the retailers: a wholesale
price w and a trade credit maturity M , which means the retailer will pay the producer after
M periods.16 Taking this contract and the total quantity Q as given, the retailer buys
amount qs and sets a final price ps such that profits are maximized. Additionally, following
Antras and Foley (2015) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), I will assume that in every period,
the retailer can face a liquidity shock such that if this shock is realized the retailer exits the
market with zero profits. This liquidity shock will be modeled as a Poisson process with
a rate of δ∗. Therefore, in a trade credit contract with a period of M , the probability of
staying in the market is e−δ
∗M . Finally, I will assume that there is no strategic default, in
other words, in the absence of a liquidity shock, if the retailer bought and received a quality
α product, she will honor the contract (w,M).
In the absence of additional costs, the retailer’s expected profits as a function of quantity
for a given quality αs are defined as
ΠR(qs|αs, w,M) = e−δ∗M
(
ps − we−r∗M
)
qs = e
−δ∗M (αs − γqs − ηQ− we−r∗M) qs (3.3)
where I substituted the final price by the expression obtained in (3.2) and r∗ is the interest
rate relevant for the retailer. Notice that, for simplicity, I assumed that the retailer sells all
16w and M depend on the variety s, but I omitted the sub-index for clarity purposes.
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the goods at the beginning of the period, but pays back to the producer after M periods.
Naturally, the demand for variety s is obtained maximizing (3.3), thus final price, demand
for variety s and total profits as functions of quality are defined by17
ps (w,M |αs) = αs−ηQ+we−r
∗M
2
(3.4)
qs (w,M |αs) = αs−ηQ−we−r
∗M
2γ
(3.5)
ΠRs (w,M |αs) = e
−δ∗M
γ
[
αs−ηQ−we−r∗M
2
]2
. (3.6)
As expected, prices and quantities are increasing in quality, prices (quantities) are increasing
(decreasing) in the wholesale prices, but most importantly, since trade credit decreases the
present value of the payment, it effectively decreases (increases) the price (quantity).
Producers
Similarly, producers, who know the quality of their products, take the demand from the
retailer as given and set wholesale prices and trade credit to maximize expected profits.
In particular, producers of a variety s maximize their profits using the demand from
the retailer given by (3.5). A producer of variety s will have a marginal cost of cs and no
additional costs. Thus, a producer of variety s of quality αs has expected profits of
ΠP (w,M |αs) =
(
we−(r+δ
∗)M − cs
)(αs − ηQ− we−r∗M
2γ
)
. (3.7)
Where r is the interest rate relevant for the producer and δ∗, again, is the liquidity shock
rate of the retailer. The assumption is that if the retailer exits the market, she defaults
on her contract. When taking the model to the data, I will assume that δ∗ is a country
characteristic. Notice that δ∗ is analogous to the inclusion of imperfect contracting friction,
as in Antras and Foley (2015) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), since it captures the likelihood
of the retailer honoring the contract that depends, among other things, on the destination
17Notice that the shock plays no role in the price and quantity. It affects only the profits.
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country legal institutions.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium, I will examine the perfect information benchmark and
conclude that in this framework, trade credit will not be provided unless there are financial
incentives. However, in the asymmetric-information equilibrium, trade credit will be pro-
vided as a signal for product quality, acting effectively as a quality guarantee, even in the
case that it is not financially efficient to provide it.
Perfect information contract
Under the symmetric-information setting, where quality αs is known by the retailer. The
producer solves:
max
w,M≥0
ΠP (w,M |αs) (3.8)
Thus, under perfect information, wholesale prices, quantities and producer expected profits
as a function of trade credit maturity and quality are defined by
w(M |αs) = (αs−ηQ)er
∗M+cse(r+δ
∗)M
2
(3.9)
qs(M |αs) = αs−ηQ−cse(
r+δ∗−r∗)M
4γ
(3.10)
ΠPs (M |αs) = e
−(r+δ∗−r∗)M
2γ
[
αs−ηQ−cse(r+δ∗−r∗)M
2
]2
(3.11)
Lemma 1. (Symmetric-information benchmark) In the symmetric-information con-
tract, if r+δ∗ > r∗ then the optimal provision of trade credit will be M = 0 and the wholesale
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prices, quantities and producer profits are
w(αs) =
αs−ηQ+cs
2
(3.12)
qs(αs) =
αs−ηQ−cs
4γ
(3.13)
ΠPs (αs) =
1
2γ
[
αs−ηQ−cs
2
]2
(3.14)
The proof is direct from (3.11). This lemma states that, under perfect information, the
motive for the provision (and maturity) of trade credit is purely financial. Therefore, if the
producer has no financial incentives, due to the fact of credit being more expensive or riskier
compared to the credit that the retailer can obtain, he will not provide trade credit to the
retailer.
The condition r + δ∗ > r∗ resembles the condition for the provision of trade credit over
prepayment obtained by Antras and Foley (2015) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013).18
Asymmetric-information contract
I turn to the case where the producer has private information about the quality of the
variety he produces. I will focus my attention on the separating equilibrium since I want to
study the case where prices and trade credit maturity may include information about the
quality of the product.19
To ease exposition, I will assume that each variety s can have two possible qualities,
high or low. Suppressing the index s, this means that α ∈ {αL, αH}. Additionally, as it is
standard in this literature, I will assume that producing a high-quality variety is more costly
than producing a low-quality one, then cH > cL. Defining ∆α ≡ αH−αL and ∆c ≡ cH−cL, I
assume that ∆α > ∆c. This last assumption implies that, under perfect information, profits
are increasing in quality or, equivalently, larger firms produce higher quality products.
18In their models, given the mismatch between delivery and payment, they also include the possibility of
default for the producer, so they also include a home country-risk variable
19In the appendix 3.A.2 I explore the pooling equilibrium and conditions for its existence.
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To isolate the role of quality signaling of the trade credit, I will assume that r+ δ∗ > r∗,
that is, producers have no financial incentives to provide trade credit. Finally, the critical
assumption of the model is that after delivery but before payment, the retailer may receive
a signal of the quality of the product. For simplicity, this signal will be a perfect bad news
signal, which means a single signal arrival conclusively indicates low quality. This signal
will be a Poisson process with an arrival rate of µ. Moreover, if the retailer receives this
signal, but she did not buy a low-quality product, she will default on her contract, and
these products become worthless. Intuitively, trade credit maturity acts as product quality
guarantee, since a more extended credit period implies a higher chance to verify the actual
quality of the product.
Proposition 6. Under asymmetric-information about product quality, a separating equilib-
rium will be characterized by the low-quality producer offering the symmetric-information
contract (wL, 0) with wL ≡ αL−ηQ+cL
2
. Whereas the high-quality producer deviates and offers
a contract (w,M) such that w > wH and M ≥ 0, where wH is the wholesale price of the
high-quality product under perfect information.
The proof of the existence of a separating equilibrium has been extensively discussed
in the literature, see for example Wolinsky (1983), Bagwell (1992), and Overgaard (1993),
where firms signal product quality exclusively through prices. Because through the provision
of trade credit, I am just broadening the space of signals, the separating equilibrium still
exists. The key assumption needed for the existence of the separating equilibrium is the
single-crossing property, guaranteed in this case by the assumption ∆α > ∆c. Intuitively, if
both types of producers offer their symmetric-information contract, the high-quality producer
does not have the incentive to deviate to the low-quality contract since it implies a lower
wholesale price (wH > wL) and he pays a higher marginal cost.
On the other hand, the low-quality producer has incentives to mimic the high-quality firm
since he will receive higher prices and pays the lower marginal cost. Therefore high-quality
producer will pay the signaling cost through higher prices and trade credit (which is costly)
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to separate themselves from the low-quality firm. In that case, the low-quality producer will
offer the full information price.
As it has been stated in the literature, there are many separating equilibria. The one
that survives the Intuitive Criterion, as defined by Cho and Kreps (1987), corresponds to the
most efficient separating equilibrium20 characterized by the solution of the following problem
max
w,M≥0
(
we−(r+δ
∗)M − cH) q (w,M |αH)
subject to
(
e−µMwe−(r+δ
∗)M − cL) q (w,M |αH) ≤ ΠL (3.15)
Where the q
(
w,M |αH) is given by (3.5), ΠL represents the profits of the low quality pro-
ducer under the symmetric-information equilibrium and the constraint corresponds to the
local incentive compatibility, where wholesale prices and trade credit maturity deter the low
quality firm from mimicking the high-quality producer. The first part of this restriction
correspond to the expected revenue of the low quality producer when he tries to pass as a
high-quality firm and he is not caught, the second part is the total production cost cLq. The
following proposition describes the optimal trade credit contract.
Proposition 7. Under asymmetric-information about product quality, the contract (w,M)
that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion is the most efficient separating equilibrium that solves
(3.15). Moreover, for µ large enough, this contract (w,M > 0) solves the following system:
w =
(αH−ηQ)er∗M+cHe(r+δ∗)M
2
+ r+δ
∗−r∗
2µ
(cH − cLeµM)e(r+δ∗)M (3.16)
ΠL =
(
e−µMwe−(r+δ
∗)M − cL) q (w,M |αH) (3.17)
Otherwise, the optimal contract is defined by the system:
M = 0 (3.18)
ΠL =
(
w − cL) q (w, 0|αH) (3.19)
20Most efficient equilibrium in the sense that producer maximizes profits using the lowest price/trade
credit maturity possible. Both are costly signals.
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Proof can be found in the Appendix. Proposition 7 characterizes the optimal contract
and shows that the parameter µ is essential for the use of trade credit. If the rate of the
verification of quality is low, there is no use in the provision of trade credit, since it is an
expensive and ineffective signal. Therefore quality will be signaled only through prices. As
long as µ is large enough, the high-quality producer will use wholesale prices and trade credit
maturity to signal the quality of the product. Figure 3.2 shows a graphical representation of
the optimal contract as the solution of the maximization problem or as the solution of the
non-linear system of equations described in proposition 7.
Figure 3.2: Characterization of optimal contract.
(a) Solution given by (3.15) (b) Solution characterized by Proposition 7
Note: Solid line corresponds to the IC constraint. Dashed line, on the left panel, corresponds to the objective
function in (3.15). On the right panel dashed line corresponds to equation (3.16) in Proposition 7
3.3.4 Increasing quality
Proposition 7 delivers the fact that high-quality goods are more likely to be traded under
trade credit. Now the question is, what happens in the case of multiple quality levels?
To easily answer this question, I conduct a comparative static analysis by increasing αH
and cH , while still assuming ∆α > ∆c.21 This delivers the following result:
21Alternatively, one can assume a set of different quality levels and their corresponding costs. The problem
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Proposition 8. In the most efficient separating, the wholesale price w and trade credit
maturity M increase with quality.
Although a formal proof in a simplified version of the model is provided in Appendix
3.A.3, this result is intuitive. Increasing quality makes mimicking more attractive for low-
quality firms, thus both signals: wholesale price and trade credit maturity must increase to
deter this behavior. Figure 3.3 exemplifies the contract and some of the outcomes as αH and
cH increase.
Figure 3.3: Contract as a function of quality
with this is that the most efficient contract becomes increasingly complicated since all the IC constraints
must be checked.
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3.3.5 Predictions
This model, and its extension, delivers 3 testable predictions. First, from the optimal
contract, propositions 7 and 8 state the main testable result of this paper.
Prediction 1. High-quality firms are more likely to extend trade credit. Moreover, higher
quality goods are traded under longer trade credit periods.
The mechanism is very intuitive. Trade credit acts as a quality guarantee. Delaying the
payment decision gives itself an enforcement tool to the retailer. In this model, a contract
does not consist only in the delivery of a product, which a short trade credit period can also
enforce. A contract describes the delivery of a product of a certain quality, and since quality
is hard to asses, longer maturities are needed to enforce the contract.
Secondly, because of the presence of financial motives (r, r∗ and δ∗) and other demand
factors (ηQ), this model also delivers the following predictions with respect to the relationship
between trade credit provision and market-specific characteristics.
Prediction 2. Trade credit maturity will be longer in countries with:
1. better institutions (low δ∗)
2. higher level of competition (high ηQ)
The first part of the prediction is intuitive. δ∗ captures an exogenous default rate on
the contract. Better legal institutions imply that this default probability is lower, the credit
becomes cheaper. Then if δ∗ is lower, the transaction under credit will be more likely to be
paid, reducing the cost of providing trade credit. Therefore the producer has more incentives
to use trade credit as a signal for quality. Figure 3.4 shows the effect of δ∗ over some of the
outcomes of the model. As risk increases, the price also increases. Consequently, quantities
and profits decrease.
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Figure 3.4: Contract as a function of δ
The competition effect is not as intuitive because, as competition increases, two things
happen: low-quality firm’s profits decreases and expected revenue when deviating also de-
creases. While the former tightens the incentive compatibility constraint, the latter relaxes
the restriction. The effect that dominates depends on the parametrization, as Appendix
3.A.3 shows, under very mild conditions, namely, a significant difference between high qual-
ity and low quality or a high rate of µ, the overall effect will be non-monotonic. For small
enough levels of competition, the low-quality profit effect dominates. Thus the IC constraint
becomes tighter, forcing an increase in the maturity of trade credit. On the other hand, for
high levels of competition, the low-quality profits are so low that the revenue effect domi-
nates. The IC constraint is relaxed, decreasing the incentives for more extended trade credit
periods.
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This relationship and the corresponding intuition can be seen in figure 3.5, particular in
the last panel, where profits for low and high-quality firms are plotted. When low-quality firm
profits are low (close to 0) is when the relationship of trade credit maturity and competition
changes direction. The overall positive relationship between competition and trade credit
provision is documented by Fisman and Raturi (2004), Hyndman and Serio (2010), and Singh
(2017). Moreover, the inverted U-shape resembles the one that Hyndman and Serio (2010)
find empirically. In their paper, they find that the provision of trade credit and competition
has an inverted U-shape.
Figure 3.5: Contract as a function of ηQ
Finally, one of the key aspects of this model is the quality verification dimension, captured
by the parameter µ. Therefore I can test an additional prediction.
Prediction 3. Trade credit maturity will be longer for products where quality is hard to
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assess (low µ).
Since µ is the rate at which the importer receives the signal that verifies the quality of
the product. A product with a higher µ is akin to a product in which quality is easy to
establish, therefore if a product’s quality is easy to asses, a shorter trade credit period will
be necessary to verify the quality and deter the low-quality firm from deviating. Figure 3.6
describes this intuition. As previously discussed, for a very low µ, trade credit will not be
used as a signal. Therefore the separating equilibrium will be sustained only through prices,
which in turn implies that high-quality firm has lower profits compared to the low-quality
firm. Notice that the prediction of a negative relationship between µ and trade credit length
is true only when high-quality firm profits are greater than the low-quality firm, which is
not an implausible assumption.22
22This outcome can be obtained in an extension where there are two sets of firms: one with access only to
low-quality technology and the other one with access to both high and low-quality technology. Under this
setting, the separating equilibrium exists, thus high and low quality will simultaneously be offered, only if
high-quality profits are greater than low quality.
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Figure 3.6: Contract as a function of µ
3.4 Payment Contracts and Data
To test the predictions of the model, I will use a detailed transaction-level from Chilean
customs. This data set that allows me to study the relationship between quality and trade
credit includes information on destination/origin, prices, quantities, and the type of payment
contract that was used in a given transaction.
3.4.1 Payment contracts
Before describing the data, it might be useful to outline the type of payment contracts
used in international trade. Following the literature, these contracts are Open Account,
Cash-in-Advance, Letter of Credit, Documentary Collection, and a Two-Part agreement
that combines any two of the previous ones.
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An Open Account (OA) transaction in the trade finance literature, corresponds to an op-
eration that the importer pays directly to the exporter after shipment/arrival of the product.
This type of arrangement is the closest to a standard trade credit contract.
The opposite in terms of payment risk is the case where the importer pays to the exporter
before shipment(arrival) of the goods. This arrangement is known as Cash-in-Advance (CIA).
Somewhere in the middle, in terms of risk, is the case where banks can intermediate
through documentation that acts as a payment guarantee. One of these mechanisms is
called Letter of Credit (LC). In this arrangement, the importer agrees to pay the transaction
to his bank, said bank issues a letter to the exporter’s bank that serves as a guarantee
for payments under specified conditions.23 After these conditions are met, the exporter’s
bank releases the payment to the exporter. Exporter’s bank collects the money from the
importer’s bank and finally, the importer pays to his bank.24
Similar to the letter of credit, there is the Documentary Collection (DC). The critical
distinction is that under LC, the bank is required to give the money to the exporter if the
conditions are satified; in other words, payment is almost guaranteed. Under DC, there is
no guarantee. The importer can decide not to honor the contract, hence the exporter will
not receive the payment.25
The final type of contract is a combination of any of the previous four in the form of a two-
part contract (e.g., 20% CIA, 80% OA). Figure 3.7 summarizes the types of arrangements
and their relationship with risk.
As figure 3.7 shows and what the literature has stressed, there is a tension in how risk
is shared between parties, particularly the default risk. CIA is the safest for the exporter,
since he will receive the payment early, but is the riskiest for the importer since the exporter
23These conditions consist of the presentation of documents by the exporter to his bank. The documen-
tation needed can vary but consists of: bill of lading, certificate of origin, commercial invoice, inspection
documents, among others.
24The importer pays a fee to his bank for this service. Between fixed charges and a percentage of the
value, these fees may vary between 1 and 10% of the total amount of the transaction.
25In this case, the importer also pays a fee to the bank, but since the bank faces almost no risk, the fees
are lower. They correspond to 1% or less of the face value of the transaction.
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Figure 3.7: Payment methods and risk
might not deliver the goods. Similarly, OA is the safest for the importer, but most uncertain
for the exporter since the importer might not pay the agreed transfer, even after the arrival
of the products.
Notice that, aside from the risk-sharing problem, financially speaking OA, LC and DC
contracts are very similar in the sense that the exporter will receive the payment after the
arrival of the goods. Hence all these arrangements look like a standard trade credit contract.
Therefore, the credit period plays an important role, since longer maturities imply that the
exporter must fund his working capital through the financial system for a more extended
period, incurring additional costs.
3.4.2 Data
My empirical analysis that relates trade credit and product quality is mainly based on
transaction-level data provided by the Chilean Customs Agency.
The data set, available for exports and imports, includes standard information such as
the firm’s tax number, 8-digit HS product code, destination/origin country, value, quantities,
etc. There are two unique features of these data sets. First, for both exports and imports,
the data sets include information about the trade finance contract for each shipment. In
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particular, if the transaction was paid in advance (CIA), post-shipment (OA), with some
bank documentation (LC/DC)26, through a two-part contract or if the purchase actually
was not paid. Secondly, and key for my analysis, both data sets also include a measure that
captures how many days later will the exporter (importer) collect (make) the payment. In
the case of exporters, they need to report to Customs the exact date that they will receive the
payment (or last payment in the case of a two-part contract). Similarly, importers need to
report directly the number of days in which they will make the payment (or final payment).
This data is available for 2009 to 2017 for the case of exports and 2007 to 2017 for imports.
Table 3.1: Shares by type of contract
Exports Imports
Transaction FOB Transaction FOB
OA 87.1 83.7 66.6 75.9
LC/DC 2.0 12.7 5.6 9.3
CIA 6.9 3.0 25.2 13.3
Two-part 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.0
No payment 3.6 0.4 2.0 0.5
Note: Column Transaction computes average weighting by transaction. Column FOB, weighting by value.
As table 3.1 shows, the most predominant form of trade finance is OA, with around
85% of exports (weighted by transaction or FOB value) and 70% of imports being paid
after arrival with no intermediation. Moreover, trade credit, in the sense of late payment
(OA+LC/DC), accounts for 90% of the exports and more than 70% of imports. Also, it
is essential to note that the two-part contracts are almost non-existent, accounting for less
than 1% of the trade flows.27
In the case of exports, I proxy the maturity of each type of contract as the difference
between the reported payment date and the shipment date. For imports, I use the direct
report of the number of days. Table 3.2 shows the number of days on average that each
contract is paid. In the case of exports, trade credit transactions are paid after 4 and a half
26From the data, I cannot disentangle if a transaction was paid using DC or LC.
27Among the two-part agreements, the most frequent is the 50% CIA, 50% OA.
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Table 3.2: Average number of days by contract
Exports Imports
Transaction FOB Transaction FOB
OA 132.7 148.7 73.8 78.0
LC/DC 159.6 197.4 133.1 131.3
CIA -20.6 -28.3 - -
Two-part 84.1 110.8 75.8 115.9
Note: Column Transaction computes average weighting by transaction. Column FOB, weighting by value.
In the case of Imports, when transaction is CIA, importers report 0 days.
months on average. Trade credit related to imports is shorter, with an average maturity
of 2 and a half months. Notice that regardless of LC/DC being considerably safer options
compared to an OA contract, LC/DC contracts have similar credit periods, in the case of
exports, or considerably longer, for imports. This last point supports the fact that from a
financial perspective, both contracts are akin to trade credit since both imply a late payment.
Finally, it is worth noting that this proxy for trade credit period implies that on average
transactions under CIA are paid 20 days before shipping, which is considerably lower than
the number of days provided as trade credit.28 Figure 3.8 shows the full distribution of
maturities. By construction, the credit period for exporters is continuous, although spikes
can be seen close to 30, 60, 90, 120 days, as it is standard in trade finance practice. For
imports, since the number of days is directly reported, there are clear modes at 0 days (CIA),
then 30, 60, 90, and 120 days.
I complement this data set with data from the Chilean Tax Agency. This additional
firm-level data set includes measures of size (number of workers, equity, tax bracket based
on total sales), age, and industry at the 6-digit level.
28This difference comes from the fact that I do not have the actual date of production/invoicing of a given
product. So this number of days should be considered a lower bound since the traded good was produced
before the shipment date. As a matter of fact, for a subsample of the data set, I can obtain the actual date
of the invoice, and for those cases, the average number of days of prepayment is between -1 and 0. Moreover,
this sample has clear modes at 0, 30, 60 and 270 days. Appendix 3.C.1 shows the comparison for both the
actual trade credit and the proxy measure I use throughout the paper.
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of number of days
(a) Exports (b) Imports
Quality
To test the main mechanism of the model and its implications, a key measure needed is
product quality. For this, I will use two approaches. First, following Khandelwal, Schott, and
Wei (2013) and Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2015), I will infer quality from prices and quantities.
Alternatively, due to endogeneity and measurement error concerns in the quality estimation,
I will focus on the wine industry and use wine ratings and other measures as proxies for
product quality. To estimate quality using prices and quantities Khandelwal, Schott, and
Wei (2013) assume a CES demand system that includes quality as a demand shifter, the
demand for a product of a given quality α is defined as:
q = p−σαηA
where q is quantity, p reflects price, σ is the demand elasticity, and A represents a combination
of the price index and aggregate expenditure in country d. Taking logs and rearranging
η logα = log q + σ log p+ logA
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Then assuming a value for σ, η logα can be estimated as the residual of
log qfpdt + σ log pfpdt = γdt + γp + εfpdt. (3.20)
Where γdt is a set of destination×year fixed effects that control for A and γp are prod-
uct fixed effects included since prices and quantities are not necessarily comparable across
product categories. Thus quality can be proxied by η logα
∧
≡ ε∧. The value of the demand
elasticity σ is key, and following the literature, I will use common values in the trade lit-
erature σ = {5, 10}, also I will use the values estimated at the product level by Broda
and Weinstein (2006), thus σ = σp in this case. Finally, when estimating quality with this
methodology, I follow the literature29 and restrict the sample to differentiated goods as de-
fined by Rauch (1999) since these products by definition are the ones who might display
quality differentiation. In contrast, homogeneous goods do not.
The previous measure of quality has several issues, particularly measurement error since
it is based on estimation. Therefore I will use an alternative approach to test the robustness
of my results. Specifically, I will take an objective measure of quality in a single industry,
wine.
The wine industry in Chile is not a large sector in Chile. It contributes 0.5% of the
GDP and represents around 3% of total Chilean exports (7% of exports in manufacturing).
However, it is a significant industry internationally. In 2018, Chile was the 5th largest
wine exporter, representing 5.3% of world wine exports.30 The key aspect of using the
wine industry is the existence of several magazines and websites that publish objective and
comparable ratings for wine. To use this information, I will exploit an additional feature of
my data set, for each transaction, there is a variable that describes, in plain text, the product
that is being traded. In the case of wine, from this variable, I will extract information that
29See Khandelwal (2010), for example
30For reference, France, Italy and Spain, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd largest wine exporters respectively, amount
to almost 30, 20 and 10% of worldwide wine exports.
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identifies the particular wine, for example, winery, brand if it exists, grape/blend31, vintage
and additional keywords e.g. Reserve, Organic. Using this information, I web-scrapped
ratings, retail price, and awards for each wine. Additionally, from the description, I extract
text that indicates if the wine is bulk wine, that obviously is not rated, but potentially may
signal a low-quality wine.
Given these approaches, I will focus my empirical analysis using only data for exports.
Table 3.3, in the following page, shows some summary statistics for the full sample and the
restricted ones. As expected, the sample is very skewed in terms of value per transaction
and exporter size (measured by total exports or by number of workers)
31Some examples of grape are Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Pinot Noir, etc. With ‘blend’ I mean a mix
of grapes.
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Table 3.4 describes additional statistics for the wine sample, particularly, statistics related
to quality. In general, the exported wine is of high quality. This fact is shown by the high
average price per bottle, high average rating, or the large share of the wine exports that have
an award.
It is worth to point out the fact that, according to Rauch (1999), wine is not a differen-
tiated good. Thus both restricted samples are completely independent.32
Table 3.4: Additional statistics wine-quality
Mean Median p1 p99
Price (FOB) 5.00 3.33 0.77 35.30
Final Price ($ per bottle) 25.71 10 4 141
Rating (0-100) 87.35 87 83 93
Award 0.43 0 0 1
Bulk 0.03 0 0 1
3.5 Empirical analysis
The primary purpose of this empirical section is to study the use of trade credit as a
quality guarantee and to assess the validity of the proposed model. To do that, I will test
the following hypotheses: (1) High-quality products are more likely to be traded under trade
credit (Prediction 1). (2) Higher quality goods will be purchased with more extended trade
credit periods (Prediction 1). (3) Trade credit period will be longer in countries with better
legal institutions and markets with a high level of competition (Prediction 2); Trade credit
will be shorter for products that quality is easier to verify (Prediction 3).
To capture the relationship between trade credit provision and quality described in Pre-
diction 1, I will estimate the following equation:
I(CIAfpdt = 1) = βqualityfpdt + γpdt + εfpdt, (3.21)
32Several authors have indicated that one of the problems with Rauch (1999) is related to the classification
of agricultural products, see Bernini, Gonza´lez, Hallak, and Vicondoa (2018) for a discussion.
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where I(CIAfpdt = 1) is a dummy variable that is one if a transaction from firm f of product
p to destination d at period t was paid under cash-in-advance, qualityfpdt is a measure of
quality and γpdt are product×destination×year fixed effects to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity potentially correlated with product quality, for example demand shocks. Similarly,
for the second part of Prediction 1 that relates trade credit maturity and quality, I will
estimate the following equation:
Mfpdt = βqualityfpdt + γpdt + εfpdt, (3.22)
where Mfpdt is the maturity in days of the trade credit extended by firm f , when selling
product p to destination d in period t.
To test Predictions 2 and 3 , I will estimate a general equation of the form
Mfpdt = βX + ν
′Z + γ + εfpdt, (3.23)
where X will be the relevant destination-specific measure for institutional quality, firm-
destination-product specific measure of competition and product-specific measure of quality
verifiability. Z represents a set of additional observables and γ are a set of fixed effects to
control for unobservables.
3.5.1 Relationship between quality measures
Before moving to the main results, it is worthwhile to show that all the measures for
product quality that I will use are correlated, as expected.
As previously stated, I will use two approaches to measure product quality. I start mea-
suring quality from the data set as the residual of (3.20). Along these lines, for robustness,
I will proxy product quality by firm size, as proposed by Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) and
Manova and Zhang (2012).
Table 3.5 shows the cross-correlations between these measures of quality. All of these
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metrics are positively related, as has been well documented in the literature.
Table 3.5: Cross correlation over quality measures
α (σ = 5) α (σ = 10) α (σ = σp) logN log Equity log tot Exp Sales bracket Age
α (σ = 5) 1
α (σ = 10) 0.95 1
α (σ = σp) 0.46 0.40 1
logN 0.17 0.10 0.15 1
log Equity 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.75 1
log tot Exp 0.31 0.17 0.21 0.65 0.66 1
Sales bracket 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.71 0.80 0.67 1
Age 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.38 0.41 0.34 0.42 1
Note: α is the estimated quality with the value of σ indicated. σp is the product-specific elasticity estimated
by Broda and Weinstein (2006). logN is corresponds to the log of employment, log tot Exp is the log of the
value of total of exports for a firm in a given year. Sales bracket is the classification of size based on total
annual sales according to the Chilean tax agency. All correlations are significant at 1%.
Alternatively, for the case of wine, I will use additional measures for quality, such as
wine rating, final price, awarded wine, and bulk wine. Table 3.6 shows the cross-correlation
between these variables. As expected, high quality, measured as the residual of equation
(3.20), is positively correlated with size, high ratings, high final price, and the likelihood of
having an award. Also, not surprisingly, high quality is negatively correlated with bulk wine.
The rest of the correlations have the expected sign, except for the final price and the fact
that the wine earned an award. This relationship has a negative correlation, although very
low.
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3.5.2 Results
Results are consistent with the predictions of the model. In particular, I find that high-
quality goods more likely to be traded under trade credit, and high-quality goods have longer
maturities. Additionally, trade credit will be longer in countries with better legal institutions,
in markets where firms face more competition and for products for which quality is hard to
verify.
Probability of extending trade credit
Table 3.7 shows one of the main empirical results of this paper, the estimation of equation
(3.21), that relates quality and the likelihood of a transaction being paid in advance. The first
column is the regression using size, measured by log employment, as a proxy for quality under
the full sample, the following columns use the estimated quality under different elasticities,
for those cases, I use the restricted sample of differentiated goods. To ease the comparison
among results, row ∆I(CIA = 1) indicates the marginal change in the probability of cash-
in-advance evaluating the independent variable from percentile 1 to percentile 99 (akin to
going from low quality to high quality). Table 3.7 shows that higher quality products are,
on average, 8 percent less likely to be traded under trade credit.
Table 3.7: Quality and Likelihood of Trade Credit
Dep. var I(CIA = 1)
logN σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp
Quality -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 9181870 2576753 2576753 2285070
R2 .439 .549 .548 .553
∆I(CIA = 1) -0.072 -0.120 -0.094 -0.056
Note: All regressions include product×destination×year fixed effects. σp is the product-specific elasticity
estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). logN is corresponds to the log of employment. Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Since the relationship between size and the probability of providing trade credit is well
159
documented33, perhaps the correlation between quality and trade credit is capturing the re-
lationship of size and trade credit. To tackle this issue, I estimate equation (3.21) controlling
by firm size. Table 3.8 indicates that the relationship between quality and provision of trade
credit still exists, although its impact is cut by half.
Table 3.8: Quality and Likelihood of Trade Credit and Firm Size
Dep. var I(CIA = 1)
σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp
Quality -0.002∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
logN -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs. 2436580 2436580 2158721
R2 .539 .538 .545
∆I(CIA = 1) -0.059 -0.044 -0.026
Note: All regressions include product×destination×year fixed effects. σp is the product-specific elasticity
estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). logN is corresponds to the log of employment. Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Now I proceed to estimate equation (3.21) for the case of wine. Since, in this case, the
sample is one product, I include a set of grape×destination×year fixed effects to control
potential differences in types of wine. According to table 3.9, the results are similar, and
they present the expected negative relationship between quality and the probability of pre-
payment. Two important comments. First, the negative correlation measured by ratings
and final prices exists but is very weak because the rated wines are already of high quality.
Therefore there is not sufficient variance. Secondly and surprisingly, bulk wine seems to be
traded through trade credit, which is counter-intuitive with the proposed mechanism, under
the natural assumption that bulk wine is of lower quality compared to bottled wine. This
result comes from the fact that bulk wine, although low quality, is traded in large volumes34.
Thus each transaction of bulk wine becomes important for both exporter and importer. Ta-
33See Justel (2019) for example
34Average volume of non-bulk wine is 4 tons, whereas average bulk wine is 52 tons
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ble ?? in the Appendix shows that once controlling for the volume of each transaction, the
rest of coefficients remain the same, but the one for bulk wine becomes positive, significative
and with a similar magnitude compared to the other ones.
Table 3.9: Quality and Likelihood of Trade Credit - Wine
Dep. var I(CIA = 1)
σ = σp σ = 5 logN Rating Avg Rating log price log Avg price Award Bulk
Quality -0.010∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Obs 1661139 1663495 1540375 937489 950493 787027 1201204 1664188 1664188
R2 .118 .112 .12 .129 .132 .153 .113 .111 .11
∆I(CIA = 1) -0.089 -0.041 -0.063 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.007
Note: Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimated σp = 2.2 for wine. Rating and price correspond to the rating
and final price of a particular wine-vintage. Avg Rating and Avg price are respective average ratings and
final prices for a wine over vintages. Award and Bulk are dummy variables with value 1 if wine earned an
award or if it is a bulk wine. All regressions include grape×destination×year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Trade credit maturity
The previous section emphasized the relationship between the discrete choice of providing
trade credit and product quality. One of the advantages of my data set is the fact that I
can study the provision of trade credit as a continuum (how many days before/after arrival,
the importer will pay). In this section, I show the second main result of this paper, namely
the positive relationship between product quality and trade credit maturity. Figure 3.C.2
shows a graphic representation of equation (3.22). It shows the relationship between product
quality and the number of days provided as trade credit.
The results of estimating equation (3.22) are summarized in table 3.10. Once again, to
ease comparison, row ∆M describes the difference in the number of days when evaluating
the independent variable from the 1st percentile to the 99th. On average, high-quality goods
have 20 days longer trade credit compared to low-quality products.
In the previous estimation, I used transactions conducted under trade credit and prepay-
ment and without additional firm controls, which might be an important omitted variable.
The results are robust when controlling for these potential issues. Table 3.11 summarizes
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Figure 3.9: Trade credit maturity and quality
(a) σ = 5 (b) σ = σp
Note: Both figures are binned scatter plots of number of days of trade credit vs. quality measured as
the residual of (3.20) demeaned by product×destination×year. Left panel estimates quality using demand
elasticity of 5 and right panel using the demand elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006)
Table 3.10: Trade credit maturity and quality
Dep. var M
logN σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp
Quality 3.164∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
(0.766) (0.224) (0.104) (0.142)
Obs. 8849859 2401104 2401104 2125504
R2 .553 .599 .598 .621
∆M 26.972 21.046 10.740 21.283
Note: All regressions include product×destination×year fixed effects. σp is the product-specific elasticity
estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). logN is corresponds to the log of employment. Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
several robustness checks. The first panel restricts the sample to exclude transactions con-
ducted under cash-in-advance. The middle panel uses the full sample, trade credit, and
CIA transactions, but controls for firm size. The final panel is a combination of a restricted
sample and firm size. In general, results remain similar quantitatively.
Now, I turn back the attention to the wine exports sample. As before, figure 3.10 shows
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Table 3.11: Trade credit maturity and quality - Robustness checks
M > 0 Size M > 0 + Size
logN σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp
Quality 2.698** 0.873** 0.291* 0.996** 0.515* 0.105 0.631** 0.736** 0.278* 0.999**
(0.76) (0.287) (0.133) (0.246) (0.237) (0.111) (0.158) (0.286) (0.133) (0.245)
logN - - - - 5.717** 5.802** 4.069** 4.499** 4.579** 2.552*
(1.025) (1.032) (1.013) (1.091) (1.098) (1.086)
Obs. 8052086 2065979 2065979 1812642 2269693 2269693 2007557 1990042 1990042 1748159
R2 0.565 0.611 0.611 0.64 0.604 0.604 0.626 0.618 0.618 0.646
∆M 23.162 20.322 13.766 29.293 12.255 5.205 19.379 16.866 12.981 29.429
Note: All regressions include product×destination×year fixed effects. Panel 1 restricts the sample to trans-
actions with positive trade credit (M > 0), panel 2 is the full sample, but includes log total employment,
final panel restricts sample to transactions under trade credit and controlling for firm size. Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm × destination level. *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
graphically the relationship between trade credit maturity and wine quality, measured by its
rating.
Figure 3.10: Trade credit maturity and wine rating
Note: Figure corresponds to binned scatter plot of number of days of trade credit vs. average Rating
demeaned by grape×destination×year.
Table 3.12 reports the results from estimating equation (3.22) with the additional mea-
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sures of quality. All the coefficients are significant. Moreover, these coefficients imply that
high-quality goods have 30 more of trade credit. Tables ??-3.B.4 in the Appendix show
additional robustness checks with restricted sample and the inclusion of firm size as controls.
The main result still holds.
Table 3.12: Trade credit maturity and quality - Wine
Dep var M
σ = σp σ = 5 logN Rating Avg Rating log price log Avg price Award Bulk
Quality 6.772∗∗∗ 4.024∗∗ 6.292∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗ 3.013∗∗∗ 5.721∗∗ 7.783∗∗∗ 15.759∗∗∗ -18.798∗∗∗
(2.388) (1.938) (2.021) (1.118) (1.076) (2.645) (2.185) (3.308) (6.536)
Obs. 1652425 1654780 1531896 933345 946440 784245 1196461 1655466 1655466
R2 .177 .167 .186 .184 .198 .261 .187 .168 .16
∆M 57.495 36.556 48.911 22.658 30.129 20.381 25.709 15.759 -18.798
Note: Rating and price corresponds to the rating and final price of a particular wine-vintage. Avg Rating
and Avg price are respective average ratings and final prices for a wine over vintages. Award and Bulk
are dummy variables with value 1 if wine earned an award or if it is a bulk wine. All regressions include
grape×destination×year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗,
∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Trade credit maturity, institutions, and competition
In this section, I test the additional predictions regarding trade credit maturity, quality
of institutions, and competition. It has been shown in the literature the effect of some of
these variables on the discrete decision of providing trade credit or not, so now I exploit the
extensive margin, namely the number days of trade credit.
First, I start testing the first part of prediction 2: the positive relationship between
trade credit maturity and better legal institutions. To verify that, I estimate the following
regression.
Mfpdt = βXdt + ν
′Zdt + γfpt + εfpdt, (3.24)
where Xdt will be a country-specific measure of institutional quality. Zdt will be additional
country-specific controls such as log GDP and log distance. Finally, I include firm×product×year
fixed effects to capture supply shocks (e.g., productivity and learning). To measure institu-
tional quality, I will use several measures; most of them already used in related literature.
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First, I will use the most basic metric, GDP per capita; this measure has been extensively
related to legal institutions.35 Additionally, I will use the rule of law index constructed by
the World Bank. This measure captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts.36 Finally, I will include measures used in Antras and Foley
(2015) such as: Common Law dummy, a variable that captures if a given country has com-
mon law legal origin as opposed to other legal frameworks such as civil, German, socialist
law; enforceability of contracts, a measured constructed by Knack and Keefer (1995) that
captures the degree to which contracts are honored; law and order index that captures the
integrity of legal system from the Country Risk Guide and it is obtained from Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
Table 3.13 shows the results of estimating (3.25) for different measures of institutional
quality. As can be seen, institutional quality is positively related to trade credit maturity.
On average, for a given firm, selling a product, better institutions implies five days longer
trade credit on average. This low number, compared to the quality-related estimations,
favors the theory that contract enforcement seems to matter for the decision of providing
trade credit more than the extension of the credit itself.
The first panel on table 3.13 corresponds to the full sample. The second panel excludes
CIA contracts. It is worth to note that distance seems to play an important role as expected.
This fact is indirectly captured in the theory since far destinations will receive their products
later. Therefore these importers need more time to asses the quality of these products. This
intuition is corroborated using an alternative specification where I additionally control by
transportation mode. Table 3.B.7 in the Appendix describes that compared to waterborne
transportation, arguably slower, air and ground transportation imply a shorter trade credit
period.37
35e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)
36More details in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011)
37I additionally, control for the trade quantity since it might be the case that air and ground transportation
have volume constraints. In general, results do not change.
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To test the competition effect on trade credit maturity, I will estimate the following
equation.
Mfpdt = βXfpdt + ν
′Zft + γpdt + εfpdt, (3.25)
where Xfpdt will capture competition. Following the discussion of institutions, I will include
product×destination×year fixed-effects to control for market and product characteristics.
Zft will control for firm characteristics. As previously mentioned, I should expect that high
levels of competition imply longer trade credit periods. Since measuring competition is hard,
I will use two approaches. The first one uses the product complexity index (PCI), a product-
year specific metric constructed by Hausmann et al. (2014) at HS 4-digit level. In a nutshell,
this measure captures how complex a product is, where complexity is defined by the ubiquity
of the product (how many countries produce the same thing) and the diversity of products
that a given country produces.38 Therefore, a highly complex product will be something that
few countries produce and these countries have a very diversified production matrix. Based
on this definition, it is natural to expect that highly complex product faces less competition,
therefore using this specification, I expect β < 0.
Table 3.14 describes the results of these estimations. For robustness, I included specifica-
tions with firm controls, firm FE and also a specification where I excluded CIA transactions.
As expected, I find a negative relationship between product-complexity/competition and
trade credit, where more complex products have between 18 to 50 days less of trade credit.
To complement this approach, I will use standard measures of competition. First, I will
compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each market, where a market will be
defined as a product-destination-year combination. Through HHI, I measure the competition
among Chilean exporters, not competition with the rest of the world. For a broader notion
of competition, I will use the market share that a given firm has in a particular product-
destination-year. This share will be computed over all the imports (not just of Chilean
origin) of a country for a said product in a year obtained from UN COMTRADE. In other
38The actual measure is computed through, as it is known in network theory, the eigenvector centrality.
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Table 3.14: Trade credit and competition - PCI
Full Sample M > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCI -12.566∗∗∗ -12.601∗∗∗ -1.424 -15.718∗∗∗ -16.105∗∗∗ -5.520∗∗∗
(2.971) (2.800) (1.172) (4.421) (4.450) (2.108)
Obs. 9167764 7661709 9156757 8304905 6983374 8299140
R2 .423 .45 .794 .438 .466 .819
Prod-2d×Dest×Year FE
Firm Controls
Firm×Year FE
∆M -42.7 -43.2 -4.83 -52.8 -54.6 -18.5
Note: Dependent variable is the trade credit maturity in days, M . Firm controls include log employment,
log equity and log Age. First panel is the full sample. Second panel excludes prepaid transactions. Robust
standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively.
words, market share is calculated as:
sfpdt =
Salesfpdt
Importspdt
As before, large HHI and large market share imply that the firm faces less competition.
Thus I expect β < 0. Regarding this latter approach, other forces may explain this correla-
tion. For example, a firm may use trade credit as a marketing strategy to increase its market
share. This strategy implies that low market share firms will extend longer trade credit peri-
ods to increase their share, delivering the expected negative correlation. Alternatively, since
large firms, with large market shares, produce high-quality goods, a positive correlation could
also be found.39 To address these issues, in a third specification, I will instrument the cur-
rent market share by the previous year’s market share of the same firm-product-destination.
Table 3.15 shows the results of these estimations. The coefficient of interest is negative, as
expected. Moreover, the magnitude of the competition seems important. On average, as we
approach the monopoly case, firms provide 35 days less of trade credit. Notice that in both
specifications, PCI and market share, when using the full sample, the results are dampened,
39Both arguments do not deliver a direct sign of the bias in the estimation.
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compared to the restricted sample of only trade credit transactions. This effect speaks to
the idea that competition drives the intensive margin of trade credit more than the extensive
margin, at least in the context of international trade.40
Table 3.15: Trade credit and competition - Market Share
Full Sample M > 0
HHI Market Share Market ShareIV HHI Market Share Market ShareIV
Competition -26.394∗∗∗ -22.848∗ -37.770∗∗ -35.292∗∗∗ -32.559∗ -45.672∗∗
(6.848) (12.548) (15.678) (8.781) (17.610) (20.973)
Obs. 7886285 7008117 5717810 6381860 6381860 5259124
R2 .453 .463 .477 .484 .482 .5
F-stat 14491.6 12847.8
Note: Dependent variable is the trade credit maturity in days, M . All regressions include firm controls:
log employment, log equity and log age and Product-2d×Destination×Year fixed effects. First panel is the
full sample. Second panel excludes prepaid transactions. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm ×
destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Finally, prediction 3 states that products that, in principle, require more time to verify
their quality (i.e., low µ) will have a longer trade credit period. To capture the notion of
quality assessment, I will turn my attention to the Rauch (1999) classification of differentiated
products used in the quality estimation. The hypothesis is that it is harder to verify quality
for differentiated goods. Therefore, these products will have longer trade credit periods
than the homogeneous/referenced priced goods. To test this prediction, I will estimate
(3.25), where Xfpdt will be a dummy variable equal to one if the product is differentiated
according to Rauch (1999), zero if not. Table 3.16 shows the result of the estimation. For
the sake of comparison, I estimate a version that only includes destination-year fixed effects.
In this case, differentiated products have a shorter trade credit maturity, which is similar
to the competition estimation.41 Once I control for the type of product (HS 2-digit), the
relationship flips and differentiated goods have 5 to 20 days longer trade credit periods.
40This result does not contradict what Demir and Javorcik (2018) found. In their case, exporters are
choosing mainly between OA and DC, which fundamentally are two different forms of trade credit.
41The correlation between the differentiated product dummy and PCI (market share) is 0.25 (0.23)
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Table 3.16: Trade credit and quality verifiability
Full Sample M > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diff -21.005∗∗∗ 23.215∗∗∗ 5.498∗∗ -19.220∗∗ 22.010∗∗∗ 5.638∗∗
(6.241) (7.206) (2.550) (7.643) (6.552) (2.457)
Dest×Year
Firm Controls
Prod-2d×Dest×Year
Firm×Year
Obs 9464609 7886285 9448375 8535148 7162498 8524639
R2 .141 .454 .795 .128 .469 .82
Note: Dependent variable is the trade credit maturity in days, M . Firm controls include log employment,
log equity and log Age. First panel is the full sample. Second panel excludes prepaid transactions. Robust
standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively.
3.5.3 Additional results
Implied interest rate
Although not a direct implication of the model, using this data set, I can calculate the
implied average interest rate for trade credit. To do this, I follow Schwartz (1974), where
the price under trade credit corresponds to an original price (CIA) corrected for an interest
rate. In other words:
P TC = (1 + r)MPCIA (3.26)
For a more parsimonious estimation and to avoid issues like price seasonality and price
variation due to exchange rate fluctuations, I will estimate the model at the annual level.
This means that, for a given firm, I will define a transaction as the sum of all quantities
exported of a product to a particular destination in a specific year, for a given payment
method. Following this, I will compute the average annual price of said transaction. Finally,
as for the trade credit maturity M , I will use the FOB-weighted trade credit maturity.
To compute the average interest rate relevant for trade credit, I will estimate the following
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equation, for exporters and importers.
log pcfpdt = βXfpdt + γfpdt + εfpdt, where c ∈ {CIA, TC}, (3.27)
where X will be either a dummy equal to 1 if the transaction is paid under some form
of trade credit or directly the trade credit maturity M , and γfpdt is a set of firm×product×
destination×year fixed effects. The identification is given by the difference in price from a
firm selling the same product to a particular destination in a year under two different modes
(trade credit and cash-in-advance) with their different maturities.
Note that equation (3.27) can be obtained by taking logarithms on both sides of (3.26),
in that case β = log(1 + r) ≈ r and logPCIA will be captured by the set of fixed effects that
will capture supply and demand factors that might affect the fundamental price.
Table 3.17: Prices and trade credit
Exports Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
I(TC = 1) -0.033** 0.092** -0.066** 0.042**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
M (in years) -0.059** 0.223** -0.306** 0.323**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016)
log q -0.148** -0.146** -0.231** -0.235**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 52818 52818 52818 52818 897984 897984 897984 897984
R2 .961 .966 .961 .966 .937 .953 .937 .953
Note: Dependent variable is log price. All regressions include firm×product×country×year fixed effects.
First panel is Exporters sample, second panel corresponds to the importers panel. Robust standard errors
are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Table 3.17 shows the estimation results. I divided M that was originally in days by 365.
Thus β will be a measure of the annual interest rate for trade credit. Columns (1) and (3)
for exporters and (5) and (6) for importers show the results from estimating (3.27) directly.
The results are counter-intuitive since they show that prices are lower under trade credit.
One issue with this simple model is that it might omit quantity discounts that firms may
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offer42 and because trade credit transactions are related to larger volumes, this can bias the
estimations. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) control by the volume of a given transaction.
These results indicate that trade credit has an implied interest rate of 22% to 28% (25% to
32%) on average for exporters (importer).43 This interest rate is quite large compared to the
lending rate in US dollars obtained in the Chilean financial sector44 but is comparable to
other estimates related to trade credit, see Petersen and Rajan (1997), Cun˜at and Garcia-
Appendini (2012), and Breza and Liberman (2017) for similar calculations.
Trade Credit and Relationship
Another point stressed by the literature is the importance of the relationship between
producer and retailer in the provision of trade credit. This issue has been discussed by
Antras and Foley (2015), Garc´ıa-Mar´ın, Justel, and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2019), and Justel
(2019). Using the exporters’ data set, I can test the effect of repeated transactions on the
likelihood of trade credit and the number of days of trade credit. One of the drawbacks of
the data set is that it does not include information to identify the foreign buyer, in the case
of exports, and the foreign seller for imports. Because of this, I will consider a transaction
as a combination of firm-product-country.
To study this effect, I follow Piveteau (2019) in his identification strategy. I estimate the
following equation.
Yfpdt = β log Transactionsfpdt + γpdt + γfpt + εfpdt, (3.28)
where Y will be trade credit maturity or a dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction is
cash-in-advance. γpdt captures demand effects that can affect the dependent variable (quality
of institutions, for example), and γfpt will control for supply-side factors (product quality,
42This point has been stressed out by Meleshchuk (2018)
43In this sample, trade credit has effective maturity of 120 days in the case of exporters and 70 days in
the case of importers.
44The lending rate in the 2009-2017 period for credits in US dollars and period greater than 3 months and
less than 6 months was on average 2.4%, with a maximum of 6.1 and a minimum of 1.4%
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size, financial shocks). Figure 3.11 shows a graphical representation of the estimation. As the
figure shows, there is a positive relationship between the number of previous transactions and
the number of days of credit. Antras and Foley (2015), Garc´ıa-Mar´ın, Justel, and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2019), and Justel (2019), also find this pattern in the data, for the provision of
trade credit. They justify this mechanism through learning.
Figure 3.11: Trade credit maturity and previous transactions
Note: Figure corresponds to binned scatter plot of number of days of trade credit vs. log Number of
transactions. Both measures are demeaned at product×destination×year and firm×product×year level
The positive relationship I find can be a mix of extensive and intensive margin effects.
In order to disentangle these margins, table 3.18 shows the full estimation for different sub-
samples or trade credit measures.
This table concludes that the number of transactions affects the extensive margin, the
provision of trade credit, as previously found in the literature, but not the intensive margin,
the number of days. Column (1) shows the positive relationship shown in figure 3.11. Once
transactions under CIA are excluded, column (2) shows that there is no effect of transac-
tions over the maturity of trade credit. To reinforce this idea, column (3) shows the same
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Table 3.18: Trade credit maturity and relationship
Dep var M M > 0 I(CIA = 1)
log # Transactions 1.060∗∗ -0.338 -0.009∗∗
(0.322) (0.332) (0.001)
Obs. 9329621 8435089 9653891
R2 .844 .863 .734
Note: All regressions include product× destination×year and firm×product×year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively.
estimation but using an indicator for a cash-in-advance transactions. This column indicates
that the number of transactions decreases the likelihood of CIA (alternatively, increases the
probability of trade credit provision). It is worth noting that, due to the shape of the log
function, the effect of the first number of transactions is very sharp, but it vanishes as the
number of transactions increases.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a model in which trade credit has two objectives. It serves
effectively as a product quality guarantee and, simultaneously, trade credit acts as a signal
of the quality of the good.
In the model, similar to Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993), product quality, known by the
producer, is not observable by the buyer, but it can be verified over time before payment.
So, the buyer can use the trade credit period to certify the quality of the product. In this
theoretical framework, I show that firms producing low-quality goods will sell with payment
in advance, whereas high-quality goods producers will extend trade credit. Additionally, I
prove that higher quality goods have more extended trade credit periods.
In addition to the relationship between product quality and trade credit, the model
delivers a set of testable predictions. Specifically, the theory suggests firms selling in countries
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with better legal institutions (e.g., the rule of law, contract enforcement) and in markets
with the tougher competition will offer more extended trade credit periods. Also, the model
predicts that firms producing goods that require a long time to verify quality will provide
longer trade credit periods as well.
I empirically test the mechanism and predictions of the model using transaction-level
data for exporters obtained from the Chilean Customs Agency. Trade credit is commonly
used in international trade, and this detailed data set includes a variable that captures the
in how many days a given transaction will be (was) paid. For quality measures, I use two
strategies. Initially, I take and off-the-shelf methodology from Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei
(2013) to estimate quality from the data set. Then, for robustness, I focus my attention on
the wine industry in Chile. I use this industry because several widely accepted proxies for
wine quality can be obtained from the internet (e.g., ratings, awards, retail price, among
others).
I find evidence consistent with the proposed model. As for the main mechanism, I find
that high-quality goods are 8% more likely to be traded under trade credit compared to
low-quality goods. Moreover, high-quality products have, on average, 20 more days of trade
credit.
The additional predictions are also corroborated. Countries with better legal institutions
have five days longer trade credit periods, firms that face higher competition provide 20 to
50 days more of trade credit, and products for which quality is hard to asses have 5 to 20
days longer maturities.
I also find that the implied annual interest rate of trade credit is 25%, on average, quite
high compared to the financial sector, but comparable to other estimations. Additionally, I
find that repeated interactions affect the decision to provide trade credit, as previously seen
in the literature. However, these interactions do not alter the maturity of the trade credit.
This model and its results imply that trade credit is not purely a financial tool for a firm
to get funding, thus explaining the significant difference between the commercial interest
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rate and the trade credit implied interest rate. Firms use trade credit to certify the quality
of the goods they are buying, similar to a standard money-back guarantee. Therefore trade
credit might be favorable for firms since it allows trade.
This mechanism argues for a careful discussion from policymakers when planning for the
regulations of trade credit. Countries like the U.S., France, and Chile have implemented
policies that effectively cap the maturity of trade credit. Authors such as Barrot (2016) and
Barrot and Nanda (2018) show that these policies have positive effects (more competition
through entry increase and exit decrease, increase labor demand), but Breza and Liberman
(2017) prove that these regulations could also have unintended consequences, namely trade
reduction, in both intensive and extensive margin. An exciting avenue for future research is
to embed these ideas into a general equilibrium model to study the welfare effects of regula-
tion and how these effects are related to financial conditions, competition, and institutional
framework.
176
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. Johnson, S. Robinson, J. A. (2001). “The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”. American Economic Review 91.5,
pp. 1369–1401.
Ahn, J. (2011). “A theory of domestic and international trade finance”.
Amiti, M. Weinstein, D. E. (2011). “Exports and financial shocks”. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 126.4, pp. 1841–1877.
Antoniades, A. (2015). “Heterogeneous firms, quality, and trade”. Journal of International
Economics 95.2, pp. 263–273.
Antras, P. Foley, C. F. (2015). “Poultry in Motion: A Study of International Trade
Finance Practices”. Journal of Political Economy 123.4, pp. 853–901.
Bagwell, K. (1992). “Pricing to signal product line quality”. Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy 1.1, pp. 151–174.
Bagwell, K. Ramey, G. (1988). “Advertising and limit pricing”. The Rand Journal of
Economics, pp. 59–71.
177
Bagwell, K. Riordan, M. H. (1991). “High and declining prices signal product quality”.
The American Economic Review, pp. 224–239.
Balachander, S. Srinivasan, K. (1994). “Selection of product line qualities and prices
to signal competitive advantage”. Management Science 40.7, pp. 824–841.
Barrot, J.-N. (2016). “Trade credit and industry dynamics: Evidence from trucking firms”.
The Journal of Finance 71.5, pp. 1975–2016.
Barrot, J.-N. Nanda, R. (2018). “The employment effects of faster payment: evidence
from the federal quickpay reform”. Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management
Working Paper 17-004.
Bernini, F. Gonza´lez, J. Hallak, J. C. Vicondoa, A. (2018). “The Micro-D clas-
sification: A new approach to identifying differentiated exports”. Economı´a 18.2, pp. 59–
85.
Biais, B. Gollier, C. (1997). “Trade credit and credit rationing”. The Review of Financial
Studies 10.4, pp. 903–937.
Brennan, M. J. Maksimovics, V. Zechner, J. (1988). “Vendor financing”. The
journal of finance 43.5, pp. 1127–1141.
Breza, E. Liberman, A. (2017). “Financial contracting and organizational form: Evi-
dence from the regulation of trade credit”. The Journal of Finance 72.1, pp. 291–324.
Broda, C. Weinstein, D. E. (2006). “Globalization and the Gains from Variety”. The
Quarterly journal of economics 121.2, pp. 541–585.
178
Burkart, M. Ellingsen, T. (2004). “In-kind finance: A theory of trade credit”. The
American economic review 94.3, pp. 569–590.
Chen, H. Frank, M. Z. Wu, O. Q. (2005). “What actually happened to the inventories
of American companies between 1981 and 2000?” Management science 51.7, pp. 1015–1031.
— (2007). “US retail and wholesale inventory performance from 1981 to 2004”. Manufac-
turing & Service Operations Management 9.4, pp. 430–456.
Cho, I.-K. Kreps, D. M. (1987). “Signaling games and stable equilibria”. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102.2, pp. 179–221.
Chu, W. Chu, W. (1994). “Signaling quality by selling through a reputable retailer: An
example of renting the reputation of another agent”. Marketing Science 13.2, pp. 177–189.
Cun˜at, V. (2006). “Trade credit: suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers”.
The Review of Financial Studies 20.2, pp. 491–527.
Cun˜at, V. Garcia-Appendini, E. (2012). “Trade credit and its role in entrepreneurial
finance”. Oxford handbook of entrepreneurial finance, pp. 526–557.
Daripa, A. Nilsen, J. (2011). “Ensuring sales: A theory of inter-firm credit”. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3.1, pp. 245–79.
Demir, B. Javorcik, B. (2018). “Don’t throw in the towel, throw in trade credit!” Journal
of International Economics 111, pp. 177–189.
Demirguc-Kunt, A. Maksimovic, V. (2002). “Firms as financial intermediaries: Evi-
dence from trade credit data. World Bank”. Policy Research working paper series 2696.
179
Di Comite, F. Thisse, J.-F. Vandenbussche, H. (2014). “Verti-zontal differentiation
in export markets”. Journal of International Economics 93.1, pp. 50–66.
Djankov, S. La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer, A. (2003). “Courts”. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118.2, pp. 453–517.
Dybvig, P. H. Lutz, N. A. (1993). “Warranties, durability, and maintenance: Two-sided
moral hazard in a continuous-time model”. The Review of Economic Studies 60.3, pp. 575–
597.
Emery, G. W. (1987). “An optimal financial response to variable demand”. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22.2, pp. 209–225.
Fan, H. Li, Y. A. Yeaple, S. R. (2015). “Trade liberalization, quality, and export
prices”. Review of Economics and Statistics 97.5, pp. 1033–1051.
Ferris, J. S. (1981). “A transactions theory of trade credit use”. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 96.2, pp. 243–270.
Fisman, R. Raturi, M. (2004). “Does competition encourage credit provision? Evidence
from African trade credit relationships”. Review of Economics and Statistics 86.1, pp. 345–
352.
Foster, L. Haltiwanger, J. Syverson, C. (Mar. 2008). “Reallocation, Firm Turnover,
and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability?” American Economic Review
98.1, pp. 394–425.
Garc´ıa-Mar´ın, A´. Justel, S. Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. (2019). “Trade credit and
markups”. CESifo Working Paper.
180
Giannetti, M. Burkart, M. Ellingsen, T. (2011). “What you sell is what you lend?
Explaining trade credit contracts”. The Review of Financial Studies 24.4, pp. 1261–1298.
Hausmann, R. et al. (2014). The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to
Prosperity. MIT Press.
Hoefele, A. Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. Yu, Z. (2016). “Payment choice in international
trade: Theory and evidence from cross-country firm-level data”. Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics/Revue canadienne d’e´conomique 49.1, pp. 296–319.
Hyndman, K. Serio, G. (2010). “Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence
from firm-level data in Indonesia”. Journal of Development Economics 93.1, pp. 88–108.
Justel, S. (2019). “Firm Heterogeneity and Trade Credit: Evidence from Chile”. mimeo.
Kaufmann, D. Kraay, A. Mastruzzi, M. (June 2011). “The Worldwide Governance
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues”. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3.2,
pp. 220–246.
Khandelwal, A. (2010). “The long and short (of) quality ladders”. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 77.4, pp. 1450–1476.
Khandelwal, A. Schott, P. Wei, S.-J. (2013). “Trade liberalization and embedded
institutional reform: Evidence from Chinese exporters”. American Economic Review 103.6,
pp. 2169–95.
Klapper, L. Laeven, L. Rajan, R. (2011). “Trade credit contracts”. The Review of
Financial Studies 25.3, pp. 838–867.
181
Knack, S. Keefer, P. (1995). “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures”. Economics & Politics 7.3, pp. 207–227.
Kugler, M. Verhoogen, E. (2011). “Prices, plant size, and product quality”. The Review
of Economic Studies 79.1, pp. 307–339.
Lee, Y. W. Stowe, J. D. (1993). “Product risk, asymmetric information, and trade
credit”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis 28.2, pp. 285–300.
Leibovici, F. (2018). “Financial development and international trade”. mimeo.
Long, M. S. Malitz, I. B. Ravid, S. A. (1993). “Trade credit, quality guarantees, and
product marketability”. Financial management, pp. 117–127.
Lutz, N. A. (1989). “Warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard”. The Rand
journal of economics, pp. 239–255.
Maksimovic, V. Frank, M. Z. (2005). “Trade credit, collateral, and adverse selection”.
Collateral, and Adverse Selection (October 26, 2005).
Manova, K. (2012). “Credit constraints, heterogeneous firms, and international trade”.
Review of Economic Studies 80.2, pp. 711–744.
Manova, K. Zhang, Z. (2012). “Export prices across firms and destinations”. The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 127.1, pp. 379–436.
Marotta, G. (2005). “When do trade credit discounts matter? Evidence from Italian firm-
level data”. Applied Economics 37.4, pp. 403–416.
182
McMillan, J. Woodruff, C. (1999). “Interfirm relationships and informal credit in
Vietnam”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114.4, pp. 1285–1320.
Meleshchuk, S. (2018). “Price Discrimination in International Trade: Empirical Evidence
and Theory”. Mimeo.
Mian, S. L. Smith Jr, C. W. (1992). “Accounts receivable management policy: theory
and evidence”. The Journal of Finance 47.1, pp. 169–200.
Milgrom, P. Roberts, J. (1986). “Price and advertising signals of product quality”.
Journal of political economy 94.4, pp. 796–821.
Moorthy, S. Srinivasan, K. (1995). “Signaling quality with a money-back guarantee:
The role of transaction costs”. Marketing Science 14.4, pp. 442–466.
Muuˆls, M. (2015). “Exporters, importers and credit constraints”. Journal of International
Economics 95.2, pp. 333–343.
Nelson, P. (1974). “Advertising as information”. Journal of political economy 82.4, pp. 729–
754.
Ng, C. Smith, J. Smith, R. (1999). “Evidence on the determinants of credit terms
used in interfirm trade”. The journal of finance 54.3, pp. 1109–1129.
Niepmann, F. Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. (2017). “International trade, risk and the role
of banks”. Journal of International Economics 107, pp. 111–126.
Overgaard, P. B. (1993). “Price as a signal of quality: A discussion of equilibrium concepts
in signalling games”. European Journal of Political Economy 9.4, pp. 483–504.
183
Paravisini, D. Rappoport, V. Schnabl, P. Wolfenzon, D. (2014). “Dissecting the
effect of credit supply on trade: Evidence from matched credit-export data”. The Review
of Economic Studies 82.1, pp. 333–359.
Parlhem, S. (2016). “Kartlaggning av betalningstider i naringslivet (Swedish)”. Memo,
Swedish Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation.
Petersen, M. Rajan, R. (1997). “Trade credit: theories and evidence”. The review of
financial studies 10.3, pp. 661–691.
Pike, R. Cheng, N. S. Cravens, K. Lamminmaki, D. (2005). “Trade credit terms:
asymmetric information and price discrimination evidence from three continents”. Journal
of Business Finance & Accounting 32.5-6, pp. 1197–1236.
Piveteau, P. (2019). “An Empirical Dynamic Model of Trade with Consumer Accumula-
tion”. Mimeo.
Rauch, J. E. (1999). “Networks Versus Markets in International Trade”. Journal of In-
ternational Economics 48.1, pp. 7–35.
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. (2013). “Towards a theory of trade finance”. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 91.1, pp. 96–112.
Schwartz, R. (1974). “An economic model of trade credit”. Journal of financial and quan-
titative analysis 9.4, pp. 643–657.
Schwartz, R. Whitcomb, D. (1979). “The Trade Credit Decision”. Handbook of Finan-
cial Economics, pp. 257–273.
184
Singh, M. (2017). Financial constraints and trade credit as a strategic tool: Evidence from
small-scale reservation reforms in India. Tech. rep. Working Paper.
Smith, J. K. (1987). “Trade credit and informational asymmetry”. The journal of finance
42.4, pp. 863–872.
Spence, M. (1977). “Consumer misperceptions, product failure and producer liability”.
The Review of Economic Studies 44.3, pp. 561–572.
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. MIT press.
Wernerfelt, B. (1988). “Umbrella branding as a signal of new product quality: An example
of signalling by posting a bond”. The RAND Journal of Economics, pp. 458–466.
Wolinsky, A. (1983). “Prices as signals of product quality”. The review of economic studies
50.4, pp. 647–658.
3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Sketch of a proof of proposition 7
The solution of the maximization problem defined by (3.15) can be obtained by solving
the Lagrangian defined as follows:
L = (we−(r+δ∗)M − cH) αH − ηQ− we−r∗M
2
+ σM
+ λ
[
ΠL − (e−µMwe−(r+δ∗)M − cL) αH − ηQ− we−r∗M
2
]
. (29)
Where σ is the Lagrange multiplier for the restriction M ≥ 0 and λ the multiplier related
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to the IC constraint. Taking first-order condition with respect to w and M and after some
algebra, σ can be expressed as:45
σ =
αH − ηQ− we−r∗M
2
(cH − cLeµM)w
2w − (αH − ηQ)er∗M − cLe(r+δ+µ)M[
(r + δ − r∗)− µ(2w − (α
H − ηQ)er∗M − cHe(r+δ)M)
(cH − cLeµM) e
−(r+δ)M
]
(30)
From this expression, two things are worth noting. First, the term outside the brackets
is always positive regardless of the value of µ or M . Secondly, the sign of the expresion
inside the brackets depends on µ. For µ small enough, the term (r + δ − r∗) dominates, and
because of the assumption r + δ∗ > r∗ the whole expression will be positive, which implies
that σ > 0, which means that the restriction M ≥ 0 is binding. Similarly, for sufficiently
large µ, the brackets might turn negative, but because of the nature of Lagrange multipliers,
this cannot happen. Therefore, for µ large enough, the only option for that expression is to
be equal to zero. Thus σ = 0, meaning the restriction M ≥ 0 is slack. This result implies
that the producer optimally chooses to provide trade credit as part of its signal of quality.
Finally, using this last result, imposing σ = 0, I can solve for w obtaining (3.16) .
3.A.2 Existence of pooling equilibrium
Although the existence of the separating is guaranteed, the pooling equilibrium also may
exist.
In a pooling equilibrium, low-quality and high-quality products will be sold under the
same contract. To simplify the analysis, let me assume that in the pooling equilibrium, both
goods are traded at M = 0.
Moreover, let me assume that the retailer knows there is a share λ of the population that
45The steps are: take FOC with respect to w and recover an expression for λ, then take FOC with respect
to M and substitute λ for the previous expression. Finally, collect terms and solve for σ
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sells high quality goods. Defining α¯ ≡ λαH + (1 − λ)αL, with this, the demand from the
retailer for a given wholesale price w will be
q(w) =
α¯− ηQ− w
2γ
.
Focusing on the low-quality producer, for a given price of w, he has incentives to not
deviate from the pooling equilibrium if
ΠLsep ≤ (w − cL)q(w) (31)
where ΠLsep corresponds to the profits of the low quality producer in the separating equilib-
rium, given by (3.11). With this, a low-quality producer will not have incentives to deviate
from the pooling equilibrium if
w ∈
 α¯− ηQ+ cL
2
−
√
8γ(ΠL,maxpool − ΠLsep)
2
,
α¯− ηQ+ cL
2
+
√
8γ(ΠL,maxpool − ΠLsep)
2
 (32)
where ΠL,maxpool ≡ 18γ (α¯− ηQ− cL)2 is the maximum profits a low quality producer can obtain
under a pooling equilibrium.46 Notice that since α¯ > αL, the square root is well defined,
therefore this interval is non-empty.
On the other hand, a high-quality producer faces a similar problem. This producer will
not have incentives to deviate from the pooling equilibrium if
ΠHsep ≤ (w − cH)q(w) (33)
where ΠHsep corresponds to the profits of the high quality producer obtained as the solution
of (3.15)
By symmetry, a high-quality producer will not deviate from pooling if
46It corresponds to the profits as if low quality producer chooses his optimal price.
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w ∈
 α¯− ηQ+ cH
2
−
√
8γ(ΠH,maxpool − ΠHsep)
2
,
α¯− ηQ+ cH
2
+
√
8γ(ΠH,maxpool − ΠHsep)
2
 (34)
where ΠH,maxpool ≡ 18γ (α¯ − ηQ − cH)2. In this case, the condition for a non-empty interval
is not guaranteed. The following lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 2. If ΠH,maxpool < Π
H
sep the pooling equilibrium does not exist.
On the other hand, a pooling equilibrium exists for a given wholesale price w only if
• ΠH,maxpool ≥ ΠHsep,
• A ∩B 6= φ, where A and B are the sets defined by (32) and (34) respectively and
• w ∈ A ∩B.
Since firms may use prices and trade credit to deviate, the existence of the pooling
equilibrium is not guaranteed. In the case that firms only use prices to separate, the pooling
equilibrium will exist if λ is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if the retailer believes that a large
part of the firms is of high-quality, the low-quality firm has incentives to pool. Moreover,
since λ is big enough, the expected demand is close to the perfect information demand for
the high-quality product and high-quality firm (that only uses prices as signal) will not pay
the cost of signaling in the pooling equilibrium.47
3.A.3 Trade credit, quality and competition
Assuming two levels of quality, combining (3.16) and (3.17) and assuming, for simplicity,
cL = 0, the IC constraint can be written as:
8γΠL = (αH − ηQ)2e−(r+δ∗+µ−r∗)M − c2H
(
1 +
r + δ∗ − r∗
µ
)2
e(r+δ
∗−µ−r∗)M
47Remember that when high-quality firms only use prices to signal quality then ΠHsep < Π
L
sep, guaranteeing
the non-empty intersection.
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Using the fact that 8γΠL = (αL − ηQ)2, then M is defined as the solution of
e(r+δ
∗+µ−r∗)M =
(αH − ηQ)2
(αL − ηQ)2 + c2H
(
1 + r+δ
∗−r∗
µ
)2
e(r+δ∗−µ−r∗)M
(35)
Figure 3.A.1: Solution of the model
(a) µ > r + δ + r∗ (b) µ < r + δ + r∗
Note: Solid line corresponds to the left side of (35) and dashed line to the right hand side.
As figure 3.A.1 shows the LHS is upward sloping, whereas the RHS is upward (downward)
sloping if µ > (<) r + δ − r∗. A couple of things worth noting. First, since the LHS is
unbounded, whereas the RHS is bounded as M → ∞48, M > 0 only if (αH − ηQ)2 ≥
(αL − ηQ)2 + c2H
(
1 + r+δ
∗−r∗
µ
)2
. Secondly only the right-hand side depends explicitly on
quality (cH , α
H) and competition (ηQ). Therefore, provision of trade credit, the relationship
between M and quality and the relationship between M and competition are completely
defined by (35) and are described in the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. If µ sufficiently high then M > 0
Lemma 4. If quality increases then M increases.
48Either this expression goes to 0 or
(
αH−ηQ
αL−ηQ
)2
> 0 depending on µ < (>) r + δ − r∗.
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Lemma 5. If µ ≥ r + δ − r∗ and ∆α > c2H
αL
(
1 + r+δ
∗−r∗
µ
)2
then M increases with ηQ for
ηQ ∈ [0, κ], for some κ < αL
The proof of the lemma 3 comes from the fact that since ∆α > ∆c = cH , then for µ
sufficiently high, ∆α > cH
(
1 + r+δ
∗−r∗
µ
)
, adding αL− ηQ on both sides and squaring them,
I find the condition for M > 0. Similarly, lemma 4 relies on ∆α > ∆c. Meaning, as we
increase quality, the cost does not increase as much, then the increase in the numerator will
always be greater than the increase in the denominator. Then, the RHS of (35) shifts up,
delivering a larger M .
The proof of the final lemma is less intuitive and I need to calculate the derivative of
the RHS of (35) with respect to ηQ. Then, this expression will be increasing in ηQ if
∆α >
c2H
αL−ηQ
(
1 + r+δ
∗−r∗
µ
)2
e(r+δ
∗−µ−r∗)M and it will be decreasing otherwise.
The former condition will be satisfied for values of ηQ ∈ [0, κ] if µ ≥ r + δ − r∗ and
∆α >
c2H
αL
(
1 + r+δ
∗−r∗
µ
)2
.
In other words, lemma 3 states the existence of the separating equilibrium for a sufficiently
high µ. The next lemma describes the fact that trade credit maturity (and with more reason
wholesale prices) are increasing as the traded good is of higher quality. This increasing signal
deters the low-quality firm from mimicking the increasingly higher quality producer.
The final lemma says that if the difference in quality is sufficiently high or the rate of
which information of bad quality arrives is high enough, firms that face tougher competition
will provide more extended trade credit periods. Notice that this condition will fail for suffi-
ciently high levels of competition (the term
c2H
αL−ηQ grows with ηQ), thus the non-monotonic
relationship between competition and trade credit maturity.
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3.B Additional Tables
Table 3.B.3: Trade credit maturity and quality - Firm size
σ = σp σ = 5 Rating Avg Rating log price log Avg price Award Bulk
Quality 3.652∗∗ 0.872 0.941 1.592∗ 1.561 3.773∗∗ 10.530∗∗∗ -13.403∗∗
(1.829) (1.415) (0.874) (0.852) (1.813) (1.691) (2.178) (5.520)
logN 4.210∗∗∗ 5.876∗∗∗ 7.464∗∗∗ 8.057∗∗∗ 10.662∗∗∗ 8.569∗∗∗ 5.668∗∗∗ 6.179∗∗∗
(1.400) (1.728) (2.520) (2.568) (2.367) (2.412) (1.950) (1.999)
Obs. 1529460 1531287 894492 910119 752403 1120481 1531896 1531896
R2 .189 .186 .208 .225 .314 .226 .19 .187
∆M 30.562 7.780 9.406 15.918 5.561 12.463 10.530 -13.403
Note: Rating and price corresponds to the rating and final price of a particular wine-vintage. Avg Rating
and Avg price are respective average ratings and final prices for a wine over vintages. Award and Bulk
are dummy variables with value 1 if wine earned an award or if it is a bulk wine. All regressions include
grape×destination×year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗,
∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Table 3.B.4: Trade credit maturity and quality - Excluding CIA transactions
σ = σp σ = 5 Rating Avg Rating log price log Avg price Award Bulk
Quality 2.599 0.813 0.983 1.604∗ 1.622 3.901∗∗ 10.682∗∗∗ -15.167∗∗∗
(1.965) (1.531) (0.912) (0.895) (1.866) (1.757) (2.246) (5.513)
logN 3.978∗∗∗ 5.082∗∗∗ 6.795∗∗∗ 7.454∗∗∗ 10.146∗∗∗ 7.949∗∗∗ 4.837∗∗ 5.336∗∗
(1.483) (1.821) (2.623) (2.667) (2.455) (2.509) (2.058) (2.112)
Obs 1466235 1468024 864234 880313 730753 1082685 1468574 1468574
R2 .18 .179 .207 .224 .315 .224 .183 .18
∆M 21.482 7.100 9.833 16.035 5.779 12.885 10.682 -15.167
Note: Rating and price corresponds to the rating and final price of a particular wine-vintage. Avg Rating
and Avg price are respective average ratings and final prices for a wine over vintages. Award and Bulk
are dummy variables with value 1 if wine earned an award or if it is a bulk wine. All regressions include
grape×destination×year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗,
∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
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Table 3.B.5: Quality and Likelihood of Trade Credit - Month
logN σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp
Quality -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 8616460 2276519 2276519 2006583
R2 .563 .702 .701 .707
∆I(CIA = 1) -0.064 -0.180 -0.135 -0.096
Note: All regressions include product×destination×year×month fixed effects. σp is the product-specific
elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). logN is corresponds to the log of employment. Robust
standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively.
Table 3.B.6: Trade credit maturity and quality - Month
logN σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σp
Quality 2.593∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗
(0.775) (0.286) (0.135) (0.230)
Obs. 8616460 2276519 2276519 2006583
R2 .655 .723 .723 .737
∆M 22.109 31.509 20.583 37.973
Note: All regressions include product×destination×year×month fixed effects. σp is the product-specific
elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). logN is corresponds to the log of employment. Robust
standard errors are clustered at firm × destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively.
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Table 3.B.7: Trade credit maturity and transportation mode
Full Sample M > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Air -5.939∗∗∗ -5.117∗∗∗ -4.292∗∗ -3.951∗∗
(1.952) (1.929) (1.944) (1.921)
Ground -12.646∗∗∗ -11.763∗∗∗ -9.673∗∗∗ -9.289∗∗∗
(3.101) (3.195) (3.138) (3.247)
Rest -5.580 -7.600 -6.455 -1.135
(6.306) (8.147) (6.884) (9.032)
log q 0.571∗∗∗ 0.207
(0.219) (0.212)
Obs 9360070 9073179 8461144 8220031
R2 .81 .807 .833 .83
Note: The benchmark transportation mode is waterborne. Air is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
product was transported by air. Ground will be 1 if the good was transported by land. Rest will be 1 if is
the good is transported by alternatives like a pipeline or train. These products are minimal. All regressions
include firm×product×year and destination×year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm
× destination level. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
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3.C Additional Figures
Figure 3.C.1: Trade credit maturity and proxy
Note: The bars represent the exact trade credit period for a subsample and the dashed-line is the distribution
of the measure of trade credit used throughout the paper.
Figure 3.C.2: Trade credit maturity and quality - Including months
(a) σ = 5 (b) σ = σp
Note: Both figures are binned scatter plots of number of days of trade credit vs. quality measured as
the residual of (3.20) demeaned by product×destination×year×month. Left panel estimates quality using
demand elasticity of 5 and right panel using the demand elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006)
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